北京奥运废弃物物流管理对策研究

废弃物物流是衡量奥运会是否成功举办的重要因素.依据奥运废弃物物流特性、历届奥运会废弃物物流管理实践和北京奥运废弃物物流规模,提出了重视分类收集、完善运作模式等建议,可以为主管部门制定北京奥运废弃物物流管理政策提供支持.     

适应网格环境的物流网络研究

随着物流网络这一概念的明确,对物流网络运行环境特性与对应发展模式等问题的探索已接踵而至.本文论证了物流网络应与将逐步兴起的网格环境协调发展的合理性,并展开了对物流网络与网格环境协调发展的框架结构、网络服务资源管理等一些关键问题的进一步分析.     

北京市配送中心的选址研究

运用聚类分析对北京市配送中心的选址问题进行研究，北京市应将配送中心的地理位置确定为：海淀四道口、丰台玉泉营、莱广营、楼梓庄、青年路、久敬庄、海淀清河、丰台五里店，这样不但减少了配送中心的个数，而且在满足需求、提高服务水平及节约成本等方面也更具合理性。     

企业资源外包运作与管理研究

资源外包是企业培育和提升核心能力以获取持续竞争优势的一种战略行为.在归纳总结西方学者资源外包概念研究的基础上,进一步界定了资源外包内涵,划分了资源外包类型,分析了资源外包动因,从外包准备、外包业务确定、外包商选择以及外包分析与建议等方面研究了资源外包决策,针对外包实施中存在的问题,从管理组织模式和外包关系管理两个方面提出了成功实施外包的建议,并构建了一个六阶段外包运作与管理框架.     

物流网络的内涵分析

物流网络是适应物流系统化和社会化的要求发展起来的,是由物流组织网络、物流基础设施网络和物流信息网络三者有机结合而形成的物流服务网络体系的总称.物流网络具有服务性、开放性、外部效应和信息主导性等基本特征.物流组织网络是物流网络运行的组织保障;物流基础设施网络是物流网络高效运作的前提和条件;物流信息网络是物流网络运行的重要技术支撑,这三个子网络各有其丰富的内涵.     

企业物流外包中选取物流供应商的应用研究

本文针对企业物流外包问题,提出了选取物流供应商的一些指标因素.基于这些指标因素,给出了一种应用三角模糊数互补判断矩阵选取物流供应商的决策方法,并结合示例对该决策方法进行验证,为企业物流外包决策提供理论依据.     

中国企业品牌建设的困境与突破方向

“代工生产”发展模式形成的严重后果是使做为接受“代工”的中国企业只对产品进行低端加工,既没有技术创新,又没有自主知识产权的知名品牌,信息来源和销售渠道完全依赖海外供应商和进口商,赚取的只是低廉的手工费。加入“世贸”以后,中国企业尤其是东南沿海的制造业应从以资源消耗型的发展转向以创建自有知识产权为核心的企业品牌建设,其中,应主要解决企业自身观念的滞后和体制因素带来的障碍,通过推动国际品牌建设,实现中国企业的产业升级。     

中国IT服务外包企业能力研究

基于企业能力理论与价值链分析,建立了适合我国国情的中国IT服务外包企业能力评价模型;通过对北京市近40家IT服务外包企业的实地访谈与问卷调查,分析了中国IT服务外包企业的能力现状及存在问题;结合理论研究与实证分析,提出了提升中国IT服务外包企业能力的对策建议。     

On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer

This study investigates a supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM), in which the CM acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to the OEM. The two parties can engage in one of three Cournot competition games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the CM as the Stackelberg leader. On the basis of these three basic games, this study investigates the two parties' Stackelberg leadership/followership decisions. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are exogenously given, either party may prefer Stackelberg leadership or followership. For example, when the wholesale price or the proportion of production outsourced to the CM is lower than a threshold value, both parties prefer Stackelberg leadership and, consequently, play a simultaneous game in the consumer market. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are decision variables, the competitive CM sets a wholesale price sufficiently low to allow both parties to coexist in the market, and the OEM outsources its entire production to this CM. This study also examines the impact of the supply chain parties' bargaining power on contract outcomes by considering a wholesale price that is determined via the generalized Nash bargaining scheme, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium to be sustained when the CM's degree of bargaining power is great and the non‐competitive CM's wholesale price is high.     

Analysis of the Market‐Based Adjustable Outsourcing Contract under Uncertainties

The market‐based adjustable contract for customized goods or services has emerged in outsourcing practices. Its objective is to minimize the operational risks inherent in today's volatile environment of operations. Our research reveals several important properties of this contract through a continuous‐time analytical approach. Specifically, we consider the determination of this contract between two risk‐averse firms through a Nash bargaining process. We derive the optimal adjusting mechanism analytically and extensively analyze the application boundary of the market‐based adjustable outsourcing contract. We conclude by discussing implications for practice and research.