造假、治假的非合作博奕分析

简要介绍了我国假冒伪劣产品的现状及其带来的危害。应用非合作博奕理论，通过建立博奕模型，分析了假冒伪劣产品产生的根源和治理对策，并给出了对执法打假部门相应的奖励系数和对政府领导相应的罚款系数。     

我国主题公园借网络游戏寻求新发展的思考

当前中国主题公园的发展面临诸多问题和重重困境,其中最为关键的问题是因缺乏鲜明特性和缺乏主题的再创造性而吸引不到足够的游客。主题公园可以利用网络游戏拥有的众多游戏迷,利用网络游戏的系列性、延展性,通过一定的合作机制,达到增加游客,不断创新主题,从而实现稳定发展的目的。     

开发区类企业的企业化博弈演进分析

基于我国开发区发展瓶颈现象和一个动态博弈模型，指出开发区类企业所具有的特殊的企业形态．该类企业在开发区初创阶段，以完成政府的效用为其义务．政府在开发区发展的各个阶段，其效用函数是不同的．当政府的期望效用基本完成之后，就应当逐渐退出其行政控制．由于政府的政绩诉求和权威惯性，其行政控制的退出往往比较迟缓．通过开发区类企业与政府的利益博弈，开发区类企业逐步完成其纯企业化的过程．这种博弈引发的交易成本可能使得开发区类企业的纯企业化过程时间过长，从而导致整个过程的非效率性．     

International Tax Competition: A Case for International Cooperation in Globalization

The liberalization of international financial flows and foreign direct investment has induced countries to use diverse measures to attract inflow of foreign capital and foreign direct investment, which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of GDP and thus a positive effect on social welfare. Tax exemption, reduction of tax rate, tax holiday, or diverse subsidies are some of the most important measures used. In this paper we study international tax cooperation, i.e., countries change and especially reduce tax rate for corporate income or for asset revenues to attract inflow of foreign direct investment. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown the sensibility of foreign direct investment decision with respect to tax rate differences between home countries and host countries. In general, more inflow of foreign direct investment can be expected if the tax rate of the home country is lower than that of foreign countries. This is the main reason for international tax cooperation. In this paper we propose a simple model to prove the sub-optimal Nash non cooperative solution in a two-country tax-competition game. The model shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the participating countries. How to reach a cooperative solution for an international tax competition game (ITCG) is therefore an important issue for further discussions and studies. International institutions can play a crucial role to reach international tax cooperation or international tax harmonization.     

论KTV业与唱片业之利益冲突与解决

本文通过分析KTV业和唱片业在版权利益和经济利益方面的冲突,认为两个行业本应是互利关系,其利益冲突是可以调和的,解决之道应是双方在博弈中互利。同时提出了一些解决的建议,期能对冲突的解决有所裨益。     

中国商业银行间存款保险制度博弈分析

通过存款保险制度下商业银行之间的博弈分析证明:一国的市场纪律约束、监管手段与水平都影响着存款保险的实施效果,良好的监管制度有利于存款保险制度带来的积极效应发挥,否则,可能给金融体系带来更大的风险。由于我国监管制度不完善,信息披露机制匮乏,银行经营不透明,造成存款保险制度带来的道德风险难以控制,所以建立存款保险制度,完善我国的监管制度和提高我国监管水平、政策执行能力显得十分必要。     

WAPI之争的不完全信息博弈实质分析

WAPI(无线局域网加密标准)是中国针对国外标准存在的安全隐患,自主研发的对国外的主流标准构成强有力的挑战的无线局域网标准。该标准从宣布强制推行到再宣布推迟执行,充分反映了当今中国无线局域网市场上中外标准竞争的实质。基于产业组织理论的市场进入和阻止理论,分析了WAPI之争潜在的“连锁店悖论”性质,揭示了WAPI之争的不完全信息博弈实质,并据此探讨了我国在这场标准竞争中运用政策和策略的合理性。     

数字媒体时代的国外游戏文化研究述评

游戏和关于游戏文化的研究传统深厚。数字媒体技术促进了网络游戏的蓬勃发展,国外关于数字媒体时代的游戏研究已成为专门的研究门类,产生了一大批游戏学家。国外的游戏文化研究大致形成了三种研究范式,即以内容和叙事分析的研究方法探析游戏和社会现实的关系,以理论辨析和案例分析的研究方法理性勾勒现实生活游戏化的若干情况,以调查访谈的研究方法分析游戏玩家的身份认同。借鉴国外游戏学成果,植根中国网络游戏领域,中国的游戏文化研究大有可为。     

Three pseudo-paradoxes in ‘quantum’ decision theory: Apparent effects of observation on probability and utility

In quantum domains, the measurement (or observation) of one of a pair of complementary variables introduces an unavoidable uncertainty in the value of that variable's complement. Such uncertainties are negligible in Newtonian worlds, where observations can be made without appreciably disturbing the observed system. Hence, one would not expect that an observation of a non-quantum probabilistic outcome could affect a probability distribution over subsequently possible states, in a way that would conflict with classical probability calculations. This paper examines three problems in which observations appear to affect the probabilities and expected utilities of subsequent outcomes, in ways which may appear paradoxical. Deeper analysis of these problems reveals that the anomalies arise, not from paradox, but rather from faulty inferences drawn from the observations themselves. Thus the notion of quantum decision theory is disparaged.     

不同决策模式下农产品质量控制策略研究

农产品质量已经引起公众的广泛关注。考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的两级农产品供应链,构建零售商主导下的Stackelberg分散决策博弈模型和两者协同合作下的集中决策博弈模型,以供应商和零售商的最优质量努力水平为状态变量,利用逆向求解法得出供应商和零售商的最优质量决策。研究表明:在一定条件下,农产品供应链中主体的合作可以实现供应商、零售商和整个供应链系统利润的Pareto改善,在此基础上分析实现Pareto改善的条件以推动农产品供应链达到协调。