Production and pricing problems in make-to-order supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation

This paper studies the production and pricing problems in MTO (make-to-order) supply chain containing an upstream manufacturer who produces two products based on MTO production and a downstream retailer. The manufacturer is regulated by cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale prices of the two products. To comply with the regulation, the manufacturer can buy or sell emission permits through an outside market. The retailer determines its order quantities to meet the price-sensitive demands. We derive the optimal total emissions and production quantities of the two products, and based on them, we analyze the impact of emission trading price on the optimal production decisions and the two firms’ optimal profits. The emission trading decisions follow a two-threshold policy and the optimal total emissions are increasing in the cap. However, contrary to intuition, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be decreasing in the cap. The manufacturer׳s optimal profit is decreasing (increasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits, and that the retailer׳s optimal profit is decreasing in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. The optimal total emissions are decreasing in buying or selling price of emission permits, however, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be increasing (decreasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. Numerical examples are conducted to illustrate our findings and some managerial insights are presented.     

Allocating Capacity with Demand Competition: Fixed Factor Allocation*

We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and two retailers. The supplier sells a single product to the retailers, who, in turn, retail the product to customers. The supplier has limited production capacity, and the retailers compete for the supplier's capacity and are duopolists engaged in Cournot competition for their customers. When the sum of the retailers' orders exceeds the supplier's capacity, the supplier allocates his capacity according to a preannounced allocation rule. We propose a new capacity allocation rule, fixed factor allocation, which incorporates the ideas of proportional and lexicographic allocations: it prioritizes retailers as in lexicographic allocation, but guarantees only a fixed proportion of the total available capacity to the prioritized retailer. We show that (1) the fixed factor allocation rule incorporates lexicographic and proportional allocations from the perspectives of the supplier and the supply chain; (2) under fixed factor allocation, the supply chain profit is not affected by the allocation factor when it is greater than a threshold; (3) the retailers share the supply chain profit with the supplier depending on the value of the allocation factor; and (4) the fixed factor allocation coordinates the supply chain when the market size is sufficiently large. We also compare fixed factor with proportional and lexicographic allocations, respectively. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the supplier can optimize his capacity level and wholesale price under fixed factor allocation.     

学习和控制行为与企业成长价值——我国上市公司的实证检验

本文以中国上市公司为样本,以实物期权理论为基础,实证分析了企业的学习(以研发费用为代表)和控制行为(以广告费用为代表),管理者的学习行为(以管理经验和社会网络关系为代表)对企业成长价值的影响.结果表明,管理者的学习行为与企业成长价值显著正相关;在一定支出水平下,企业的学习行为和控制行为与企业成长价值正相关;学习行为相对于控制行为而言更为重要.部分行业存在研发支出和广告支出的临界支出水平.     

Competitive markdown timing for perishable and substitutable products

We model as a duopoly two firms selling their fixed stocks of two substitutable items over a selling season. Each firm starts with an initial price, and has the option to decrease the price once. The problem for each firm is to determine when to mark its price down in to maximize its revenue. We show that the existence and characterization of a pure-strategy equilibrium depend on the magnitude of the increase in the revenue rate of a firm when its competitor runs out of stock. When the increase is smaller than the change in the revenue rate of the price leader when both firms are in stock for all of the three possible scenarios, neither firm has the incentive to force its rival to run out of stock and if a firm marks its price down after the season starts, its inventory runs out precisely at the end of the season. When the increase is larger than the change of the price leader׳s revenue rate in one particular scenario, waiting until its rival runs out of inventory may be an equilibrium strategy for the larger firm even though this may lead to leftover inventory for itself. In other cases, there may be no pure-strategy equilibrium in the game. In certain regions of the parameter space, a firm׳s revenue may be decreasing in its starting inventory which shows that a firm may be better off if it can credibly salvage a portion of its inventory prior to the game. While most of our analysis is for open-loop strategies, in the final part of the paper, we show that the open-loop equilibrium survives as an equilibrium when we consider closed-loop strategies for an important subset of the parameter space.     

（火用）概念下企业战略管理研究

本文试图定义（火用）管理学。按照演进的时间顺序回顾了（火用）经济学和企业战略管理理论研究历程,给出（火用）管理学的定义,通过分析企业的环境要素,定量计算企业环境管理要素与企业内部战略要素（火用）值,指出企业最适宜的战略选择。提出了企业在进行战略管理研究的时候,要根据所处的环境条件,分析自身企业内外部优劣势,制定出符合本企业的战略规划和生产（火用）值最大的产品和服务,把企业（火用）值做到最大,才能使企业生存和发展。     

A Closed-Form Formula for an Option with Discrete and Continuous Barriers

This article presents a methodology to derive analytical formulas for a class of complicated financial derivatives with a continuously monitored barrier and a few discretely monitored ones. Numerical results based on concrete numbers for the parameters are presented and analyzed.     

The Impact of Manufacturers' Wholesale Prices on a Retailer's Shelf‐Space and Pricing Decisions*

This article examines shelf‐space allocation and pricing decisions in the marketing channel as the results of a static game played à la Stackelberg between two manufacturers of competing brands and one retailer. The competing manufacturers act as leaders that play a simultaneous and noncooperative game. They fix their transfer prices by taking into account the shelf‐space allocation and price‐markup decisions of their common exclusive dealer. The results indicate that the wholesale prices of brands are strongly linked to their share of the shelf. The main results of our numerical simulations may be summarized as follows: first, the lower the unit cost and/or the greater the price elasticity, the greater the shelf space allocated to that brand. Second, the higher the shelf‐space elasticity, the lower are the wholesale prices and the profits of all channel members.     

消费者短视和以旧换新情形下设计架构与定价策略研究

耐用品的耐用性会抑制了新一代耐用品的销售,企业通常会采用以旧换新政策来激励新一代耐用品的销售。企业有两种产品设计架构策略:一体化架构策略与模块化架构策略,同时企业也有两种定价策略:静态定价策略和动态定价策略。在这种情况下,企业该如何确定产品设计架构和定价策略?在假定两期内消费者是短视情形下,论文建立了消费者与企业博弈模型分析和比较了三种情况。研究发现,无论是静态定价还是动态定价,无论是模块化架构还是一体化架构,购买了第一代产品的消费者都会整体更换成第二代产品;随着第二代核心系统的质量提升,以旧换新促使企业产品架构选择从一体化架构转变为选择模块化架构;当采用动态定价、第二代核心系统质量提升适中和折扣因子高时,企业会选择模块化架构;当企业采用模块化架构时,以旧换新政策会降低模块化产品第二代核心子系统和基础子系统之间的兼容性;如果两代产品之间的质量差距比较大,企业将会选择动态定价策略,反之会选择静态定价策略。     

关于低价倾销的理论认识

低价倾销在有关法规中的界定是清楚和明确的 ,但如何正确理解和认识并不简单。那种认为低价倾销在中国经济中是一种普遍现象的看法值得商榷。经营者所处的市场环境以及供求关系等在界定低价倾销行为时都是必须考虑的。政府反低价倾销具有复杂性