基于信号博弈的外资并购国有企业定价研究

定价是外资并购国有企业能否成功的最关键因素,并购定价主要涉及外资企业与国有企业之间的一系列讨价还价过程,是一种典型的博弈行为。本文运用博弈理论与方法构建了外资并购国有企业定价的信号博弈模型,并进行博弈均衡分析。结果表明,在分离均衡下,定价信号可以真实地反映国有企业经营绩效的好坏,是一种最有效率的均衡。定价信号能为提高并购效率和成功率提供有益参考,为并购各方提供决策依据。     

制度缺陷与利益博弈——农村集体土地的所有制困境

鉴于农村集体土地所有权的制度缺陷所引发的诸多问题,许多人基于促进农业发展和保护农民利益等理由,提出应从根本上改变现行农村土地制度,以土地国有化或者土地私有化取代农村集体所有权制度。农村集体土地所有制的改革涉及到农民、中央政府、地方政府、乡村权势阶层等多方利益,所有制的缺陷损害了农民的利益,但却对其他利益相关群体有利,作为政策主导的政府和权势阶层在利益博弈的过程中不可能改变现有农村土地的集体所有制。     

基于无限次重复博弈模型的人民币升值节奏问题研究

从游资与预期的角度,利用无限次重复博弈模型研究人民币汇率升值幅度的纳什均衡问题。研究结论包括：纳什均衡汇率与游资不撤离的损失补偿正相关,与中国维持GDP高增长的概率正相关,与贴现系数负相关;在游资大量流进的条件下,人民币汇率升值幅度不仅要包括游资持有者所获得的稳定外汇收益以及损失补偿,还要求汇率调整出现＂超调＂;游资流入对经济的推动扣除风险损失后的剩余,不能小于游资持有者的机会成本加上一定比例升水。     

精神家园的迷失：远离自然的儿童游戏--基于柳溪村儿童游戏的田野调查

在幼儿游戏方面,柳溪村幼儿班里年纪较小的孩子们在幼师和家长的视野之外,建构了独立自由的游戏空间,从而区隔了课上与课下的二元游戏界限———唯有在课下“真空”的游戏场域中,孩子们的游戏精神方能发挥到淋漓尽致。但从乡村儿童总体的游戏情形来看：传统的儿童游戏几近衰落,手工制作玩具濒临失传。这些伴随电子游戏成长起来的乡村儿童,面临着比城市儿童更严重的电视依赖,他们游戏的性质经历了从亲近自然到远离自然、从手工创意制作到购买廉价玩具、从群体嬉戏到个体自娱、从动态游戏到静态娱乐的异化过程。     

Stochastic Algorithms,Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium,and the ‘curse’ of Dimensionality

This paper introduces a stochastic algorithm for computing symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. The algorithm computes equilibrium policy and value functions, and generates a transition kernel for the (stochastic) evolution of the state of the system. It has two features that together imply that it need not be subject to the curse of dimensionality. First, the integral that determines continuation values is never calculated; rather it is approximated by a simple average of returns from past outcomes of the algorithm, an approximation whose computational burden is not tied to the dimension of the state space. Second, iterations of the algorithm update value and policy functions at a single (rather than at all possible) points in the state space. Random draws from a distribution set by the updated policies determine the location of the next iteration's updates. This selection only repeatedly hits the recurrent class of points, a subset whose cardinality is not directly tied to that of the state space. Numerical results for industrial organization problems show that our algorithm can increase speed and decrease memory requirements by several orders of magnitude.     

Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers

Laboratory and field studies of time preference find that discount rates are much greater in the short‐run than in the long‐run. Hyperbolic discount functions capture this property. This paper solves the decision problem of a hyperbolic consumer who faces stochastic income and a borrowing constraint. The paper uses the bounded variation calculus to derive the Hyperbolic Euler Relation, a natural generalization of the standard Exponential Euler Relation. The Hyperbolic Euler Relation implies that consumers act as if they have endogenous rates of time preference that rise and fall with the future marginal propensity to consume (e.g., discount rates that endogenously range from 5% to 41% for the example discussed in the paper).     

浅议网络游戏对大学生校园生活的影响

通过分析网络游戏对大学生的正、反影响因素,对摆正网络游戏与大学生生活及学业之间的关系作了认真思考。     

公共行政部门支出预算过程的博弈分析

我国推行的支出预算管理方面的改革,其目标是建立与社会主义市场经济相适应的预算管理体制,在这一改革进程中,个体利益和部门利益有了合法地位,但因新的信息传递机制尚未建立或完善而导致的预算管理中信息不完全、不对称现象非常严重。因此,运用不完全和不完美信息的博弈理论,可以解释政府支出中许多低效率现象的根源,揭示导致低效率的制度性原因,从而有助于完善政府支出预算管理制度和提高政府支出预算管理制度的运行效率。     

An Analysis of Stability Sets in pure Coordination Games

We calculate the Lebesgue–measures of the stability sets of Nash-equilibria in pure coordination games. The results allow us to observe that the ordering induced by the Lebesgue–measure of stability sets upon strict Nash-equilibria does not necessarily agree with the ordering induced by risk–dominance. Accordingly, an equilibrium selection theory based on the Lebesgue–measure of stability sets would be necessarily different from one which uses the Nash-property as a point of orientation.     

企业技术联盟与一类“产学研”合作技术创新模式选择研究

面向创新网络,将企业间与"产学研"合作创新模式进行统一考虑,建立了企业技术联盟和一类"产学研"合作技术创新模式选择动态博弈模型。在投入规模、投入比例、产品价格与创新利润等均衡变量的基础上,分析了企业间、企业-高校间资源共享进行合作研发的条件:探讨"产学研-集成创新模式"下技术许可与合资企业2种模式的有效选择问题:研究了由企业联合体模式向"产学研-集成创新模式"进行演化的过程及条件。