Ethics, regulation and the new artificial intelligence, part II: autonomy and liability

This is the second article in a two-part series on the social, ethical and public policy implications of the new artificial intelligence (AI). The first article briefly presented a neo-Durkheimian understanding of the social fears projected onto AI, before arguing that the common and enduring myth of an AI takeover arising from the autonomous decision-making capability of AI systems, most recently resurrected by Professor Kevin Warwick, is misplaced. That article went on to argue that, nevertheless, some genuine and practical issues in the accountability of AI systems that must be addressed. This second article, drawing further on the neo-Durkheimian theory, sets out a more detailed understanding of what it is for a system to be autonomous enough in its decision making to blur the boundary between tool and agent. The importance of this is that this blurring of categories is often the basis, the first article argued, of social fears.     

Agency,reflexivity and risk: cosmopolitan,neurotic or prudential citizen?

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the turn to risk within sociology and to survey the relationship between structure and agency as conceived by popular strands of risk theorizing. To this end, we appraise the risk society, culture of fear and governmentality perspectives and we consider the different imaginings of the citizen constructed by each of these approaches. The paper goes on to explore what each of these visions of citizenship implies for understandings of the structure/agency dynamic as it pertains to the question of reflexivity. In order to transcend uni‐dimensional notions of citizenship and to reinvigorate sociological debates about risk, we call for conceptual analyses that are contextually rooted. Exampling the importance of knowledge contests around contemporary security threats and warnings of the deleterious effects of pre‐emptive modes of regulation that derive from the ‘risk turn’ within social science, we argue for a more nuanced embrace of reflexivity within risk theorising in order to facilitate a more dynamic critique of the images of citizenship that such theorizing promotes.     

对特殊群体艾滋病防治干预工作的思考

本文是一个人类学个案研究,它以女性性服务者的经历为切入点,在分析女性性服务者人群的文化特点的同时,通过解读“高危人群”、“艾滋病”与“安全套”的文化意义,从微观层面考察她们作为艾滋病预防的主体,怎样建构关于艾滋病的知识,怎样看待自己的“高危人群”身份,怎样在具体的环境中选择符合自己利益的行为方式。本文认为,艾滋病防治干预工作必须充分考虑到性服务者的这种主体性,让她们积极投入到改变自身处境的行动中去,才能使干预工作进一步取得成效。     

应收账款质权风险分析

我国《物权法》明确规定的应收账款可作质权质押,这种规定澄清了关于应收账款的性质争议。应收账款的质权性决定其担保性,而应收账款的风险性属性,决定了这种担保的有效性存在限制。依据法律经济学的分析路径、应收账款质权主体之间存在对策行为的博弈,从而决定了应收账款质权具有的风险性特征,规避应收账款风险的就应建立信息披露制度,以提高应收账款的质权性实现的法律制度保障。     

A Comprehensive Model for Managing Credit Risk on Home Mortgage Portfolios*

Managing credit risk in financial institutions requires the ability to forecast aggregate losses on existing loans, predict the length of time that loans will be on the books before prepayment or default, analyze the expected performance of particular segments in the existing portfolio, and project payment patterns of new loans. Described in this paper are tools created for these functions in a large California financial institution. A forecasting model with Markovian structure and nonstationary transition probabilities is used to model the life of a mortgage. Logistic and regression models are used to estimate severity of losses. These models are integrated into a system that allows analysts and managers to depict the expected performance of individual loans and portfolio segments under different economic scenarios. With this information, analysts and managers can establish appropriate loss reserves, suggest pricing differentials to compensate for risk, and make strategic lending decisions.     

信用衍生品的法律规制:国际改革趋向及启示

信用衍生品对于提高金融机构的风险管理水平和整个金融体系的安全和效率都具有重要作用。但是,由于缺乏有效的法律规制,信用衍生品逐渐由风险管理工具转变为投机工具。危机后,全球范围内的场外金融衍生品规制框架重构渐次展开。对于信用衍生品法律规制的主要内容,可以归纳为集中清算、信用风险管理和信息透明化三个方面。这些国际改革实践,对我国信用衍生品市场及其法制的构建和发展具有重要的借鉴意义。     

浅议高校管理审计与风险管理

通过分析高校开展内部管理审计的必然性,以及内部管理审计在风险管理中发挥的具有前瞻性、客观性、效益性的作用,提出了高校内部管理审计应以预决算的财务审计、内部控制制度审计、重大经济活动的全程跟踪审计作为工作重点,从而推进高校风险管理。     

Does IO Economics Really Make the Case for Investments in IT: Comment on West and Courtney

West and Courtney [18] rely on industrial organization economics in general, and the economics of uncertainty in particular, for insights into the benefits of overcoming information constraints through information systems (IS) and improved information technologies (IT). This Comment argues that the IS researcher who looks to the economics of uncertainty to make a case for improved IT will only find support from a selective reading of a constantly expanding literature whose aims and inferences are easily misunderstood.     

Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We develop and estimate a model of dynamic interactions in which commitment is limited and contracts are incomplete to explain the patterns of income and consumption growth in village economies of less developed countries. Households can insure each other through both formal contracts and informal agreements, that is, self‐enforcing agreements specifying voluntary transfers. This theoretical setting nests the case of complete markets and the case where only informal agreements are available. We derive a system of nonlinear equations for income and consumption growth. A key prediction of our model is that both variables are affected by lagged consumption as a consequence of the interplay of formal and informal contracting possibilities. In a semiparametric setting, we prove identification, derive testable restrictions, and estimate the model with the use of data from Pakistani villages. Empirical results are consistent with the economic arguments. Incentive constraints due to self‐enforcement bind with positive probability and formal contracts are used to reduce this probability.     

Calibration Results for Non‐Expected Utility Theories

Rabin (2000) proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's arguments strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments apply to general non‐expected utility theories.