论网络谣言型寻衅滋事罪的法律适用

疫情背景下，有关网络传谣行为的刑法规制问题再次引发广泛关注。大量裁判案例显示，网络谣言型寻衅滋事罪的打击范围出现了相当程度的偏差，亟需对该罪构成要件的规制范围做出更加贴合时代需求的分析研究。在解释论上，应将“虚假信息”解释为“与事实不符的信息”，而非“没有根据的信息”。不应将行为人的“实质恶意”视为“主观明知”的判断因素。在逻辑上，虽然“网络空间秩序”是“公共场所秩序”的内涵之一，但在我国目前的社会条件下还不宜将之上升为独立的刑法法益。因此，我们应将该罪中的“公共秩序”限缩解释为物理空间中的“公共场所秩序”。在下次刑法修正时，立法者可以考虑将在网络中传播谣言并造成公共场所秩序严重混乱的行为，明确设置为一个独立的轻罪罪名。     

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity

We construct and estimate an equilibrium search model with on–the–job–search. Firms make take–it–or–leave–it wage offers to workers conditional on their characteristics and they can respond to the outside job offers received by their employees. Unobserved worker productive heterogeneity is introduced in the form of cross–worker differences in a “competence” parameter. On the other side of the market, firms also are heterogeneous with respect to their marginal productivity of labor. The model delivers a theory of steady–state wage dispersion driven by heterogenous worker abilities and firm productivities, as well as by matching frictions. The structural model is estimated using matched employer and employee French panel data. The exogenous distributions of worker and firm heterogeneity components are nonparametrically estimated. We use this structural estimation to provide a decomposition of cross–employee wage variance. We find that the share of the cross–sectional wage variance that is explained by person effects varies across skill groups. Specifically, this share lies close to 40% for high–skilled white collars, and quickly decreases to 0% as the observed skill level decreases. The contribution of market imperfections to wage dispersion is typically around 50%.     

High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms

We study a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers from more than five hundred thousand employing firms. We decompose real total annual compensation per worker into components related to observable employee characteristics, personal heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and residual variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. At the level of the individual, we find that person effects, especially those not related to observables like education, are a very important source of wage variation in France. Firm effects, while important, are not as important as person effects. At the level of firms, we find that enterprises that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more profitable. They are also more capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that pay higher wages, controlling for person effects, are more productive and more profitable. They are also more capital intensive but are not more high-skilled labor intensive. We find that person effects explain about 90% of inter-industry wage differentials and about 75% of the firm-size wage effect while firm effects explain relatively little of either differential.