企业年金积累期的最优动态资产配置策略

替代率是评价企业年金基金投资效果的重要指标之一.本文构建了与替代率挂钩的目标基金,建立了基于目标的企业年金基金最优资产配置模型,利用随机动态规划方法获得了年金基金最优投资策略的解析解,并通过蒙特卡洛模拟技术对所得结果进行数值模拟,考察了不同市场环境及不同群体的最优配置策略和最优策略对可控制参数的敏感性.结果表明:模型中参数对年金基金的最优配置策略各有不同影响,不同群体和不同金融市场中的最优策略也有差异,但总体而言最优资产配置策略具有高风险资产权重随着时间推移而降低的动态特征.     

城市路网运输性能退化成本评估模型

路网的运行受到诸多因素的影响而使得路网运输性能发生退化,分析了路网运输性能退化的影响因素和作用机理,给出了路网运输性能退化及退化的极端情况路段失效的成本分析过程框架.基于BPR路阻函数和用户均衡分配理论分析路网运输性能退化的成本函数,建立了拥堵情况下城市路网路段失效的成本评估模型.最后,通过实例分析了路网运输性能退化对出行成本影响的变化规律,给出了路网运输性能退化的极端情况路段失效成本评估的具体过程,研究表明路网运输性能退化对出行成本具有很大的影响,二者成显著的正相关关系.     

我国卷烟消费额影响因素分析

文章分析了影响我国居民卷烟消费的主要因素,并对我国卷烟消费额函数进行了实证研究。结果表明,人均收入和卷烟销售价格是影响我国卷烟消费额的主要因素。     

人力资源投入与地方经济的动态关系探索

本文以生产函数为基石,分析广东省1997-2007人力资源投入和固定资产投资对经济增长的影响,得出结论：广东省人力资源投入和固定资产投资都会对经济增长产生影响,但人力资源投入影响效果更大,并建议政府和企业应加大教育投入和人力资源开发力度。     

基于最大熵方法测算生产要素间的定量关系

劳动力素质偏低一直是制约我国经济发展的主要因素,作为最主要的生产要素,劳动力素质的提高一直受到广泛的关注。本文以最大熵方法为基础,结合已有的研究结论,给出了固定资产投入的增长与劳动力素质的增长之间的定量关系,并根据我国1993-2003年的相关数据进行了定量计算,求得了在固定资产投入的年均增长率为12.77352%时,劳动力素质的相应的提高就为6.2%。     

在Excel中应用随机函数模拟多服务台单队列排队系统

计算机模拟是研究排队论问题的一个重要手段,可以选择的软件有很多,本文提出了一种基于Excel的简便方法。选用Excel中的随机函数,配合以自然对数函数,以两服务台单队列为例,模拟排队系统。     

氮元素施用与农户粮食生产效率:来自全国农村固定观察点数据的证据

本文采用2003～2015年全国农村固定观察点的大样本数据,构建相关随机效应模型(Correlated Random Effect)尽可能降低传统随机前沿生产函数中一步法的内生性问题,实证分析氮元素施用对农户家庭层面"加总"粮食生产效率的影响。在清理数据的过程中,本文对全国农村固定观察点数据可能存在的面板数据衔接偏误问题进行纠正,进一步检验了计量分析结论的稳健性。研究结果表明,中国农户粮食生产过程中氮元素施用过量,对粮食生产效率具有显著的负向影响,且这一结论是稳健的。氮元素施用对粮食作物生产效率的负向影响存在着异质性,对不同经营规模农户的影响效果是显著的,但对不同区域农户的影响效果并不显著。基于实证研究结论,本文提出了适当降低氮元素施用量的政策建议,即为农户施肥提供技术指导,深入推进化肥减量化和有机肥替代行动,健全化肥相关管理条例与科学施用的指导办法。     

基于犹豫直觉模糊语言集均值-标准差偏好距离的多属性决策研究

在犹豫直觉模糊语言集和语言尺度函数的基础上定义了均值-标准差偏好的Hamming距离，并提出了基于犹豫直觉模糊语言集距离TOPSIS和TODIM的多属性决策方法，进一步利用这两种方法对实例问题建筑商的招标方案进行排序，并讨论了偏好参数对排序结果的灵敏度分析。为验证上述方法的有效性，与已有方法对同一实例的排序结果进行了比较分析。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

半参数空间ZISF的估计、分类与蒙特卡罗模拟

零无效率随机前沿模型（ZISF）包含随机前沿模型和回归模型,两模型各有一定的发生概率,适用于技术无效生产单元和技术有效生产单元同时存在的情形。本文在ZISF的生产函数中引入空间效应和非参函数,并假设回归模型的发生概率为非参函数,构建了半参数空间ZISF。该模型可有效避免忽略空间效应导致的有偏且不一致估计量,也避免了线性模型的拟合不足。本文对非参函数采用B样条逼近,使用极大似然方法和JLMS法分别估计参数和技术效率。蒙特卡罗结果表明：①本文方法的估计精度和分类精度均较高。随着样本容量的增大,精度增加。②忽略空间效应或者非参数效应,估计精度和分类精度降低,文中模型有存在必要性。③忽略发生概率的非参数效应会严重降低估计和分类精度,远大于忽略生产函数的非参数效应的影响。