洛克和卢梭的契约政府理论比较

契约观念在古希腊智者时代就已经出现了,但第一个系统地运用契约理论解释民主政府起源的是洛克,在欧洲大陆,卢梭也用契约理论解释了道德社会与民主政府的起源。本文旨在比较洛克、卢梭二人的政府起源理论,并在此基础上阐述古典契约理论的贡献与不足。     

对“西门子现象”的法律思考——谈《劳动合同法》第22条的适用

《劳动合同法》颁布实施以来,为保护劳动者权益作出了不可磨灭的贡献。但与此同时,在劳动争议案件中由培训费纠纷引起的"西门子现象"显得非常突出。作为解决这类纠纷的法律依据,《劳动合同法》第22条在司法实践中面临着严峻的考验。要做到正确适用此条款裁判案件,必须对其中涉及的"培训","培训费用","服务期"等相关术语有准确的解读。     

股东至上论质疑

企业的不完全契约理论不是根据企业性质的变迁来解释真实的企业世界,只是充当了一个论证“股东至上”的工具。以新制度经济学为基础、物质所有权至上的主流企业理论,由于其逻辑上的内在缺陷,其理论假设和实际应用等方面,越来越遭受到了多方面的挑战、质疑和批判。本文从理论和实践两个方面进行分析和论证,认为随着上市公司中所有权和控制权的分离,在绝大多数情形下,股东并不负责管理公司,也不提供资本或接受负债,没有理由保有对企业所创造的大部分财富的所有权。将劳动者们劳动创造的绝大部分分给投机者们,这其实是违反了市场原则。只有把财富和利润分到它的创造者手中的时候,效率才能得到最大化的满足。     

组织行为对管理者感知心理契约违背的影响

本研究运用512个中国管理者样本检验了组织沟通、组织公正和人力资源管理行为对管理者感知心理契约违背的影响。研究发现组织沟通对管理者感知心理契约违背不存在显著影响；直接上司沟通对管理者感知管理型心理契约违背存在负向影响。对关系型心理契约违背存在正向影响；程序公正对管理者感知管理型心理契约违背有负向影响,对管理型和交易型心理契约违背有正向影响；人际公正对管理者感知管理型和关系型心理契约违背有负向影响；人力资源管理实践对管理者感知心理契约违背有负向影响。     

Capability,Quality, and Performance of Offshore IS Vendors: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Investigation

Information systems (IS) offshoring has become a widespread practice and a strategic sourcing choice for many firms. While much has been written by researchers about the factors that lead to successful offshoring arrangements from the client's viewpoint, the vendor's perspective has been largely scarce. The vendor perspective is equally important as offshore IS vendors need to make important decisions in terms of delivering operational and strategic performance and aligning their resources and processes in order to meet or exceed targeted outcomes. In this article, we propose and test a three‐level capability–quality–performance (CQP) theoretical framework to understand vendor outcomes and their antecedents. The first level of the framework represents three vendor capabilities: relationship management, contract management, and information technology management. The second level has three mediating variables representing process quality: partnership, service, and deliverable quality. The third level has three dependent variables representing vendor outcomes: operational performance, strategic performance, and satisfaction. The model was tested with 188 vendor firms from India and China, the two most popular destinations for IS offshoring. Results support the CQP framework; vendor capabilities are significant predictors of intermediate quality measures, which in turn affect vendor outcomes. Implications of the study findings to both theory development and IS offshore vendor strategic decision making are discussed.     

