网络群体事件政府治理的演化博弈分析

利用演化博弈模型预测舆论的发展趋势,对政府应对网络群体事件采取的治理模式进行了研究.在一般化复制动态模型基础上建立网络群体事件舆论的传播方程,将地方政府部门与弱势群体的策略互动和行为演化融入到传染病传播模型中,用以模拟舆论的扩散和收敛过程.结果表明:在网络群体事件初期,如果弱势群体通过抗争获得政府补偿的概率不断增大,将造成事态的扩大.此时,地方政府应控制信息的交流程度与初始抗争人数,减缓舆论的扩散;在网络群体事件舆论大范围扩散阶段,上级政府介入并采取惩罚措施,及时披露信息,促使网络舆论的收敛平息,实现社会福利最大化.     

研发团队社会资本对创新绩效作用路径——心理安全和学习行为整合视角

一方面,研发团队作为企业创新活动的基本单位,对提升企业创新能力起着关键作用;另一方面,如何有效管理研发团队以促进创新,在现实中又面临严峻挑战.基于团队心理安全和学习行为整合视角,以151个研发团队585个研发成员为样本,实证研究研发团队社会资本对创新绩效的作用路径.研究结果表明:研发团队3维社会资本(结构、认知和关系)对创新绩效均具有显著的积极影响,团队学习行为部分中介团队心理安全与创新绩效的关系;团队心理安全部分中介团队社会资本与学习行为的关系;团队心理安全和学习行为分别部分中介团队结构资本、认知资本与创新绩效的关系,完全中介团队关系资本与创新绩效的关系.     

工程项目中社会资本对合理风险分担的影响研究

经济活动总是嵌入在一定社会关系中的,因此,任何一个工程项目风险分担的合理性都应在社会资本的视域下考察与判断.本文通过理论分析构建工程项目中社会资本对合理风险分担的影响模型,并以30个成功建设项目为样本采集到126份有效数据,运用结构方程模型的方法进行实证分析.研究结果表明:(1)风险分担可分解为缔约阶段的风险初次分担和履约过程中的风险再分担,二者之间具有显著的互补与联动关系;(2)社会资本对风险初次分担的完备程度产生显著反向影响,而对事后支持制度产生显著正向影响,且对事后支持制度的总效应相对较大;(3)社会资本对风险再分担的规模与实施效率均产生显著正向影响,且对风险再分担的实施效率总效应最大.本研究有利于引导工程项目交易双方根据社会资本制定更为合理的风险分担方案,从而促使项目成功.     

制度落差、社会资本与跨国公司海外子公司合法性

组织合法性是制度理论的核心概念,是影响跨国公司海外子公司生存和发展的关键因素.将跨国公司海外子公司的社会资本分为内部社会资本和外部社会资本,将海外子公司合法性划分为内部合法性和外部合法性,分析海外子公司社会资本对其合法性的影响机理,进而揭示制度落差在跨国公司海外子公司社会资本与其合法性关系间的调节作用,提出相应的理论命题,以期拓展组织合法性理论,并为越来越多进行跨国经营的中国企业提供理论参考.     

企业与非营利组织社会联盟实施战略分析

依托资源依赖、组织学习、新制度主义等视角,在识别企业与非营利组织社会联盟构成维度和类型的基础上,探索了企业与非营利组织社会联盟实施战略的决策依据和过程,构建“初始条件-治理过程-联盟绩效”的整体研究框架,并识别出可能影响联盟战略实施的情境特征.     

基于社会媒体的股票行为预测

通过社会媒体信息预测股票行为已经成为近年来金融和知识管理等领域的研究热点。考虑到社会媒体参与人员和讨论话题的多样性,传统的基于整体层面分析社会媒体信息来预测股票行为的方法过于粗糙。本文根据社会媒体信息在写作风格和内容特征上的不同,利用文本特征提取技术、主成分分析法、EM聚类技术等分析参与社会媒体的干系人和他们关注的话题。进一步,我们针对每类干系人和话题,从信息活动强度和情感倾向两个方面提取四个社会媒体变量构建股票行为的回归预测模型,用以分析各干系人和话题在社会媒体上的活动状况对公司股票行为的影响。最后,本文以雅虎金融论坛的Bank of America板块为实验平台进行实验研究,验证了所提出方法的有效性和实用性。     

Shared Ownership and Affordable Housing: A Political Solution in Search of a Planning Justification?

Planners in England routinely include shared ownership (SO) housing in the affordable housing element of new developments. Government policies in a number of European countries have also backed intermediate housing market mechanisms as a solution to housing affordability. The rhetoric of such mechanisms makes claims about its social progressiveness, its role in facilitating socio-economic mobility and helping people move from rented accommodation into full owner-occupation. SO schemes in England have been justified on the grounds of being transitional tenures and planners have accepted SO on this basis. However, given the paucity of rigorous empirical work, there is a concern that this is a policy based on assumption rather than evidence. This paper delineates existing knowledge, clarifies dimensions of the intermediate housing market and highlights underlying policy issues based on a large data-set of shared owners in England. Our analysis indicates that SO may not be appropriately classified as affordable housing, and justifiable policy requires further evidence.     

Supply Chain Consequences of Subsidies for Corporate Social Responsibility

The use of government incentives tied to market prices as means of boosting corporate social responsibility (CSR) has expanded notably in recent decades. Enhanced business tax deductions for charitable donations and credits for conservation easements are notable cases. While providing incentives for socially desirable behavior to achieve legislative goals has intuitive appeal, the broader economic consequences are not always fully understood. In this study, we examine such wider consequences for supply chains when subsidies for CSR are offered. One effect we identify is that since incentives are typically tied to market value, firms have not only an added incentive to achieve societal objectives (say by donating inventory) but also an incentive to raise output (retail) market prices. A second consequence is that since firms forgo potential revenues by engaging in socially desired behavior, they become increasingly sensitive to supplier pricing; in an uncoordinated supply chain this leads to input (wholesale) price concessions. Among other things, the results underscore that incentives put in place to meet broader societal objectives also have notable ramifications for suppliers, retailers, and consumers in primary markets.     

Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks

We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social network. We show that the question of whether or not the agents learn efficiently depends on the topology of the social network. In particular, we identify a geometric “egalitarianism” condition on the social network that guarantees learning in infinite networks, or learning with high probability in large finite networks, in any equilibrium. We also give examples of nonegalitarian networks with equilibria in which learning fails.