外部性的分类及外部性理论的演化

从产生外部影响和接受外部影响的主体的不同,外部性有两类典型的定义.从外部性的表现形式看,可以从七个角度进行分类.外部性理论发展经历了马歇尔的"外部经济"、庇古的"庇古税"和科斯的"科斯定理"三个阶段.这三个阶段被称之为外部性理论发展进程中的三块里程碑.张五常和杨小凯认为外部性概念是没有意义的.新兴古典经济学理论也许比外部性理论具有更强的解释力,但不一定能够彻底否定外部性理论.     

企业税收筹划的实务策略探讨

从企业的生命周期入手,对企业设立阶段、经营、筹资和投资方面的税收筹划进行了探讨和分析,提出了可行的筹划方案,以使企业达到减轻税负,增加营运资金的目的。     

电子商务中的税收问题研究

21世纪电子商务已呈全球迅速发展之势,电子商务中的诸多涉税问题,已越来越引起世界各国和税务当局以及消费者的广泛关注。电子商务在全球的迅速发展,对现行的税收体系产生了很大的影响.本文阐明了我国电子商务应坚持的基本原则,电子税务是未来税收征管的必由之路。     

试论土地革命时期根据地的农业税

1927年"八七”会议之后到抗日战争前夕为土地革命时期,这一时期的主要任务是建立工农革命政权,解决农民土地问题.为了解决行政经费和战争经费,在根据地设置了农业税制,农业税是根据地税收的一个重要来源,它对各革命根据地财政的稳定和军队的供给起了重要的保障作用     

“淘金热”时期澳大利亚金矿管理制度初探

1851年初,澳洲发现黄金,闻讯而来的淘金者蜂涌而入,掀起了一场震惊世界的“淘金热”。面对数以万计的淘金者,澳洲各殖民区政府适时成立了金矿管理委员会,派遣金矿管理委员前往各大矿区加强管理,并颁布了有关条例,初步建立起临时性的金矿管理制度,既增加了政府的税收,又有效地保障了矿区的社会秩序。     

对企业实行债转股的思考

启动财务杠杆给企业带来的效益一直是理论界关注的焦点.本文所介绍的是在西方较为流行的两种对启动财务杠杆实行馈转股的企业进行效益分析的理论模型.第—种模型强调资本成本在债转股中的重要性,认为企业制订是否实行债转股的决策依据就是对企业破产成本,委托代理成本和无形资产成本的评估.而对投资者来说,在投资中选择持债还是持股也依据他们对委托代理成本和无形资产的评估.第二种模型则建议企业在启动资本杠杆实行债转股中注重对风险的规避. 对于中国国有企业实行的债转股,本文以为它在所有制、市场条件及社会经济制度背景等方面具有完全不同的性质.但我们仍可以利用财务杠杆的工作原理将国有企业的债务转为股份公开上市交易,以实行中国国有企业的民营化,减轻企业的债务负担,同时减少国有银行的呆坏帐.     

Measuring tax distortions with neutrality-based effective tax rates

In public economics, effective tax rates (ETRs) are often used to measure the combined effects of tax rates, tax bases, and the time effect of taxation. Until now, the modelling of comparable figures for revealing tax effects and tax-induced distortions is not solved satisfactorily. This paper derives an ETR approach based on neutral tax systems. In contrast to traditional measures of ETRs, the neutrality-based ETR discloses preferential or discriminatory taxation of investments regardless of their pre-tax rate of return. Moreover, comparing different ETRs exposes the degree of tax-induced investment distortions.

Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance

The paper analyses the emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance when individuals interact in a social network. It develops a model in which taxpayers possess a range of individual characteristics – including attitude to risk, potential for success in self-employment, and the weight attached to the social custom for honesty – and make an occupational choice based on these characteristics. Occupations differ in the possibility for evading tax. The social network determines which taxpayers are linked, and information about auditing and compliance is transmitted at meetings between linked taxpayers. Using agent-based simulations, the analysis demonstrates how attitudes and beliefs endogenously emerge that differ across sub-groups of the population. Compliance behaviour is different across occupational groups, and this is reinforced by the development of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. Taxpayers self-select into occupations according to the degree of risk aversion, the subjective probability of audit is sustained above the objective probability, and the weight attached to the social custom differs across occupations. These factors combine to lead to compliance levels that differ across occupations.     

The effects of income source,context, and income level on tax compliance decisions in a dynamic experiment

This study employs a laboratory experiment to explore the joint effect of income source (earned versus endowed) and decision context (tax versus nontax) on tax compliance behavior. During the experiment, subjects faced various income levels and made multiple reporting decisions. The results indicate that overall compliance is not significantly affected by the interaction of income source and context. However, this joint effect influences the relationship between income level and compliance and how compliance behavior evolves over time. In both cases, the treatment group with earned income in a tax context displays behavior that is distinct from the other three groups.     

The slippery slope framework on tax compliance: An attempt to formalization

Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) presented with the so-called ‘slippery slope’ framework a new approach to understand tax compliance. The slippery slope approach supposes two routes to tax compliance: deterrence of tax evasion by audits and fines on the one hand, and building a trusting relationship with taxpayers by services and support on the other hand. In this paper, the slippery slope framework is formalized by assuming two groups of taxpayers: compliance-minded and evasion-minded persons. Defining reaction functions for persons of both groups with respect to coercive and persuasive power instruments of tax authorities, the typical slippery slope picture emerges that characterises the authorities’ work. As a consequence, both groups of policy tools are considered necessary to generate tax compliance. In addition to that, it is shown that coercive and persuasive power may be substitutes or complements to each other, depending of the parameters of the taxpayers’ reaction functions. As a further crucial determinant of tax compliance, the behaviour of the fellow citizens with respect to taxpaying is identified.