LACK OF COMMITMENT AND THE LEVEL OF DEBT

The tendency of countries to accumulate public debt has been rationalized in models of political disagreement and lack of commitment. We analyze in a benchmark model how the evolution of public debt is affected by lack of commitment per se. While commitment introduces indeterminacy in the level of debt, lack of commitment creates incentives for debt to converge to specific levels. One of the levels that debt often converges to implies no debt accumulation at all. In a simple example we prove analytically that debt converges to zero, and we analyze numerically more complex models. We also show in an imperfect credibility setting that a small deviation from full‐commitment is enough to obtain these results.     

秦朝禁儒运动质疑

秦朝重法,以法为至尊,但并不排儒,“焚书坑儒”不等于禁儒,儒学在秦朝政治生活中起到了相当重要的作用。把“焚书坑儒”等同于禁儒是一种历史的误解。     

基于单片机控制的编织袋折边折角装置设计

为提高编织袋折边折角的自动化水平和效率,更好地与编织袋缝纫工序结合起来,文章设计了基于单片机控制的编织袋折边折角装置.首先利用Pro/E 4.0设计了编织袋折边折角装置的机械结构三维模型,然后在Microsoft Office Visio中设计了该设备的气动系统,最后利用AT89C51单片机对该套设备进行设计与控制.结果表明,这套编织袋折边折角装置结构紧凑合理,成本控制在1万多元,单片机控制系统稳定有效,整个折边折角动作耗时在6 s左右,效率较高,能够真正提高编织袋折边折角自动化水平,具有很高的工程实践价值.     

基于021 半无限规划的新产品开发计划方法

开发新产品, 加速产品更新换代, 是企业持续经营和不断发展的重要手段. 近年来随着 C IM S 技术的不断发展, 生产管理集成化程度的提高, 只对产品作定性的分析已远远不能满足 企业发展的需要. 本文提出一种新产品开发计划的定量分析方法. 该方法将所有产品分为四种 具有不同收益曲线与参数的产品类型. 每种类型产品的曲线参数由其经济特性确定. 在产品量 化描述的基础上, 给出了一种利用021 半无限规划(021 S IP) 制订新产品开发计划的数学模型 方法.     

LETTING DOWN THE TEAM? SOCIAL EFFECTS OF TEAM INCENTIVES

This paper estimates social effects of incentivizing people in teams. In three field experiments featuring exogenous team formation and opportunities for repeated social interactions, we find large team effects that operate through social channels. In particular, assignment to a team treatment increases productivity by 9%–17% relative to an individual incentive treatment, even though the individual incentive yields a higher private return. Further, we find that in a choice treatment individuals overwhelmingly prefer the individual incentive to the team incentive, despite the latter being more effective. These results are most consistent with the team effects operating through guilt or social pressure as opposed to pure altruism.     

Leadership with Imperfect Monitoring

This paper provides experimental evidence on how monitoring intensity shapes the impact of leadership instruments like leading-by-example and punishment. The results show that, with low monitoring intensity, neither leading-by-example nor punishment increases cooperation if the leader can already send nonbinding signals about desired behavior. We identify two different reasons for this effect. Regarding leading-by-example, it is the cautiousness of the leader. Leaders are reluctant to recommend cooperative behavior and act accordingly, even though followers are particularly reciprocal in this context. Regarding punishment, it is the level of monitoring that matters. Monitoring of individual follower behavior increases the cooperation of leaders and followers across all treatments, but in particular, if the leader can punish uncooperative behavior. This result implies that monitoring in itself does not have a negative impact on the inclination to cooperate. It suggests that any motivational crowding out effect derives from a leader’s choice of monitoring, as it signals low trust in the followers. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications.     

The value of a firm’s engagement in ESG practices: Are we looking at the right side?

Firms allocate many resources to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues and to growth options as if they were independent sources of value. Challenging this view, this paper explores the interplay of a firm's engagement in ESG practices and growth options in determining its total value. We draw upon real options reasoning to explain how ESG practices can carry two opposite (trust-enhancing and risk-reducing) forces, driving an inverted U-form relationship between ESG performance and growth options value. Moreover, we argue that ESG performance and growth options are likely to build substitutive insurance mechanisms which might exert a negative moderating effect of growth options on the relationship between ESG performance and a firm's total value. Empirical analyses of ESG scores and growth options values on a panel of U.S. firms from 2009 to 2018 provide substantial support for our hypotheses. Our results show that the inverted U-form relationship between ESG performance and growth options value becomes stronger for the environmental and social pillars. Our evidence on the moderating effect of growth option values also provides valuable insights for interpreting prior conflicting empirical evidence on the association between ESG performance and a firm's total value.     

SOCIAL COMPARISON AND EFFORT PROVISION: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT

Social comparison has potentially far reaching consequences in many economic domains. We conducted a field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers' effort provision if their own wage or that of a co‐worker is cut. Workers were assigned to groups of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both group members' wages caused a decrease in performance. But when only one group member's wage was cut, the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers' wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison among workers affects effort provision because the only difference between the two wage‐cut treatments is the other group member's wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member's pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers' wages remained unchanged. This indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort.     

What's Wrong with Risk Matrices?

Risk matrices—tables mapping "frequency" and "severity" ratings to corresponding risk priority levels—are popular in applications as diverse as terrorism risk analysis, highway construction project management, office building risk analysis, climate change risk management, and enterprise risk management (ERM). National and international standards (e.g., Military Standard 882C and AS/NZS 4360:1999) have stimulated adoption of risk matrices by many organizations and risk consultants. However, little research rigorously validates their performance in actually improving risk management decisions. This article examines some mathematical properties of risk matrices and shows that they have the following limitations. (a) Poor Resolution . Typical risk matrices can correctly and unambiguously compare only a small fraction (e.g., less than 10%) of randomly selected pairs of hazards. They can assign identical ratings to quantitatively very different risks ("range compression"). (b) Errors . Risk matrices can mistakenly assign higher qualitative ratings to quantitatively smaller risks. For risks with negatively correlated frequencies and severities, they can be "worse than useless," leading to worse-than-random decisions. (c) Suboptimal Resource Allocation . Effective allocation of resources to risk-reducing countermeasures cannot be based on the categories provided by risk matrices. (d) Ambiguous Inputs and Outputs . Categorizations of severity cannot be made objectively for uncertain consequences. Inputs to risk matrices (e.g., frequency and severity categorizations) and resulting outputs (i.e., risk ratings) require subjective interpretation, and different users may obtain opposite ratings of the same quantitative risks. These limitations suggest that risk matrices should be used with caution, and only with careful explanations of embedded judgments.     

孤桑好勇独撑风——抗战初期陈独秀在武汉的活动述论

抗战爆发后,陈独秀从南京出狱后来到武汉,积极投身到抗日的洪流中。他主张坚持持久抗战,拥护国共合作的统一战线,这些都是爱国主义的表现。在处理与国民党、中共及托派的关系上,他拒绝国民党的拉拢,对托派不屑与之为伍,对中共则心情复杂,关系紧张。武汉这段时期的活动对陈独秀后期的政治思想产生了重要影响,也造就了他作为孤独的反对派的最终命运。