互动公平、委员会决策程序公平与员工决策承诺:基于公平启发理论与不确定管理理论的实证研究

借助层级团队形式制定决策,决策者能激发员工的决策承诺,确保决策的有效执行。以委员会作为决策者的层级团队为例,本文探讨了以下问题:当存在个体对自身胜任力的自信、专用性人力资本投资这两个因素的影响时,互动公平与委员会决策程序公平效应及它们之间的交互效应会发生什么变化?引入公平启发理论与不确定管理理论,本文假设并检验了上述四个因素如何交互作用于员工决策承诺。以两家大型商业银行信贷业务人员为研究对象,实证研究表明:(1)自信和专用性人力资本投资对委员会决策程序公平效应有着显著调节作用,但它们对互动公平效应的调节作用不显著;(2)当存在自信和专用性人力资本投资的影响时,较强的互动公平与委员会决策程序公平之间的交互效应更稳定一些,而较低的互动公平感知与程序公平之间的交互效应在方向上发生变化。本文有助于管理者理解"公平何时能引致员工合作"这一问题,帮助其更好地把握决策过程以获得员工对其决策的支持。本研究的假设完全基于公平启发理论(FHT)和不确定管理理论(UMT)的理论逻辑做出,实证结果与FHT和UMT的理论预测以及已有实证研究结果相一致,这意味着本研究具有较高可信性和可靠性,能为进一步理论探索提供了比较坚实的基础。     

Leader’s morality,prototypicality, and followers’ reactions

We examine the effects of moral (vs. competent) leadership on followers' leader evaluations and endorsement. In Study 1 (N = 157), followers evaluated a leader more negatively and endorsed them less when they failed on morality than competence. An indirect effect from leader morality to leader evaluation, through perceived group prototypicality emerged, demonstrating the identity-basis of this evaluation. In Studies 2 (N = 150), 3 (N = 297), and 4 (N = 192) participants considered incongruous situations in which the leader failed on morality but succeed on competence, or vice-versa. Followers expressed more negative evaluations and less endorsement of an immoral but competent leader than of a moral but incompetent leader, through group prototypicality. In Study 4, we manipulated group prototypicality. A leader considered prototypical of the group received worse evaluations when they behaved immorally, irrespective of their competence. Results contribute to the understanding of leader-followers dynamics.