非线性板方程组对称

本文中利用作者提出的计算微分方程对称的特征列集算法和编制的程序包,给出了（各向异性）非线性板方程组的全部古典对称     

Tax collection efficiency in OECD countries improves via decentralization,simplification, digitalization and education

This paper offers an assessment of tax administration performance and provides evidence of the relationship between fiscal decentralization (and tax structure) and the technical efficiency of tax collection. The initial stage of the investigation consists of a data envelopment analysis (DEA) to obtain technical efficiency estimates for a sample of 28 OECD countries over the period 2004–2017. In a second stage, we explore how technical efficiency is affected by fiscal decentralization and tax structure variables. The results show how the degree of fiscal decentralization has a positive and significant impact on the technical efficiency of tax collection. They also reveal a relevant role of tax structure choices and the ratio of indirect to direct taxes, which can significantly affect tax collection efficiency. Finally, we extract some policy implications.     

Fiscal transparency and tax ethics: does better information lead to greater compliance?

By relying on WVS data and using multilevel mixed modeling, the paper tests the hypothesis that access to larger flows of information about government fiscal accounts and financial transactions increases citizens’ willingness to pay taxes. By supporting such an hypothesis, our analysis suggests that in the presence of more information, the implicit contract between the government and taxpayers displays less stringent incentives and participation constraints and causes part of the contract, namely tax morale, to be enhanced. This finding supports the implementation of fiscal transparency policies, whose possible design is discussed.     

Less cheating? The effects of prefilled forms on compliance behavior

As a consequence of digital transformation, individuals are often confronted with prefilled forms or prefilled data entry masks. In situations where cheating and lying are of concern, prefilling might reduce dishonest behavior. In a controlled experiment, we investigate how correctly and incorrectly prefilled forms influence compliance behavior. We frame our experiment as filing the annual income tax return. We show that correct prefilling enhances compliance. However, in cases of incorrect prefilling, we observe asymmetric effects. If prefilled income is lower than true income, we find no positive compliance effect, and compliance is on the same level as with blank forms. If prefilled income is higher than true income, prefilling still has a positive effect on compliance. In that case, compliance is on the same level as with correctly prefilled forms and higher than with blank forms. Our study contributes to the literature on cheating and lying by showing that prefilled forms affect compliance.     

税收激励与企业劳动雇佣——来自薪酬抵税政策的“准自然实验”

在经济下行压力不断加大的形势下,如何“稳就业”成为了各界关注的热点问题。本文以2008 年推行的薪酬抵税政策作为“准自然实验”捕捉企业税负的外生变化,并以2000-2018 年A 股上市公司数据作为研究样本,利用双重差分法考察了税收激励与企业雇佣行为之间的因果关系。实证结果表明:薪酬抵税政策带来了额外的税收优惠,进而促进了企业的雇佣需求,在有效排除共同趋势、预期效应、政策叠加效应以及反向因果问题后,这一结论依然稳健;异质性检验中发现,薪酬抵税政策对企业雇佣的激励效应在民营企业,成本转嫁能力较弱、劳动密集度较高以及处于市场化程度较高区域的企业中表现更加明显,这意味着企业对劳动力成本的变化越敏感,这一政策的作用效果就越好;薪酬抵税政策显著地提升了企业的经营绩效。本文的研究有助于深入理解税收影响企业行为的微观机理,对于政府利用税收政策扩大就业具有重要启示。     

Work performance and tax compliance in flat and progressive tax systems

Different tax systems, and their impact on work motivation and tax compliance are significant issues in contemporary political and economic debates. The proportional feature of a flat tax system is assumed to lead to higher performance, while the fairness of the redistributive progressive tax system is assumed to result in higher tax compliance. However, empirical findings on the topic are inconclusive. Both work performance and tax compliance under different tax systems were examined in an experiment, with special attention devoted to the effect of a change in tax systems. A flat tax system was supposed to induce greater work performance, whereas a progressive tax system was expected to increase tax compliance based on fairness perceptions, allowing for the opposite effect due to higher complexity. Furthermore, it was assumed that performance and tax payments would be influenced by motives of self-interest. The design included 20 rounds with a real-effort task in each round, determining participants’ experimental income. Participants (N = 191) made decisions about their tax payments from round-to-round in four different experimental conditions: (1) a flat tax system, (2) a progressive tax system, (3) starting with a flat and changing to a progressive, and (4) starting with a progressive and changing to a flat tax system. Results indicate higher work performance in a progressive system. However, a change from a progressive tax system to a flat system led to increased tax compliance.     

Quality self-control and co-supervision mechanism of construction agent in public investment project in China

Public investment project (PIP) plays an important role in the China economy. In order to improve the project management performance of public projects, the government is searching for a scientific system to build a construction management supervision mode. This paper introduces the policy background and connotation of Agent Construction System (ACS). As a public investment construction management model, ACS, is gradually being incorporated into the legal framework, it is necessary to improve the construction agent supervision mechanism. This article analyzes the supervision mechanism of construction agent quality management under the principle of two-stage agent mode and establishes an agent quality self-control system and a government co-supervision system. These systems take the contract management as the core and the project quality objective as the guidance. These systems also consist of a two-dimensional framework of vertical self-control and horizontal supervision, which form a quality supervision mechanism. Based on Rough Set theory, the article proposes the idea of building an agent quality self-control and government co-supervision model, and illustrates it with a flow chart for building the model, which paves the way of quantitative research for the future.     

Learning in experiments: Dynamic interaction of policy variables designed to deter tax evasion

While neoclassical economic theory sheds insight into the way that audit rates and penalty rates interact when individuals decide to declare income for taxation, it predicts far lower levels of compliance than observed levels of compliance. This paper analyses experimental responses to explore a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates as individuals learn how to comply with taxation. It compares the responses of subjects in experiments with responses that are predicted when individuals rely on an adaptive learning process (that offers information feedback about decision payoffs). This comparison suggests that learning is an important consideration when explaining differences between predicted and observed levels of tax compliance.     

Tax evasion and emotions: An empirical test of re-integrative shaming theory

Shaming can be either of two types, shaming that becomes stigmatization of the offender and favors his exclusion from the community, or shaming that is followed by forgiveness and reintegration of the deviant. Here we test experimentally these aspects of shaming theory with a repeated tax-payment game, in which the shaming “ritual” consisted of displaying the evader’s picture in addition to charging monetary sanctions. Results show that when cheating is made public and the contravener is not successively reintegrated, the total amount of cheating is significantly increased compared to when cheating is made public but publicity is immediately followed by reintegration. The former condition is associated with more intense negative emotions related to cheating. This suggests that the employment of a social shaming mechanism may be an effective, albeit very sensitive, tool in the hands of policy makers.     

A Bayesian analysis of a change in the parameters of autoregressive time series

In this article, we consider a Bayesian analysis of a possible change in the parameters of autoregressive time series of known order p, AR(p). An unconditional Bayesian test based on highest posterior density (HPD) credible sets is determined. The test is useful to detect a change in any one of the parameters separately. Using the Gibbs sampler algorithm, we approximate the posterior densities of the change point and other parameters to calculate the p-values that define our test.