Risk Mitigation Benefit from Backup Suppliers in the Presence of the Horizontal Fairness Concern

The backup supply strategy is demonstrated as an effective approach to mitigating supply risk. We study a supply chain in which a leader manufacturer designs a contract to a potential backup supplier to mitigate the yield uncertainty of the primary supplier. In this context, the backup supplier may compare with the primary supplier and have horizontal fairness concerns. We model the contract design problem using a Stackelberg game and characterize the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and backup supplier, in both fairness and off‐fairness settings. The theoretical results show that the leader manufacturer must sacrifice his own payoff to balance the payoffs of both suppliers. As a result, using a self‐interested backup supplier is the dominating strategy, whereas using a fair‐minded backup supplier is only suggested when the reliability of the primary supplier is low and the fairness concern of the backup supplier is not strong. Additionally, the backup supplier only benefits from fairness concerns when the level is not exceeding a threshold value. With regard to high fairness levels beyond this threshold, fairness concern has negative effects on the monetary payoff and even might lead to loss of the business. By conducting laboratory experiments, we provide evidence of the horizontal fairness concern from the backup supplier. Further, we show that if the primary supplier also has horizontal fairness concerns, the leader manufacturer can conditionally benefit from a promoted yield reliability due to an extra effort from the primary supplier.     

Channel Coordination for a Supply Chain with a Risk‐Neutral Manufacturer and a Loss‐Averse Retailer*

This articles considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single manufacturer is selling a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. It differs from traditional supply chain contract models in two ways. First, while traditional supply chain models are based on risk neutrality, this article takes the viewpoint of behavioral principal–agency theory and assumes the manufacturer is risk neutral and the retailer is loss averse. Second, while gain/loss (GL) sharing is common in practice, there is a lack of analysis of GL‐sharing contracts in the supply chain contract literature. This article investigates the role of a GL‐sharing provision for mitigating the loss‐aversion effect, which drives down the retailer order quantity and total supply chain profit. We analyze contracts that include GL‐sharing‐and‐buyback (GLB) credit provisions as well as the special cases of GL contracts and buyback contracts. Our analytical and numerical results lend insight into how a manufacturer can design a contract to improve total supply chain, manufacturer, and retailer performance. In particular, we show that there exists a special class of distribution‐free GLB contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and retailer; in contrast with other contracts, the parameter values for contracts in this class do not depend on the probability distribution of market demand. This feature is meaningful in practice because (i) the probability distribution of demand faced by a retailer is typically unknown by the manufacturer and (ii) a manufacturer can offer the same contract to multiple noncompeting retailers that differ by demand distribution and still coordinate the supply chains.     

Quantity Flexibility Contract in the Presence of Discount Incentive

We design a new contract, which we refer to as the QFi contract, that combines the quantity flexibility (QF) mechanism and the price‐only discount incentive. Under the QF contract, the buyer does not assume full responsibility for the forecast, yet the supplier guarantees the availability of the forecasted quantity and extra buffer inventory. In contrast, the price‐only discount contract places full inventory burden on the buyer. We show that the proposed QFi contract effectively balances the inventory risk for both the buyer and the supplier considering both the QF and discount mechanisms. We also show that the QFi contract is able to achieve supply chain coordination. More importantly, the QFi contract's coordinating price scheme does not require knowledge of demand distribution. We identify areas where the buyer and supplier may both benefit from implementing the QFi contract as opposed to the extant QF or price‐only (wholesale) discount contractual decisions in a decentralized supply chain. We also specify the conditions under which supply chain coordination can be achieved in a win‐win manner. We conclude with managerial implications and provide directions for future research.     

悬赏广告法律制度探析

从发布广告的悬赏者角度划分,悬赏广告可以分为私人所为的悬赏和政府所为的悬赏,私人所为的悬赏理论界始终有两种对立的观点契约说和单独行为说.从利益平衡角度考虑,单独行为说更好地兼顾了悬赏人与行为人的利益,因此采单独行为说应是我国立法的趋向.在具体的制度设计上,法律应赋予行为人报酬请求和赔偿请求权,以保护其权益.同时对悬赏金额设置最高限额,起到道德促进作用.     

被逐渐放逐的卢梭：以梁启超的认知为中心

有＂中国的卢梭＂之称的梁启超,对卢梭思想进行了有力宣传。就他对卢梭思想的认知而言,经历了明显的变化过程：在1900年前是全盘颂扬;从1900年至1902年对卢梭思想的推崇较为审慎,其间进行过详尽的学理分析,还表露了些微的异议;自1903年起开始质疑并逐渐走向否定,最终则完全抛弃了卢梭思想。