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71.
Rahul Savani Bernhard von Stengel 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2006,74(2):397-429
The Lemke–Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. This paper presents a class of square bimatrix games for which this algorithm takes, even in the best case, an exponential number of steps in the dimension d of the game. Using polytope theory, the games are constructed using pairs of dual cyclic polytopes with 2d suitably labeled facets in d‐space. The construction is extended to nonsquare games where, in addition to exponentially long Lemke–Howson computations, finding an equilibrium by support enumeration takes on average exponential time. 相似文献
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基于合作博弈的易腐性产品运输设施选择的费用分配 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
易腐性产品的价值会随着时间而损失,运输易腐性产品时,客户除了支付运输费用外还需要承担产品的价值损失。本文把易腐性产品的价值损失和运输费用之和作为总费用,应用合作博弈理论,把易腐性产品的运输设施选择的费用分配问题构造成费用分配博弈,证明了在易腐性产品线性价值损失的情况下,运输设施选择博弈的核心非空,且为子模博弈,并讨论核仁、夏普利值、τ-值等解。论文最后讨论了有约束运输的设施选择的费用分配博弈的解的情况,说明其核心也许为空,并提出了进一步研究的方向。 相似文献
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产业集群内双寡头企业合作创新博弈分析 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
在A-J模型的基础上,引入产业集群内双寡头企业间的距离衰减系数变量,采用3阶段博弈,分析技术创新企业间的距离对技术创新水平和产品市场的影响,分析企业在博弈中的决策,以及决策条件和效果,为产业集群内企业技术合作创新决策提供依据。博弈第1阶段是企业在产业集群内的创新合作对象选择,决定相互之间的距离;第2阶段是企业技术创新水平决策;第3阶段是企业在产品市场上进行古诺竞争决定产量。 相似文献
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William R. Zame 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2007,75(5):1453-1500
This paper takes steps toward integrating firm theory in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Grossman and Hart (1986), contract theory in the spirit of Holmstrom (1979), and general equilibrium theory in the spirit of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1959). In the model presented here, the set of firms that form and the contractual arrangements that appear, the assignments of agents to firms, the prices faced by firms for inputs and outputs, and the incentives to agents are all determined endogenously at equilibrium. Agents choose consumption—but they also choose which firms to join, which roles to occupy in those firms, and which actions to take in those roles. Agents interact anonymously with the (large) market, but strategically within the (small) firms they join. The model accommodates moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and insurance. Equilibria may be Pareto ranked. 相似文献
80.
The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods. 相似文献