产权性质、大股东控制程度与投资效率--基于Shapley指数的实证研究

在全球金融危机的背景下,企业面临着不同程度的融资约束,这种约束势必会对企业的投资效率产生影响,本文选用基于海洋博弈模型（ Oceanic Games）的Shapley指数来测度大股东控制度,研究了后股权分置时代上市公司股权结构对投资效率的影响。研究发现,金融危机背景下,我国上市公司整体而言存在一定程度的投资不足,特别是非政府控制上市公司,而大股东投资决策的积极参与,能够在很大程度上缓解企业因融资约束而面临的投资不足问题,大股东的这种积极作用在非政府控制企业中更为显著。这些研究结果表明在企业面临发展困境时,大股东的自身资源和决策对企业的发展起着重要的作用。     

Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit

This paper develops a framework to assess how fear of miscoordination affects the sustainability of cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson and van Damme (1993), it explores the effect of small amounts of private information on a class of dynamic cooperation games with exit. Lack of common knowledge leads players to second guess each other's behavior and makes coordination difficult. This restricts the range of equilibria and highlights the role of miscoordination payoffs in determining whether cooperation is sustainable or not. The paper characterizes the range of perfect Bayesian equilibria as the players' information becomes arbitrarily precise. Unlike in one‐shot two‐by‐two games, the global games information structure does not yield equilibrium uniqueness.     

The Right to Remain Silent

The paper points out that in dynamic games a player may be better-off if other players do not know his choice of strategy. That is, a player may benefit by not revealing (or not pre-determining) the choice of his action in an information set he (thereby) hopes will not be reached. He would be better-off by exercising his ``right to remain silent' if he believes –- as the empirical evidence shows –- that players display aversion to ``Knightian uncertainty'. In this case, a player who behaves strategically, may wish to avoid revealing his strategy. This is true under various interpretations of the notion of ``strategy profiles'.     

试论体育比赛的知识产权化——从电视转播权交易谈起

在现代体育商业化进程中,存在着一个法律的盲点。体育比赛组织者同传媒进行转播权交易并取得丰厚回报,似乎组织者对体育比赛有一种专有的权利。但是这种通过惯例或自我宣示取得的权利,并没有什么在法律上经得起考验的依据。这一盲点的存在有很大的隐忧,而要解决这一问题应该将体育比赛纳入知识产权法律体系(知识产权化)。知识产权化有两种可选择的路径。     

Evidence for Learning to Learn Behavior in Normal Form Games

Evidence presented in Salmon (2001; Econometrica 69(6) 1597) indicates that typical tests to identify learning behavior in experiments involving normal form games possess little power to reject incorrect models. This paper begins by presenting results from an experiment designed to gather alternative data to overcome this problem. The results from these experiments indicate support for a learning-to-learn or rule learning hypothesis in which subjects change their decision rule over time. These results are then used to construct an adaptive learning model which is intended to mimic more accurately the behavior observed. The final section of the paper presents results from a simple simulation based analysis comparing the performance of this adaptive learning model with that of several standard decision rules in reproducing the choice patterns observed in the experiment.JEL Classification: C92, C72     

对称成本企业合作竞争博弈分析

企业间的合作竞争已成为当今世界经济发展战略的大趋势,本文采用Minimax定理来进行合作竞争的战略决策,该决策战略能确保均衡点处达到较高满意度的企业数量较多。将Minimax定理用于线性逆需求对称成本企业合作竞争的产量战略博弈,并与完全竞争市场中的NASH博弈均衡和完全合作均衡进行了对比,最后提出了对付非合作行为的战略。     

A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation

We present an approach to network formation based on the notion that social networks are formed by individual decisions that trade off the costs of forming and maintaining links against the potential rewards from doing so. We suppose that a link with another agent allows access, in part and in due course, to the benefits available to the latter via his own links. Thus individual links generate externalities whose value depends on the level of decay/delay associated with indirect links. A distinctive aspect of our approach is that the costs of link formation are incurred only by the person who initiates the link. This allows us to formulate the network formation process as a noncooperative game. We first provide a characterization of the architecture of equilibrium networks. We then study the dynamics of network formation. We find that individual efforts to access benefits offered by others lead, rapidly, to the emergence of an equilibrium social network, under a variety of circumstances. The limiting networks have simple architectures, e.g., the wheel, the star, or generalizations of these networks. In many cases, such networks are also socially efficient.     

大学生网游成瘾案例引发的思考

通过分析一则大学生网游成瘾的案例及其心理诱因——人际交往受挫、学习目标迷失、抑郁人格特征形成、社会支持缺乏,找到矫正策略——认知重建,压力排解,责任归位,勇于“空杯”,以期引发对大学生网游成瘾问题的进一步思考。     

网络游戏中虚拟财产的强制执行探析

《中华人民共和国民法总则》第一百二十七条未对网络虚拟财产的权利属性做明确规定.网络游戏中虚拟财产在现实中的兴起对人民法院的执行工作提出了挑战,能否将其纳入强制执行的范围,如何构建针对虚拟财产的强制执行制度,是司法实践中需要解决的一个问题.解决这一问题的前提是明确网络游戏中虚拟财产的权利属性.网络游戏中的虚拟财产具有物权属性,从财产历史层面、社会实践层面、法律制度层面考量,可以将其纳入强制执行的范围,在现有执行理论和法律制度范围内对其强制执行进行制度构建.