物流定义探讨

我国现有国家标准的物流定义是＂物流功能论＂与＂物流管理论＂混合的物流定义。根据大物流理论,本文提出新的物流定义：＂物流是物的实体流动;由物质M、流动F、主体O、地域R、时间T、信息I六要素组成;有自然界、社会界和经济界物流三大类;除了自然界物流外,经济界和社会界物流一般包括运输、储存、装卸搬运、流通加工等四个基本的实体环节。＂笔者把它称为＂大物流论＂的物流定义。根据该定义,不仅运输、储存、装卸搬运和流通加工的有机结合属于物流的范畴,其中单独一项也属于物流的范畴,但反之不然。     

供电企业滥用市场支配地位行为的法律规制

纵向一体化的经营模式使得供电企业拥有了市场支配地位,而法制建设的相对滞后以及监管体制的不尽完善又使得供电企业滥用市场支配地位的行为时有发生。供电企业滥用市场支配地位的行为不仅损害了电力用户的合法权益,也阻碍了电力市场的有效竞争。为了维护电力用户的合法权益,促进电力市场的有效竞争,必须加快电力体制改革,完善相关的法律制度,进一步强化监管体制。     

考虑不同碳排放处理模式的动态供应商选择及采购批量问题研究

不同的碳排放处理模式及不确定的市场需求等因素影响下,如何选择供应商并确定采购批量直接影响企业的运营和效益。本文在多时间周期、多产品种类、多供应商及随机需求情形下,同时考虑不同碳排放处理模式,分析动态供应商选择及采购批量等最优决策问题,构建混合整数非线性规划模型。通过设计变异算子和扰动因子来改进粒子群算法,力求在短时间内求解大规模决策问题。针对不同规模供应商选择及采购批量决策问题,采用精确方法、近似方法和改进粒子群算法求解。数值实验验证了模型及改进粒子群算法的有效性和可行性,分析了碳税、碳交易价格及碳限额对供应链管理的影响,并给出了供应商选择及碳排放处理的决策参考建议。     

Supplier quality assessment to identify depth technical knowledge of component reliability

As a result of global competition, international companies that manufacture photocopiers, printers or car navigation systems have to purchase low-cost electronic components such as semiconductors and hard disk drives by outsourcing production. However, it is often difficult for these companies to evaluate the quality of their suppliers through interviews and technical documentations. This article proposes new measures for supplier assessment and a systematic approach to select suppliers that have in-depth knowledge of component reliability and technology. The measures for selection not only include the physical quality of components but also information disclosures provided by suppliers, which consist of failure analysis, reliability data and details of the design-manufacturing process. The proposed measures are applied to real data of photocopier manufacturing enterprises. Experiments conducted show that a systematic assessment will enable selecting appropriate suppliers with a lower failure rate.     

A Multi‐Supplier Sourcing Problem with a Preference Ordering of Suppliers

We study a sourcing problem faced by a firm that seeks to procure a product or a component from a pool of alternative suppliers. The firm has a preference ordering of the suppliers based on factors such as their past performance, quality, service, geographical location, and financial strength, which are commonly included in a supplier scorecard system. Thus, the firm first uses available inventory from supplier 1, if any, then supplier 2, if any, and so on. The suppliers differ in costs and prices. The buyer firm seeks to determine which suppliers to purchase from and in what quantities to maximize its total expected profit subject to the preference ordering constraint. We present the optimal solution to this problem, and show that it has a portfolio structure. It consists of a sub‐set of suppliers that are ordered by their underage and overage costs. This portfolio achieves a substantial profit gain compared to sourcing from a unique supplier. We present an efficient algorithm to compute the optimal solution. Our model applies to component sourcing problems in manufacturing, merchandizing problems in retailing, and capacity reservation problems in services.     

论产品质量纠纷中供货者的责任

供货者处在产品流通过程的中间环节，不同于流通链条两端的生产者与销售者，在产品质量纠纷中具有特殊法律地位，为避免过多“内部求偿”之诉讼浪费，不必与生产者或销售者就产品缺陷损害承担连带责任，而应采取相对法定责任的模式。现行产品质量法关于供货者与销售者的规定含混不清，不利于消费者群体及各方合法权益的平衡，必须对供货者的责任分担作出具体明晰的规定。     

On the Same Page? How Asymmetric Buyer–Supplier Relationships Affect Opportunism and Performance

Research on buyer–supplier relationships (BSRs) has often focused on only one side of the relationship and, thus, has tended to overlook asymmetries. Yet, a buyer (supplier) may often deal with a bigger supplier (buyer) or one that has higher levels of trust, respect, and reciprocity. Therefore, we examined how two types of asymmetries—size and relational capital—affect perceived opportunism and performance. We used dyadic data from 106 buyers and their matched suppliers gathered from a survey and an archival database. The results demonstrate that the degree and direction of both asymmetries affect the BSR. Our results also reveal that an imbalance of relational capital in a firm's favor may have the opposite effect from that intended. In other words, the firm's counterpart perceives more, rather than less, firm opportunism. The results also suggest that a buyer observes lower benefits in the presence of size asymmetry, whereas the supplier's perception of benefits is unaffected. Thus, our research represents a significant step forward in understanding BSRs and asymmetries by (i) bringing attention to two key asymmetries inherent in BSRs and (ii) showing that these asymmetries are not unidirectional in their influence on perceived opportunism and performance.     

供应商参与技术创新研究--基于宝钢集团的案例分析

供应商与其用户(主要是制造商)之间的合作创新模式是突破原来仅仅是产业链上下游的销售关系,扩展成相互支持的战略伙伴关系,从而打造有竞争力的供应链.通过对我国最大的钢铁公司--宝钢集团作为供应商参与技术创新模式的研究,来阐述这一合作创新模式的意义.     

Strategic Inventory and Supply Chain Behavior

Based on a serial supply chain model with two periods and price‐sensitive demand, we present the first experimental test of the effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance. In theory, if holding costs are sufficiently low, the buyer builds up a strategic inventory (even if no operational reasons for stock‐holding exist) to limit the supplier's market power, and to increase the own profit share. As it turns out, this enhances the overall supply chain performance. The supplier anticipates the effect of the strategic inventory and differentiates prices to capture a part of the increased supply chain profits. Our results show that the positive effects of strategic inventories are even more pronounced than theoretically predicted, because strategic inventories empower buyers by shifting the perception of the fair split. Overall, strategic inventories have a double positive effect, a strategic and a behavioral, both reducing the average wholesale prices and dampening the double marginalization effect. The latter effect leads to more equitable payoffs.     

Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case

When firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for a competitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what happens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is used: exclusive capacity and first‐priority capacity. We model firms' investment and production decisions, and analyze the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one firm taps into the other firm's invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually discourages firms' investment. We also characterize the firms' and supplier's preference about the capacity type. While the non‐investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first‐priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to shut off the other firm's access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to invest. The supplier's preference depends on the trade‐off between over‐investment and flexibility.