Identification of Standard Auction Models

This paper presents new identification results for models of first–price, second–price, ascending (English), and descending (Dutch) auctions. We consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure, nesting both private values and common values models, and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry. We address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data. The simplest model—symmetric independent private values—is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed. For richer models, identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available: (i) the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders; (ii) one or more bids in addition to the transaction price; (iii) exogenous variation in the number of bidders; (iv) bidder–specific covariates. While many private values (PV) models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data, identification of common values (CV) models requires stringent assumptions. Nonetheless, the PV model can be tested against the CV alternative, even when neither model is identified.     

Constants and variables: Pareto's asymmetric distribution curve

The article sets out the classic Paretian theory of income distribution. As it does so, it seeks to highlight the constant elements in the human faculties represented, at aggregate level, by the invariability and persistence of the asymmetric income curve, and the variable elements connected with the same curve and manifest in upward and downward mobility – what Pareto calls ‘circulation’. The two theorems arising from Pareto's discovery constitute a specific theory of development which has been confirmed from two points of view: in the positive sense of development when – as in the West – the second theorem has been applied (also independently of Pareto) with the connected theory of the entrepreneur and innovation in democratic regimes; but also in the negative sense of underdevelopment, with the destruction of wealth and the consequent general impoverishment, when expropriation policies have been implemented in despotic regimes, or excessive taxation in others.     

On the probability distribution of economic growth

Three important and significantly heteroscedastic gross domestic product series are studied. Omnipresent heteroscedasticity is removed and the distributions of the series are then compared to normal, normal mixture and normal–asymmetric Laplace (NAL) distributions. NAL represents a skewed and leptokurtic distribution, which is in line with the Aghion and Howitt [1 Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica, 60: 323–351. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]] model for economic growth, based on Schumpeter's idea of creative destruction. Statistical properties of the NAL distributions are provided and it is shown that NAL fits the data better than the alternatives.     

基于不对称需求信息的供应链最小订购量决策

在由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级分散供应链中,供应商通过制定最小订购量取得规模效应,保障自身利益。当零售商和供应商之间存在需求信息不对称时,即零售商掌握需求信息而供应商仅知道需求信息中价格敏感因子的分布,如何进行最小订购量决策成为供应商面临的一个重要问题。针对这一问题,从营销视角构建了基于Stackelberg博弈的利润最大化模型。假设供应商知道需求的价格敏感因子服从正态分布,通过严密的数学推导确定了模型中的最优最小订购量。将提出的最优最小订购量决策方法应用于云存储的销售供应链中,确定了云存储供应商销售的最优最小存储容量,阐释了方法的合理性与有效性。通过实验研究发现,最小订购量的设置提升了供应商的利润。所提方法对于考虑最小订购量的供应链协调研究具有积极的推动作用。     

基于ARCH-Expectile方法的VaR和ES尾部风险测量

甄别和确定风险因素的贡献是资产或资产组合风险管理的重要研究内容。近十年,下端风险越来越受到关注,在险价值（Value at Risk,VaR）和预期不足（Expected Shortfall,ES）是资产组合风险管理中两个常用的风险度量工具。Kuan等^[1]在一类条件自回归模型（CARE）下提出了基于expectile的VaR度量-EVaR。本文扩展了Kuan等^[2]的CARE模型到带有异方差的数据,引入ARCH效应提出了一个线性ARCH-Expectile模型,旨在确定资产或资产组合的风险来源以及评估各风险因素的贡献大小,并应用expectile间接评估VaR和ES风险大小。同时给出了参数的两步估计算法,并建立了参数估计的大样本理论。最后,将本文所提出的方法应用于民生银行股票损益的风险分析,从公司基本面、市场流动性和宏观层面三个方面选取影响股票损益的风险因素,分析结果表明,各风险因素随股票极端损失大小的水平不同,其风险因素的来源及其大小和方向也是随之变化的。     

