高管持股与企业价值——基于利益趋同效应与壕沟防守效应的经验研究

本文以深交所78家民营上市公司为样本,从利益趋同效应和壕沟防守效应两方面研究了高管持股与企业价值的关系。与目前大多数相关研究不同,本文在计量高管持股比例时包括了高管人员通过间接方式持有的公司股权。本研究发现,高管持股比例不同引起的利益趋同效应和壕沟防守效应导致高管持股与企业价值之间呈显著的非线性关系。当高管持股比例在8%—25%之间,高管持股的壕沟防守效应占主导,而小于8%或大于25%时,高管持股的利益趋同效应占主导。研究结论对以激励为主要目的或以股权结构优化为主要目的的高管持股方案提供了经验证据。     

Does state ownership really matter? The dynamic alignment of China's resource environment and firm internationalization strategies

Recent research suggests that unequal access to home country institutional resources affects firm internationalization strategies. We add to this debate, based on an analysis of state-owned (SOEs) and non-state-owned (NSOEs) Chinese mining firms, by developing a more dynamic and multi-layered understanding of this interplay. We find that home institutional support can be ownership-based or performance-based, whereby the former benefits SOEs and the latter favors high-performing NSOEs. Combined, these support structures serve as institutional control mechanisms in promoting competition, performance and loyalty to national policies. In addition, they establish a permanent link between firm- and home country-specific assets and incentivize firms to develop dynamic resource access capabilities at home and abroad. Our findings inform our understanding of the firms-institutions nexus and Chinese foreign direct investment dynamics, especially in industries of strategic importance to the state.     

中国上市公司终极控制权及其与东亚、西欧上市公司的比较分析

本文运用终极产权论对上市公司的控股主体进行分类,通过追踪上市公司终极控制股东,发现在1260家样本公司中,终极控制股东拥有的控制权平均为43.67%,而其投入的现金流平均只有39.33%,就是说控制股东投入的现金流显著小于其获得的控制权,有4.34%的差异,两者的比值为0.890。在三种终极控制股东中,家族企业投入了相对较少的现金流量,却取得了相对较多的控制权,控制权和现金流量权的偏离达到了49.16%。同时,通过对中国上市公司和东亚、西欧国家的上市公司进行比较分析,得出了许多有意义的结论。     

要素所有者的谈判力与企业权益分配格局

在全面解释“谈判力”涵义的基础上,着重论证了谈判力与企业权益分配格局的关系,并据此提出了改进我国企业权益分配状况的建议。     

我国国际惯例基本理论问题研究

文章针对我国学术界对国际惯例含义问题的不同看法 ,提出中国有关国内立法中的“国际惯例”不仅指实体意义上的国际惯例 ,也包括冲突法上的国际惯例。由于历史和现实的需要 ,国际惯例已成为我国国际经济法的重要渊源。其法律效力具有特殊性 ,一旦采用 ,即具有优先于公约和国内法的效力。论文建议“删除”我国立法中独特于他国立法的“公共秩序保留”;建议我国现行有关“国际惯例”的国内立法对有关的概念及其适用条件加以明确的界定及修改     

所有权保留制度若干问题探讨--以分期付款买卖为视角?

我国现行民法所有权保留制度只是确立了一个原则,在实际应用中需要具体问题具体分析。首先,就不动产分期付款买卖而言,并不会存在所谓的所有权保留,出卖人为担保自身价款债权的实现,不能直接就所有权的移转附加条件,仅能就出卖人（协助）登记义务的履行附加条件。其次,在我国不承认物权行为独立性的立法背景下,所有权保留条款并不是一个附条件的法律行为,而是买卖合同当中关于移转标的物所有权的相关条款附有条件,保留所有权本身就是法律行为的一部分。最后,在我国物权法规定的不动产物权变动模式下,不动产不存在适用所有权保留的可能性。     

公共政策保留与国际商事仲裁裁决的承认和执行

国际商事仲裁是当今国际商事领域最主要的争议解决方法之一。它以其灵活性、专业性、自主性得到了越来越多当事人的青睐。然而,国际商事仲裁的发展有赖于其裁决能否得到各国法院的承认和实际执行。公共政策保留在很大程度上限制了国际商事仲裁裁决的有效执行。我国应当合理区分国际公共政策和国内公共政策,以积极而审慎的态度对待外国仲裁裁决的承认和执行问题。     

Insider ownership and corporate performance: evidence from Germany

In this paper we address the question whether insider ownership affects corporate performance. Evidence from studies dealing with Anglo-Saxon countries is rather inconclusive, especially because results seem to be significantly affected by endogeneity. Economically, this is due to the fact that in these countries insider ownership seems to be mainly driven by management’s compensation contracts. We argue that Germany is different in this regard, as insider ownership is often related to family control, stock-based compensation is less widespread, and the market for corporate control used to be less developed. Starting from this presumption, our data allows an unbiased observation as to whether insider ownership affects firm performance. Using a pooled data set of 648 firm observations for the years 2003 and 1998, we find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performance—as measured by stock price performance, market-to-book ratio and return on assets—and insider ownership. This relationship seems to be rather robust, even if we account for potential endogeneity by applying a 2SLS regression approach. Furthermore, the results hold for a sub-sample of firms that did not have a stock-based compensation program in place. Moreover, we find outside block ownership as well as more concentrated insider ownership to have a positive impact on corporate performance. Overall, the results indicate that ownership structure might be an important variable explaining the long term value creation in the corporate sector.

实验市场中的股权结构、信息与控制权收益

实验室环境下的决策过程研究可以较好地考察决策变量的行为基础和动态临界值.本文以中国股市中的股权结构为背景,在实验框架下考察了股权结构、信息披露和控制权收益的关系.文章先从理论上计算股东的夏普利值并以此代表股东控制权.再分不同设置变量来实验地考察控制权收益.结果表明:(1)股东控制权越平均,控制权收益越少;大股东与小股东形成"核"联盟的机会越多,其取得控制权的机会越少.(2)信息对控制权收益的影响主要体现在信息在联盟的形成和维持中的作用.(3)大股东夏普利值的高低和信息情况决定了联盟的方式.(4)控制权溢价并不一定就是控制权收益,也许只是大股东为防止自身利益被侵害而支付的成本.(5)信息不完全不一定是坏事,部分信息的隐含更能增加公司的分配效率.