农户购买种子行为探析

通过对部分地区农户购买种子的行为进行研究,为种子企业在新品种开发、市场营销、乡镇网络建设等方面的决策提供依据,为政府实施农业产业结构调整和农业产业化决策提供依据。     

消费者冲动性购买行为的影响因素分析

消费者冲动性购买行为的复杂性表现为其既可能受到外部因素的影响,同时更可能接受内部因素的作用.通过定性分析和定量验证,认为产品、个人及心理、营销刺激和购物情景是影响消费者冲动性购买行为发生的主要因素,其中个人及心理的影响是内因,在消费者冲动性购买行为中起决定性作用;产品、营销刺激、购物情景是影响消费者冲动性购买行为的外因,外因通过内因作用于消费者,由此提出了提高消费者购买力的一些建议.     

网络购买“意向—行为”过程及影响因素研究

在综合分析已有文献的基础上,提出了网络购买行为模型(MOB),对消费者网络购买行为的产生过程以及相关影响因素进行分析。分析结果认为,当消费者有初始购买意向时,对网络的接受程度会影响最终线上购买意向的形成,最后消费者理性程度会影响实际购买行为的产生。此外,采用文献综述法,借鉴相关理论模型并通过MOB解决其中的不足。同时提出的"心理账户"作为理性的测度方式,可为模型的检验手段提供依据。     

窃取、收买、非法提供信用卡信息罪的刑法分析

窃取、收买、非法提供信用卡信息罪中的信用卡信息是指信用卡本身所承载的信息。对实践中出现的利用虚假的银行客户服务电话套取持卡人的信用卡信息资料的行为,不宜认定为“窃取”。“非法提供”是指将自己掌握、了解的他人信用卡信息传授给他人的行为。采用侵占、抢夺、抢劫、毁坏等方式取得信用卡信息的行为也不宜认定为本罪。由于本罪是选择性罪名,其犯罪形态的认定也应区别对待。本罪与出售、非法提供公民个人信息罪,非法侵入计算机信息系统罪,妨害信用卡管理罪以及非法获取计算机信息系统数据罪的界分,应从犯罪客体、客观方面予以把握。     

广义ATO下基于多种团购模型的供应链协调

针对由多个供应商、单个制造商和零售商所组成的广义按订单装配式供应链,在上游多个供应商不确定的零部件（或商品）供应以及下游客户不确定的需求的环境下,首先分析基本模型中团购前后的零售商和制造商的利润变化,然后提出了团购的标准模型和协调模型,并比较三种不同的团购模型对各成员以及全局供应链绩效的影响。通过数学推导证明和仿真数据算例分析,结果表明：零售商自发的团购基本模型总是对制造商有利,而对零售商的好处是有限的;由制造商主导的团购标准模型在满足一定条件时是优于团购基本模型的,但有使得零售商甚至制造商自身受到损失的可能;而集中决策下的团购协调模型能够提升全局供应链的期望利润,实现渠道的帕累托改善,但协调的效果会受到团购客户组成结构的限制。     

网络舆情扰动下房地产投资者“追涨杀跌”行为扩散研究

一旦房地产投资者“追涨杀跌”行为发生大范围扩散,将诱发房地产市场的价格严重偏离甚至动荡。本文从传播学与行为金融学交叉视角,基于复杂网络理论构建了房地产投资者“追涨杀跌”行为的网络扩散模型,进而仿真分析了网络舆情与投资者行为偏好交互作用下房地产投资者“追涨杀跌”行为扩散的演化特征。研究表明：房地产投资者越偏向于随机建立关联,“追涨杀跌”行为越可能快速扩散;网络舆情因素在“追涨杀跌”行为扩散过程中发挥主导作用,同时对投资者行为偏好因素发挥较强的“强化效应”或“抑制效应”;当媒体权威性足够高或网民情绪足够乐观时,通过综合调节网络舆情和投资者行为偏好因素能够有效实现预防和限制“追涨杀跌”行为扩散的目的。     

冲动性购买情境下消费者后悔影响的实证研究

采用情境投射与普通问卷相结合的多样化研究方法,探讨冲动性购买负面后果的影响以及不同归因的消费者受影响程度是否不同。结果表明,如果第一次冲动性购买行为带来负面后果,再次遇到类似情境时消费者的购买冲动性和认知评价都会受到较大影响,他们往往降低自身的购买冲动性,倾向于不再购买,并且对下一次购买具有负面的认知评价。同时,不同归因的消费者对再次冲动性购买的认知评价存在差异。     

Compulsive buying: Does it matter how it’s measured?

The primary purpose of the present study is to compare and contrast the validity and reliability of the Faber and O’Guinn [Faber, R. J., & O’Guinn, T. C. (1992). A clinical screener for compulsive buying. Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 459–469] and Edwards [Edwards, E. A. (1993). Development of a new scale for measuring compulsive buying behavior. Financial Counseling and Planning, 4, 67–84] compulsive buying scales within a nomological network. Although both psychometric scales were designed to measure compulsive buying, the two instruments appear to be distinct in how they conceptualize the compulsive buying phenomenon. The seven-item compulsive buying scale developed by Faber and O’Guinn (1992) is the most commonly used scale for measuring compulsive buying. The Edwards scale in contrast is not as well-known. Empirical results of the present study suggest that the two compulsive buying scales may be capturing either separate constructs, or different dimensions of the same compulsive buying construct. Edwards (1993) compulsive buying scale, for instance, is correlated with materialism but not with attitudes toward money while the Faber and O’Guinn scale is not correlated with materialism but is correlated with attitudes toward money. The present study’s results suggest, among other things, that it does in fact appear to matter how compulsive buying is measured.     

洪宪帝制前袁世凯与部属的关系--兼论袁世凯的用人术

袁世凯知人善用,礼贤下士,不拘一格地提拔和笼络了一批政治、经济、军事、外交方面的人才,使之成为自己的部属,辅佐其统治。但实质上他用人是以利益关系为转移的,靠金钱利诱和个人交情等手段来笼络,一旦其部属与其利益不一致或危及到他的利益,就对部属行排挤和猜忌之术,而不管以前他们之间的关系是多么密切和融洽。袁世凯的用人术有开明的一面,同时又有浓厚的狭隘性。由此还可以透视出袁世凯集团的团结是基于一种纯利益关系,袁世凯集团最终分裂亦肇因于此。     

Optimal pricing for group buying with network effects

In this paper, we analyze online group-pricing mechanisms for sellers and compare them with the option of selling only to individuals. We formulate the demand for group buying and individual buying (GB and IB, respectively) based on the utility a consumer attains from each environment considering two specific types of externalities unique to our problem. First, we assume that consumers receive positive “network effects” from GB, i.e., they obtain utility from shopping with others because of information exchange and collective support. Second, they encounter a negative externality of group buying because of inconvenience costs and delays in receiving the products. The two types of externalities lead to distorted demand, which in turn affects prices and profits. We analyze the optimal and equilibrium strategies for a seller operating in monopoly, duopoly, and multiple-firm competition. We derive the equilibrium strategies and show the existence of a Nash Equilibrium under competition of multiple firms. In addition, we show that positive network effects from group buying often outweigh the negative externalities arising from costs.