非对称成本扰动信息非线性需求函数下的供应链契约设计

为了分析非对称的成本扰动信息对于供应链契约设计的影响,研究了当制造商的成本发生扰动并且扰动信息是非对称的情形下的零售商的最优契约设计问题。假定市场需求是关于价格的非线性函数,使用委托-代理理论,设计了非对称的成本扰动信息下的供应链最优契约菜单,并且分析了非对称的扰动信息对于供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明,当需求为常数柔性函数或者指数函数形式时,可以设计有效的契约菜单来改善供应链的绩效;在非对称的成本扰动信息下,当生产成本扰动满足一定条件时,初始的生产计划仍然是最优的;非对称的成本扰动信息并不必然会给供应链带来利润损失。最后通过数值算例对模型的结果进行了验证。     

双边不确定性条件下制造商质量投资与零售商销售努力决策

已有研究较少同时考察供应链中制造商产品质量信号传递和零售商销售努力调整的问题。本文考虑零售商通过努力水平改变市场需求,且制造商分摊一定比例销售努力成本的情形,制造商在决定进行质量投资后,双方对制造商能否成为高质量类型各有不同的信念,零售商只能通过观察制造商提供的契约来修正关于制造商类型的信念,并确定产品销售价格与销售努力水平。构建博弈模型分析了双方的质量投资决策、销售努力决策、定价决策以及成本分摊比例。结果表明,在不考虑质量投资成本的情形下,制造商的质量投资能够达到帕累托最优。为了激励零售商付出最优促销努力水平,销售契约中规定销售成本分摊比例与惩罚措施,由于讨价还价的存在,实际的销售成本分摊比例小于对制造商最有利的成本分摊比例。对零售商而言,制造商承担的销售成本分摊比例并非越高越好,这意味着如果超过一定范围,制造商的成本分摊反而会损害零售商的利益。     

Analysis of directional dependence using asymmetric copula-based regression models

The directional dependence between variables using asymmetric copula regression has drawn much attention in recent years. There are, however, some critical issues which have not been properly addressed in regards to the statistical inference of the directional dependence. For example, the previous use of asymmetric copulas failed to fully capture the dependence patterns between variables, and the method used for the parameter estimation was not optimal. In addition, no method was considered for selecting a suitable asymmetric copula or for computing the general measurements of the directional dependence when there are no closed-form expressions. In this paper, we propose a generalized multiple-step procedure for the full inference of the directional dependence in joint behaviour based on the asymmetric copula regression. The proposed procedure utilizes several novel methodologies that have not been considered in the literature of the analysis of directional dependence. The performance and advantages of the proposed procedure are illustrated using two real data examples, one from biological research on histone genes, and the other from developmental research on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.     

A Note on Air‐Cargo Capacity Contracts

Carriers (airlines) use medium‐term contracts to allot bulk cargo capacity to forwarders who deliver consolidated loads for each flight in the contractual period (season). Carriers also sell capacity to direct‐ship customers on each flight. We study capacity contracts between a carrier and a forwarder when certain parameters such as the forwarder's demand, operating cost to the carrier, margin, and reservation profit are its private information. We propose contracts in which the forwarder pays a lump sum in exchange for a guaranteed capacity allotment and receives a refund for each unit of unused capacity according to a pre‐announced refund rate. We obtain an upper bound on the informational rent paid by the carrier for a menu of arbitrary allotments and identify conditions under which it can eliminate the informational rent and induce the forwarder to choose the overall optimal capacity allotment (i.e., one that maximizes the combined profits of the carrier and the forwarder).     

建设时间和投资成本不对称的双寡头期权博弈模型

运用不对称双寡头期权博弈模型,在投资成本不对称的基础上引入建设时间不对称,采用逆向归纳法导出建设时间和投资成本同时不对称的双寡头企业投资期权博弈模型;对存在的抢先均衡、序贯均衡和同时投资均衡进行分析讨论,投资均衡分析表明,建设时间和投资成本都会对企业投资策略产生影响,对于每个企业而言能否成为领先者以及何时投资要视建设时间和投资成本的相对优劣势等具体情况确定,但努力建立建设时间和投资成本的相对优势会给企业带来更多投资先机;进一步分析建设时间和投资成本对投资策略的影响显示,与建设时间相比,投资成本对企业的投资临界值影响更大,因此企业应花费更多精力通过降低投资成本获得竞争优势.