Trimmed mean and bounded influence estimators for the parameters of the ar(1) process

Trimmed mean type estimators are proposcd for estimating the parameters of an AR(1) process. Thcsc definitions are then extended to bounded influence trimmed mcans in analogy to those in the regression case. The behaviour of the estimators are studied numerically under two

outlicr generating models.     

论音乐创作主体心理结构

影响和支配音乐创作主体的心理因素有感知记忆、思维想像、审美体验、直觉感悟、实践意志等。考察和探究这些复杂的心理活动 ,有助于创作主体对自己创作过程的了解 ,并为人们理解音乐这门艺术提供一个认识的窗口。     

Semi‐Nonparametric IV Estimation of Shape‐Invariant Engel Curves

This paper studies a shape‐invariant Engel curve system with endogenous total expenditure, in which the shape‐invariant specification involves a common shift parameter for each demographic group in a pooled system of nonparametric Engel curves. We focus on the identification and estimation of both the nonparametric shapes of the Engel curves and the parametric specification of the demographic scaling parameters. The identification condition relates to the bounded completeness and the estimation procedure applies the sieve minimum distance estimation of conditional moment restrictions, allowing for endogeneity. We establish a new root mean squared convergence rate for the nonparametric instrumental variable regression when the endogenous regressor could have unbounded support. Root‐n asymptotic normality and semiparametric efficiency of the parametric components are also given under a set of “low‐level” sufficient conditions. Our empirical application using the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey shows the importance of adjusting for endogeneity in terms of both the nonparametric curvatures and the demographic parameters of systems of Engel curves.     

Level‐k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private‐Value Auctions?

This paper proposes a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete‐information games based on “level‐k” thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete‐information games. We derive the model's implications in first‐ and second‐price auctions with general information structures, compare them to equilibrium and Eyster and Rabin's (2005) “cursed equilibrium,” and evaluate the model's potential to explain nonequilibrium bidding in auction experiments. The level‐k model generalizes many insights from equilibrium auction theory. It allows a unified explanation of the winner's curse in common‐value auctions and overbidding in those independent‐private‐value auctions without the uniform value distributions used in most experiments.     

询价制下IPO定价的演化博弈分析

基于网下询价过程中发行人、投资者与承销商的策略选择,构建IPO定价演化博弈模型,分析中国询价制下IPO定价过程中发行人、投资者与承销商策略行为的演化均衡过程,结果表明不同策略下的收益差异决定了三者的演化稳定策略：1）如果发行人如实报告并不能得到相匹配的收益,那么之后的上市公司在披露信息时将选择粉饰业绩,进而导致IPO市场出现"逆向选择"问题;2）投资者是追求风险报价还是价值报价,取决于新股发行定价与上市后价格之间的净抑价,因而只有压缩风险报价下的净抑价空间,才可能使投资者回归价值报价;3）对于承销商来说,一方面承销收入激励其提高新股发行价,另一方面声誉约束其高定价,因而只有当掠夺的抑价利益不能够抵消声誉损失时,其才采取让渡定价策略,否则采取掠夺定价策略。     

在"枢纽"与"限界"之间的边缘人 民国时期边地汉人形象构建论说

民国时期,边地汉人在研究者的笔触之下被赋予了不同的形象。吴文藻、陶云逵等较早地接受了美国芝加哥学派社会学家罗伯特·帕克提出的“边缘人”理论,并从宏大国家叙事着眼,阐释了边地汉人的“枢纽人”作用。不过,李安宅、梁钊韬、费孝通等基于微观“边地日常”的观察表明,作为“限界群”的边地汉人的图利动机及其行为有时对边疆建设来说是一个“问题”。两种相互矛盾的形象表述直接或间接地与罗伯特·帕克的“边缘人”理论发生对话,揭示了民国时期国内社会知识精英所持边疆社会改造方法论的分歧。回到历史现场,无论是“枢纽说”抑或“限界说”,均表达了研究者对边地汉人的关怀和期待,同时亦反映了历史经验和现实利益交织下边地人群交往、交流、交融的复杂性。     

新兴技术不确定性的起源及应对方法

人的有限理性与认知风险是产生新兴技术不确定性的根本原因,通过新兴技术活动的放大,新兴技术的不确定性最终体现在新兴技术的市场、技术、管理等多个方面.要从组织学习、运用实物期权思维、建设新型组织、优化网络结构、关注市场以及应用情景规划法等方面着手寻找应对新兴技术不确定性的方法.     

有限理性视角下区域内地方政府博弈行为的演化与稳定

文章从有限理性视角出发,运用演化博弈理论对区域内地方政府间的博弈行为进行分析.研究发现:在外部条件既定的情况下,区域内同质、异质地方政府的博弈存在各自不同的演化路径和稳定策略;并且实现稳定策略的路径不是经典博弈理论下的简单线性路径,而是复杂的非线性路径,存在关键性的阀值.这意味着,对区域内地方政府间博弈行为的调节需要依博弈参与者的不同属性和博弈的演化路径来进行,并且有效地调节思路需在博弈的外部求解.     

渠道销售中的机会主义——收益与损失

研究表明,当制造商处于竞争性环境,而购买商具有一定的市场势力时,制造商的机会主义行为并不能使自己的利润增加,反而使购买商的销售利润增加、福利有一定的提高。因而在渠道销售中有必要区分“好”的机会主义行为和“坏”的机会主义行为,针对不同的机会主义行为采用相应的治理机制,才能够科学地保证渠道销售低交易成本运行,那种凡机会主义行为必有害、必须严厉控制的观点会适得其反,导致不必要的资源浪费和福利损失。     

Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules

This paper considers learning rules for environments in which little prior and feedback information is available to the decision maker. Two properties of such learning rules are studied: absolute expediency and monotonicity. Both require that some aspect of the decision maker's performance improves from the current period to the next. The paper provides some necessary, and some sufficient conditions for these properties. It turns out that there is a large variety of learning rules that have the properties. However, all learning rules that have these properties are related to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. For the case in which there are only two actions, it is shown that one of the absolutely expedient learning rules dominates all others.