The effect of particularism on corruption: Theory and empirical evidence

This paper investigates the role played by the cultural norm of particularism, as opposed to universalism, for collusive bribery. In our theoretical framework, the act of proposing or demanding a bribe violates a commonly held social norm, thus producing a psychological cost. By lowering this psychological cost, particularism increases the probability of offering or asking for a bribe. We test the predictions of the model by using individual-level data for 25 countries from the European Social Survey. Consistent with the theory, particularism is found to have a positive causal effect on the probability of offering a bribe. Overall, our findings indicate that policies aimed at favoring universalism may provide an effective tool to reduce corruption.     

我国经济转型中的两极分化与反腐败

经济转型以来,用基尼系数来衡量,我国已由一个收入分配绝对平均的社会迅速进入一个收入差距急剧扩大、贫富两极分化不断发展的社会。腐败与此直接相关。从价格双轨制腐败到金融证券腐败,从国企腐败到税收流失腐败,再到地下经济腐败,各种腐败大大加剧了我国经济转型中的贫富两极分化。遏制两极分化的发展势头,缩小乃至最终消除两极分化,必须坚定不移地大力反腐败。     

影响力交易罪若干问题研究

影响力交易罪是《联合国反腐败公约》中规定的一项腐败领域中的新罪名。它具有交易主体的广泛性、交易行为的多样性、交易的双向性与惩罚的双向性、交易的隐蔽性等特征。影响力交易罪是行为犯,存在未遂状态。法人也可以构成影响力交易罪。强烈建议在刑法中规定影响力交易罪。     

新形势下腐败对高校的冲击

教育事业的特殊性决定了人们对高校腐败的特别关注和忧虑。主要阐述了新形势下高校腐败的特点、成因 ,并提出了预防高校腐败的相应对策 :建立效率制度 ,推行校务公开 ,从源头上防止腐败 ;进行与市场经济相匹配的制度改革 ,依靠制度遏制学术腐败 ,深化财务管理 ,强化对易发生腐败部门的监督 ;加大惩罚力度 ,提高腐败成本 ,遏制腐败     

从国家起源看权力腐败与防治

腐败和公共权力密切相关 ,并和公共权力始终相伴。人的贪欲是人的一种非理性的欲求 ,一旦假借公共权力 ,为自己谋求私利 ,腐败便产生了。腐败并不可怕。防治腐败的关键是建立有效的公共权力制约监督机制。     

论我国反腐败刑事司法协助中的证人制度——以《联合国反腐败公约》为视角

反腐败刑事司法协助是国际打击与惩罚腐败犯罪的重要制度之一.证人制度是其中不可或缺的组成部分.《联合国反腐败公约》对刑事司法协助中的证人制度规定较为具体,如电视会议作证方式、污点证人作证、证人作证刑事责任豁免制度等.我国仅在《刑事诉讼法》中规定了普通刑事案件的证人制度,在刑事司法协助中的证人规定上存在明显不足.以《联合国反腐败公约》为视角,梳理该公约对刑事司法协助证人制度的规定,指出我国制定《刑事司法协助法》、引入高科技作证方式、构建污点证人及证人作证刑事责任豁免制度等具有迫切的现实必要性.     

2010～2011年突尼斯变革:起因与现状

2010年12月17日,突尼斯"茉莉花革命"爆发后,总统本.阿里带家人离境,飞抵沙特阿拉伯,结束了其长达23年的统治。随后,在突尼斯变革的"雪球效应"的影响下,埃及、利比亚、也门、叙利亚以及其他阿拉伯国家相继发生了反政府的变革。本文着重探讨导致2010～2011年突尼斯变革的内外原因,阐述变革后突尼斯的政局现状并展望其未来走向。     

Multi‐stakeholder Groups for Better Sector Performance: A Key to Fighting Corruption in Natural‐Resource Governance?

Multi‐stakeholder groups – involving representatives from civil society, government and the private sector — are increasingly seen as a means of promoting improved service delivery and operational performance in natural‐resource sectors. Although the intention is to promote dialogue, learning and collaboration towards agreed goals and the implementation of standards for better sector governance and performance, the impact of these initiatives will be shaped by members' incentives and external constraints. This article describes how incentive incompatibilities will prevent the group from effectively addressing fundamental problems in the sectors, such as corruption. Multi‐stakeholder groups can be a viable forum for debate, but should not be expected to perform a role in fighting corruption in natural‐resource management.     

Subnational Institutions and Location Choice of Emerging Market Firms

I examine how subnational institutions of emerging markets affect the location choice of emerging market firms. I argue that the weak institutions in emerging markets push firms to acquire the skills needed for survival in unfavorable institutional environments. When they start their international venturing, such knowledge, skills, and capabilities will become their unique advantage, which makes them more resilient to red tape, nepotism, and corruption in the host countries. Using a sample of 143 outward FDI events of Chinese multinationals, I test the relationship between subnational institutions at home and firm propensity to enter a target market with weak institutional systems and found robust empirical support for the use of different estimation strategies. Further, my results demonstrate that the effect of subnational institutions at home on location choice is more pronounced in private enterprises compared to state-owned enterprises. This study reveals the importance of home country effects in location choice research and tests empirically the existence of institutional advantage.