Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules

With three candidates and an odd number n of voters, let Q(n, λ, p) be the probability that the winning candidate under the point-total rule that assigns 1, λ, and 0 points respectively to each first, second, and third-place vote is the same as the simple majority candidate, given that there exists a simple majority candidate, when each voter independently selects a linear preference order on the candidates by a common probability distribution p on the six linear orders on the candidates. With Q(n, λ) = Q(n, λ, p) when p assigns probability $\text{1}\text{6}$ to each order, the λ values that maximize Q(n, λ) for small n consist of open intervals in [0, $\text{1}\text{2}$]. Using quadrivariate normals, a computational form is developed for the limiting probability Q(λ) = lim_n→∞Q(n, λ). The function Q(λ) = Q(1 ? λ) for each λ ? [0, 1] and is differentiable with Q(λ) strictly increasing as λ goes from 0 to $\text{1}\text{2}$. The maximum value $\text{Q(}\text{1}\text{2}\text{)}$ is approximately. 901189. Effects of nonuniform p distributions on Q(n, λ, p) are also discussed.     

事业单位绩效工资改革的成功经验与启示——以C县人民医院为例

C县人民医院通过绩效工资改革获得了巨大发展,不仅收入提高,患者满意度大幅度提升,而且核心竞争力也迅速增强;C县医院绩效工资改革具有4条成功经验,包括全员、全过程、全方位的变革,广泛调研和访谈,坚持公开、公平、公正、透明的原则,进行组合绩效与组合改革,运用KPI技术将复杂问题简单化,并将考核结果与工资、升迁、福利等通联,而且责任到岗、人人必须有考核等;同时还得到6条启示,如关键在于抓"领头羊",在于"激励"管理,在于高效率的沟通,并建立社会效益第一的崇高目标和消费者(病人)满意(服务价格满意、服务质量满意,服务环境满意等)的最终目标,这是事业单位绩效工资改革与企业改革的最重要区别。     

Civic Action,Historical Agency,and Grassroots Advocacy: Historical Inquiry Into Freedom Summer

Abstract

In this article, the authors discuss how to explore the agency of ordinary citizens using local institutions to combat Jim Crow segregation laws during Freedom Summer. Primary sources from Miami (OH) University website about Freedom Summer and Susan Goldman Rubin's trade book ground the inquiry. Through the series of activities discussed, middle school students utilize the steps of the Inquiry Arc in the C3 Framework to analyze primary and secondary sources about Freedom Summer to determine how ordinary citizens took civic action to address the economic, social, cultural, and political inequalities of Jim Crow segregation laws. These experiences equip students with the knowledge and skills to be change agents in their own communities.     

Knowing what I should, doing what I want: From selfishness to inequity aversion in young children’s sharing behavior

The social utility model suggests that people feel more satisfied with equal divisions of resources than from inequitable outcomes, even when the latter favors oneself. Research examining children’s behavior has shown that the tendency to share half of one’s endowment increases with age between the ages of 3 and 8. However, the satisfaction the children derive from their decisions (to share half of their endowments) has yet to be examined. I present two studies (using the dictator and ultimatum games) suggesting that young children (5-6 years old) are aware of the norms of fairness but choose to act selfishly and prefer not to share. Slightly older children aged 7-8 adopt these norms in their actual behavior but do not feel happier when they share half of their endowments than when they share less than half. Finally, true inequity aversion only appears at the ages of 9-10, when children not only give more, but they correspondingly also feel better when their endowments are equally divided.     

What’s in a frame? Goal framing,trust and reciprocity

Economists often rely on the Berg et al. (1995) trust game, or variants thereof, to identify levels of trust and reciprocity, which are fundamental to discussions of social capital. But to what extent is behavior in this game sensitive to the way the instructions are framed? We use the Berg et al. trust game played for ten rounds with random re-matching to study this. We implement a number of variations in the way the game is presented to subjects. We show that levels of trust, reciprocity and returns to trust are significantly higher under “goal framing”, which highlights the conflict inherent in the game, between self-interest and maximizing social surplus. Furthermore, with such framing, trust measured via the experimental game exhibits significant positive correlation with trust measured via the Social Values Orientation questionnaire.     

Revealing side effects of quota rules on group cooperation

The quota rule in employment is a legal tool to promote gender equality in professions and positions where women are underrepresented. An accompanying assumption is that gender diversity positively affects one of the aspects of team performance in form of group cooperation. However, it is unclear whether this positive effect can be achieved if diversity increases due to a quota rule. In two fully incentivized experiments involving a real-effort task (N₁ = 188 and N₂ = 268), we examined the impact of quotas as compared to performance-based promotion on group cooperation. We thereby categorized participants either with regard to gender or to an artificial category that was randomly assigned. Cooperation within groups declined when promotion was based on quota compared to performance-based promotion, irrespective of the categorization criterion. Further analyses revealed that this negative effect of quota rules on cooperation is not driven by procedural fairness perceptions or expectations about performance of the promoted group member. Implications of the results for the implementation of equality and diversity initiatives are discussed.     

The effects of female employment status on the presence and number of children

The main concern of this paper is to analyze the effects of female employment status on the presence and number of children in households in the Netherlands. For this purpose a hurdle count data model is formulated and estimated by the generalized method of moments. The hurdle takes explicitly into account the interrelationship between female employment status and timing of first birth. The number of children, once children are present in the household, is modeled conditional on female employment status. The empirical results show that female employment status is a major determinant of the presence and number of children in households: employed women schedule children later in life and have fewer children compared to nonemployed women, holding educational attainment constant. After controlling for female employment status, the educational attainment of both the woman and the man in the households are found to have relatively small effects on the presence and number of children. Received: 3 November 1998/Accepted: 22 September 1999     

Modeling female fertility using inflated count data models

For modeling complete female fertility we propose a zero-and-two-inflated count data model, which accounts for a relative excess of both zero and two children. As the underlying distribution of counts we use the standard Poisson distribution and the more general Gamma count distribution. We compare our proposed model with standard count data models by using data on complete fertilities for a sample of Swedish women. The preferred specification for Swedish fertility data is the zero-and-two inflated Gamma count data model. The estimated “extra” probabilities of zero and two children, when modelled as individual specific probabilities, vary substantially across individuals, with mean of 0.05 and 0.16, respectively. These extra probabilities show that women who formed a family later in life have a higher probability of being childless, and women of our youngest cohort have a higher probability of forming a two-child family. Received: 7 January 1999/Accepted: 19 May 1999     

基于3C的科技企业孵化器动态绩效评价模型

科技企业孵化器的绩效评价具有动态特征,科技企业孵化器绩效评价模型必须遵循一般规律。现有的科技企业孵化器绩效评价的模型存在各种优缺点及应用难点,基于3C的科技企业孵化器动态绩效评价模型能够解决这些对应的难点。合理的数据来源是绩效评价的基础,测算过程举例能够指导基于3C的科技企业孵化器动态绩效评价模型的应用,而且通过具体的数值运算亦能说明如何应用二次相对绩效评价模型测算科技企业孵化器的二次相对绩效。