环境规制与资源型企业绿色行为选择:“倒逼转型”还是“规制俘获”

资源型企业绿色行为选择,除承担转型调整成本外,还面临高昂的沉没成本。为避免陷入“资源优势陷阱”,政府试图通过环境规制来约束企业的负外部性行为。通过构建环保监管部门与企业的双方动态博弈模型,并将绿色声誉对二者行为的约束、得益引入模型,探究环境规制能否诱导资源型企业的绿色行为选择。研究发现:精心制定的环境规制能触发企业绿色行为选择,但资源实际控制者环保监管部门与企业间易出现“规制俘获”;声誉机制透过政府公信力损失与得益,媒体披露影响力度与利益相关者态度,可有效约束监管部门被“俘获”行为,遏制企业寻租的可能性,间接倒逼待转型企业绿色行为选择;企业违规处罚力度的增加,在倒逼其绿色行为选择的同时,也降低了监管部门被寻租的机会。     

西方经济学中的信誉理论及其启示

信誉机制是保证契约诚实执行的重要机制,在现代市场经济中,信誉越来越成为影响现代企业成长的重要因素。在一个社会中,企业的信誉主要受博弈次数、产权和法律制度、竞争的环境以及政府行为的影响。信誉理论给我们的启示是:必须建立现代产权制度,加大对产权的保护力度;进一步消除垄断,引入更为开放的竞争政策;加快建立对失信者的惩罚机制;建立健全信息传输体系,发展我国的信用管理行业;政府应加强社会信用观念的培养,提高全社会的信用意识。     

论海瑞的“廉名”传播及历史启示

海瑞是清官的典型,他廉以处己,不惧强权,果断采取措施,整顿吏治,打击贪官污吏,在明代社会生活中产生积极的社会影响。其清廉的声誉随着其政治生涯变迁也有一个不断传播,并向神化发展的过程,这与明代官僚政治与民间社会心理需求有密切关系。海瑞的反贪措施直到今天仍有积极的现实借鉴意义。     

契约的可实施性与中国企业组织形式选择

契约的实施性影响企业组织形式的选择,对违约行为与契约实施机制的分析有助于理解企业在一体化与长期契约之间的选择。本文对我国的违约行为与契约的实施机制的特殊性进行了分析,将不可实施的契约分为自然违约、“敲竹杠”(hold-up problem)与恶意违约三种类型;在此基础上,笔者以东软集团有限公司为例,指出在恶意违约大量存在、信誉机制缺乏与法律执行力弱的情况下,一体化而不是长期契约是中国企业组织形式的理性选择。     

高校声誉的培育与维护

良好的声誉是高校所拥有的独特资源,它能在各个方面增强高校的竞争力.文章从明确学校定位,提高毕业生质量,重视校风建设,实施名师强校战略和转变管理观念等方面,阐述了培育高校声誉的途径,提出了高校声誉维护的两个原则,即快速反应和高效沟通.     

对重庆南岸区中小企业信用担保中心的调查研究

在我国目前中小企业信用程度不高的情况下,通过担保机构为中小企业融资提供信用担保服务,是解决中小企业融资难的重要举措。重庆市南岸区中小企业信用担保中心经历了从1999年"破题"成立,2000年运作"开步",到2001年"走稳路"三个阶段,收到了良好的效果。本文对南岸区信保中心的运行情况进行了理论分析,并对存在的问题提出了对策建议。     

Alignment between Quality Enforcement Devices and Governance Structures in the Agro-food Vertical Chains

Using a Transaction Cost Economics framework, this paper studies how supply chain governance are aligned with the type of quality enforcement mechanisms used in transactions with consumers. Specifically we compare governance of supply chains when private brand assures quality to chains where official certification assures products’ quality for customers. To test our proposition, we conducted a set of 42 case studies in 3 agro-food sectors (processed meat, cheese, fruits and vegetable) from 7 European countries. We found that supply chain governance is closer to hierarchy-like modes of organization in cases where reputational capital is the main quality assurance device, whereas market-like governance is more prevalent in cases with public certification.     

《让县自明本志令》评议

《让县自明本志令》是曹操在政治气候极不利于自己的情况下写成的。文中谈其早年的心志是客观的,至于谈到迎汉献帝于许都以后如何诩戴汉室,绝无“不逊之志”云云,则纯属英雄欺人。那种认为曹操此文字字是实、句句是真的传统观点值得商榷。评价历史人物,尤其伟大的政治家,我们所凭据的只能是他的行为,言谈则只有在做评价的参考时才有其意义。     

高校教师激励机制的模式研究

从经济理论角度透视高等院校教师激励机制的本质,用委托代理、声誉理论等方法研究和揭示高等院校教师激励机制的内在规律,提出修正的工资激励模型及"知本市场"("教授市场")理论.     

Bargaining,Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

Consider a two‐person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period, and collect payoffs (as a function of that period's actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split, because a folk theorem applies. Perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided, as the perturbation probabilities approach zero. Behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent's play. In equilibrium, rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues. How much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining? In both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the “Nash bargaining with threats” (NBWT) theory developed for two‐stage games. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, she can guarantee herself virtually her NBWT payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy: in every period, ask for (and accept nothing less than) that player's NBWT share and, while waiting for the other side to concede, take the action Nash recommends as a threat in his two‐stage game. The results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others. This is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems, to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two‐sided reputational perturbations, and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go.