工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

以政务诚信引领全社会诚信建设的对策与思考

国务院颁布《社会信用体系建设规划纲要（2014—2020年）》后，各省、市分别结合本地的特点制定了信用体系建设规划纲要，将全社会的诚信建设纳入规划。针对社会诚信建设的需要，在分析我国当前社会诚信缺失的基础上，提出了加强政务诚信建设，通过政务诚信建设示范引领全社会诚信建设的对策建议。     

Reputation spillover effects from grant‐providing institutions

There is a broad academic discussion about the impact of funding grants from a foundation or a government department on individual support intentions toward the nonprofit organization receiving the grant. However, the role of the grant provider's reputation has frequently been overlooked. In this study, we experimentally tested whether there is a reputation spillover effect of a grant‐providing organization. Based on a real‐life example, we asked citizens to rate their willingness to donate to a nonprofit organization, and we experimentally manipulated the available information on funding sources. We test this for both a government department and a foundation as a grant provider. Our results suggest that not the act of receiving a grant, but the citizens' awareness about the funding organization—at least in the case of a foundation—has an impact on support intentions. In contrast, for a prominent government department as a grant provider, we did not find support for a reputation spillover effect.     

A class of partially linear transformation models for recurrent gap times

In this article, we propose a general class of partially linear transformation models for recurrent gap time data, which extends the linear transformation models by incorporating non linear covariate effects and includes the partially linear proportional hazards and the partially linear proportional odds models as special cases. Both global and local estimating equations are developed to estimate the parametric and non parametric covariate effects, and the asymptotic properties of the resulting estimators are established. The finite-sample behavior of the proposed estimators is evaluated through simulation studies, and an application to a clinic study on chronic granulomatous disease is provided.     

Promoting sustainable development through civil society: A case study of the EU’s NSA/LA thematic programme in Kyrgyzstan

The article focuses on the contribution of the European Union (EU) in promoting sustainable development through the involvement of civil society in partner countries. More specifically, it analyses the main features and outcomes of the projects implemented by civil society organizations (CSOs) in Kyrgyzstan under the EU thematic programme Non‐State Actors and Local Authorities in Development (NSA/LA). Despite its importance—this is the only EU programme providing direct support to non‐state actors and local authorities engaged in poverty reduction—to date, there has been very little research on the functioning of this instrument on the ground. This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature by examining the EU’s contribution to sustainable development through a case study on Kyrgyzstan. The study is based on primary data: 10 semi‐structured interviews conducted with the EU‐funded organizations implementing the NSA/LA programme. The NSA/LA projects were analysed by considering two major fields of engagement of non‐state actors in the development process: as service providers and as advocates (Banks & Hulme, 2012). Overall, the organizations awarded EU support were not only focused on fulfilling short‐term needs but also sought to introduce new ways of dealing with poverty and inequality, positioning themselves between the “Big‐D” and the “little‐d” approaches to development (Bebbington, Hickey, & Mitlin, 2008). Nonetheless, the EU‐funded projects were too limited and fragmented to be able to sustain long‐term structural change. Therefore, the EU should place new emphasis on creating synergies between new and old structures at the grassroots level and establishing mechanisms and bodies that could merge and co‐ordinate their efforts. In addition, the calls for proposals could highlight the need to share the lessons learnt by “obliging” the beneficiaries to act as multipliers and to pass on their positive experience to neighbouring communities. Finally, the EU could stimulate the funded organizations to experiment with innovative mechanisms of involvement in the policy‐making process, by making this aspect a mandatory requirement of the projects implemented with its support.     

无产阶级政权建设规律的初步探索

马克思从揭示人类社会发展规律的角度,通过对世界上第一次出现的无产阶级政权——巴黎公社的分析和总结,阐述了科学社会主义政权建设理论,提出了一些基本政治原则。他指出:建立一个真正的人民国家是无产阶级专政的基础和前提;以责任制廉价政府代替官僚等级制政府是其主要形式;以议行合一原则取代分权制衡原则的权力分配形式可以保证国家机构的政治效能。中国共产党在长期执政实践中积累了丰富的执政经验,党的十九大提出中国特色社会主义已进入新时代。在此契机下重新研读马克思经典著作,对认识和把握中国共产党执政新飞跃、实现国家治理体系和治理能力现代化有着重大现实意义。     

社会变迁过程中政府能力的政策学解读--基于系统论观点

中国正处于巨大的社会变迁之中，复杂性与不确定性的环境特征对政府能力提出了更高要求。从系统论的视角看，政府能力体现在政府对变迁中社会环境的反应、适应与变革能力。基于系统论的政策学解读，政府能力最终可以归为“制定”和“执行”公共政策的能力。从环境与组织管理的关系出发，围绕公共政策的生命过程，可以分别考察政府在输入、转化、输出三个环节中政策制定和政策执行的情况，进而探讨政府能力提升的路径。     

近代城市空间改造的时空进程

近代城市人口的增长、城市职能的变化、市政机构的出现带来了城市空间的转变。２０世纪初，中国开始了大范围的城市基础设施改造与新建。其中最有代表性的是拆城、填濠、修筑环城马路的工程，此后全国大部分的城市改造都遵循了相似的模式。本文通过对近１２００座治所城市城墙变动信息的研究发现，２０世纪大规模的城市空间改造最初主要从东南沿海省份开始，３０年代末至４０年代的战争打破了这一过程，但随着新中国成立后城市建设的恢复，空间改造的进程继续向西部省份推进，总体上呈现由东向西，由中心向边缘发展的特点。     

Dimension reduction via local rank regression

Outer product of gradients (OPG) achieves dimension reduction via estimating the gradients of the regression function. In this paper, we propose two novel OPG estimators via local rank regression: the rank OPG estimator and the Walsh-average OPG estimator. Both proposals guard against a wide range of error distributions, and are safe alternatives to existing OPG estimators based on local linear regression or local L1 regression. The effectiveness of the new proposals are demonstrated via extensive numerical studies.     

家电下乡政策的消费效应评估——基于全国221个村庄的4年跟踪调查

以全国221个村庄所获得的4年调查数据作为研究基础,对"家电下乡"政策的消费效应予以评估和分析。调查表明,家电下乡政策消费效应的最大特征是农民消费需求的释放,其中包括全国消费总额的上升,户均消费额增幅达到8成,全国各地消费总量和户均消费数量的增加。但家电下乡政策的消费效应在实践中也遇到了持续性疲软的难题,如农民收入的限制作用,农民购买下乡产品比重偏低,政府补贴额和补贴程序不足,政策宣传和解说不到位。为了使家电下乡政策的消费效应持续起效,必须不断完善政策,使家电下乡政策的实惠真正落实到农民身上。