生物自然主义：塞尔意向性理论的独特视角

约翰·塞尔以一种独特的自然主义——生物自然主义的视角关注意向性,建立起一个比较完整的意向性理论体系。塞尔坚决反对主流的自然主义,由意向性的逻辑结构入手,以内在的意向性为研究范式,将网络和背景作为意向性的基础,力图将意向性解释为在进化中形成的特定类型的生物能力。作为在主流自然主义理论之外的有益探索,塞尔的意向性理论体系为意向性自然化问题的研究提供了新的进路。但是其自身还存在一些难以解决的问题,应该不断地吸收科学发展的最新方法、最新成果,进一步完善论证方式与具体的细节,将这种生物自然主义的意向性理论不断推向深入。     

模态的语用逻辑

清华学人、中国著名逻辑学家周礼全先生从 195 0年开始研究语言逻辑 ,1989年起指导作者对奥斯汀的言语行为理论和塞尔的语用逻辑进行研究。文章介绍周礼全先生对语言逻辑的重要贡献 ,并给出模态的语用逻辑系统 MF,以期与作者先期发表的《命题的语用逻辑》、《量化的语用逻辑》共同形成对语用逻辑形式化研究的全面描述。     

意向性在心灵哲学转向中的意义

为了考察塞尔的心灵哲学对日常语言哲学的突破,从4个方面分析“意向性”概念在立场转变中的核心意义,即对塞尔意向性概念的建设性意义作重点分析; 讨论其不同于胡塞尔思想的地方; 批判地讨论从这种概念出发对一些基本哲学问题的回答效力。研究认为,塞尔的意向性概念为其心灵哲学提供了一个很好的自然主义基础,然而同时也无法避免自然主义的难题。     

Game theory,cheap talk and post‐truth politics: David Lewis vs. John Searle on reasons for truth‐telling

I offer two potential diagnoses of the behavioral norms governing post‐truth politics by comparing the view of language, communication, and truth‐telling put forward by David Lewis (extended by game theorists), and John Searle. My first goal is to specify the different ways in which Lewis, and game theorists more generally, in contrast to Searle (in the company of Paul Grice and Jürgen Habermas), go about explaining the normativity of truthfulness within a linguistic community. The main difference is that for Lewis and game theorists, “truthful” signaling follows from an alignment of interests, and deception follows from mixed motives leading to the calculation that sending false information is better for oneself. Following in the Enlightenment tradition, Searle argues that practical reasoning, which involves mastery of at least one language, requires that actors intend to communicate. This intention includes constraining the content of statements to uphold veracity conditions. After distinguishing between these two accounts, I will articulate the implications for explaining, and even informing actions, constitutive of post‐truth politics. I argue that the strategic view of communication is sufficient neither to model everyday conversation nor to reflect a public sphere useful for democratic government. Both the pedagogy of strategic communication as cheap talk, and its concordance with new digital information technologies, challenge norms of truthfulness that underlie modern institutions essential to an effective public sphere.     

意向性与意义理解--从言语行为论的视角看

意向性的概念虽并非言语行为理论家之首创, 却由他们赋予了新的内涵。在言语行为意义论中, 话语施事行为与意向状态被认为具有某种同构性, 意义不仅是意向性的一种派生形式, 而且意义的可能性及其限度均由意向性所奠定。因此, 意向性也就成为理解言语行为之意义的关键。     

塞尔言语行动和意义关系理论的批判

塞尔的言语行动论对意义的说明引起一些误解，塞尔对这些误解的澄清基本是成立的，但是论据上存有谬误之处。塞尔在前期对意义的解释存在漏洞，但后期以一种新的方式对意义的解释不但是成功的，而且解决了言语行动中的那些漏洞。     

自由意志的生物自然主义解释

塞尔试图把自由意志的心理状态说明与神经生物学解释结合起来,认为在自由意志行为中存在间隔。这种阐释虽然符合人们的日常经验和科学说明,但却引发了一个新的难题,即神经元系统的决定性如何与意志自由行动中的间隔相一致。     

Rules, Social Ontology and Collective Identity

Mainstream game theory explains cooperation as the outcome of the interaction of agents who permanently pursue their individual goals. Amartya Sen argues instead that cooperation can only be understood by positing a type of rule-following behaviour that can be (and often is) out of phase with the pursuit of individual goals, due to the existence of a collective identity. However, Sen does not clarify the ontological preconditions for the type of social behaviour he describes. I will argue that Sen's account of collective identity can be best interpreted in the light of John Searle's notion of collective intentionality, while Sen's explanation of rule-following behavior and agency is best understood using the critical realist transformational model of social activity.