Restoring Meaning to Supervision Through a Peer Consultation Group in Rural Australia

The establishment of a cross-discipline peer consultation group in regional Australia is described. A research project, which explored the impact of the peer consultation on participants, using pre-group and post-group evaluation surveys along with data from an externally facilitated group evaluation session is discussed. Key findings reveal the value of access to varied modes of supervision; the importance of supervision not feeling like being subjected to surveillance; and the contribution that positive experiences of peer consultation have for our participants' well-being. The potential for improved connection and mutual benefits for practice and academia in sponsorship of professional peer consultation by regional universities also emerges from this research. The effectiveness of contemporary workplace counselling supervision arrangements, and of what, precisely, the enjoyment of engaging in case discussions in peer consultation groups is constituted are areas for more exploration.     

浅谈企业如何发挥效能监察

针对效能监察工作在现代企业建设步伐中发挥的重要作用,就如何更好地发挥效能监察的作用,提高市场竞争能力,进行了一些探讨。     

从第三方支付发展看上海国际金融中心建设

互联网时代第三方支付的发展,揭示了企业"控制用户信息流以控制支付流,控制支付流以控制资金流;获得用户网络接入权胜过获得资本所有权,获得数据投入量胜过获得资金投入量"的新规则。大平台日益成为金融机构控制用户信息流、获得用户网络接入权的重要载体,在平台组合上加载信用有关数据流日益成为形成金融机构风险管理能力的重要生产资料。在互联网时代推进上海国际金融中心建设,既要继续重视金融机构集聚,更要注重鼓励企业赢得全国性用户网络接入权,加强平台组合,增强信用数据流。上海应依托自贸试验区推进互联网金融监管创新;牵头建立长三角征信联盟集团公司;搭建本地金融机构网聚平台。     

浅析人事档案管理存在的问题与对策

本文论述人事档案管理存在的问题,并提出相关的对策。     

北京城市社区数字化管理

北京作为中国的首都,在城市社区数字化建设方面成绩显著,但也存在着一些问题。本文在调查分析的基础上,提出了具体的解决方案,并就其未来发展作了展望。     

矿产资源资产化管理创新研究——以湖南省为例

改革开放以来,市场经济的发展迫切需要我国矿产资源管理体制进行改革和创新。借鉴矿产资源资产化管理的国际经验,创新性地提出湖南省矿产资源资产化管理的“321”模式：构建三级矿权,优化矿产资源产权安排;健全两级市场,优化矿产资源的配置机制;优化一级控管,完善矿产资源宏观调控和管理。希望能为湖南省及其他省市矿产资源管理体制的改革和创新提供参考借鉴。     

Hybridization in China's elder care service provision

Although the party‐state has embarked on a mission to increase elder care services, evaluating this development according to different sectors demonstrates certain challenges. Official statistics do not include sector‐specific information, and while provider websites suggest that elder care services are largely in public hands, Chinese experts argue that they are mostly “civilian‐run.” How can we explain these discrepancies in data on Chinese elder care? Drawing on the concept of hybridization and triangulating quantitative and qualitative data, I argue that the party‐state's efforts to “socialize” elder care provision has resulted in hybridization within the industry which blurs the line between care providers and obfuscates the stark role of the state in elder care service provision. During the implementation of state‐initiated hybridization, providers misclassify their ownership type to benefit from financial incentives or circumvent political control, resulting in even greater hybridization and fragmentation on the ground.     

从二分到合作:区域经济发展中的公共行政结构与范式

进入21世纪以来,国家日益强调统筹区域与协调发展。与此同时,传统上分割化、闭合化的地方行政管理体制已经成为阻碍区域经济一体化发展的深层次根源。针对这一问题,需要通过区域层面的政策规划、组织架构、运行机制等方面的制度安排与系统创新来促进区域合作、产业整合乃至区域经济一体化。从公共行政学的理路出发,面对经济全球化与区域一体化的双重压力与挑战,需要遵循公共行政体系的内在逻辑秩序与成长规律,改变固有的"中央—地方"二分的行政结构框架,增加区域的"视野"与"选择",实现向"中央—区域—地方"复合型结构范式的转换。通过变革传统行政管理体系的构造,构建区域合作行政的制度与模式,推进区域合作组织的创新与效能,解决区域经济一体化发展中长期存在的体制性、制度性障碍。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

Evaluating the Temporal Location of Feedback: Providing Feedback Following Performance vs. Prior to Performance

In order to make feedback as effective as possible, it is important to understand its function in the three-term contingency (TTC) and the impact of various factors involved in delivering feedback. Timing of feedback is one factor that can affect the impact of feedback on learner’s behavior. An analysis of timing of feeback may help us getting closer to better understanding how feedback functions in the TTC. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effects of feedback at different temporal locations. Specifically, feedback was provided either immediately (a) after a teaching session or (b) before the following teaching session, on teaching performance of undergraduate psychology students. The results indicated that feedback provided before the teaching session was more effective in improving teaching skills than feedback that was provided after the session. These findings suggest that feedback may function primarily as an antecedent to future performance and not necessarily as a consequence for past performance. However, the behavioral mechanism that explains these results is not yet clear. Future studies should investigate this further by manipulating the content of feedback prior to the teaching performance.