区域游戏中幼儿学习行为的图式论解析

图式理论研究不仅为幼儿园区域游戏的开展提供理论指导，同时也提供了可操作的技术支持，在帮助教师更好地理解 幼儿学习特点与学习品质的同时也提升教师对区域游戏活动因区而异、精准指导的水平。本研究采用观察法、案例分析法和 文本解析法对区域游戏中幼儿学习行为的特点进行了研究，在重点梳理与分析覆盖—容纳、动态旋转、动态垂直、动态来回四 种图式类型行为特点的基础上，对幼儿的学习特点进行解读，同时发现不同类型图式存在着典型性、稳定性、发展性和一致性 等共性特征，并在此基础上提出了相应的研究启示。     

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

We consider a dynamic Bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first‐order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game. In general, there is a trade‐off between productive efficiency, whereby the low‐cost firm serves the market in a given period, and high prices. We show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm, if the distribution of costs is log‐concave and firms are sufficiently patient, then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity: firms set the same price and share the market equally, regardless of their respective costs. When serial correlation of costs is imperfect, partial productive efficiency is optimal. For the case of two cost types, first‐best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks, but not otherwise. We present numerical examples of first‐best collusive schemes.     

法经济学视角下国家法的限度——民间规则与国家法关系的重新定位

当下法学界存在一种较为普遍的看法,即民间法具有"乡土性"、"依附性"及"弥补性"特征.然而从法经济学的视角看,民间规则是通过私人自主博弈而实现的最优产权安排,只是由于存在交易成本而妨碍了利害关系人自主博弈的效果,国家立法的有限度地干预才成为必要.因此,依赖于利害关系人自主博弈和自我实施的民间规则,才是产权安排的理想状态,是整个社会规则的根本基础.国家法不应介入低交易成本条件下的私人自主博弈,在高交易成本条件下不可替代利害关系人自主博弈,并应避免公共选择对集体选择的替代和排挤.     

2009年中国男篮亚洲篮球赛事结果评述

通过对2009年亚锦赛、东亚运动会中国男篮在关键比赛场次的核心技术指标的比较、分析,解谜占有身高优势和内线实力的中国男子篮球队,在这些年的国际大赛中总是不能取得令国人满意的竞赛成绩的深层原因.由此提出在篮球竞技赛场上,追求各个＂位置＂技、战术能力的平衡发展,形成内外结合的团队优势,是中国男篮在发展过程中应该注重解决的问题.     

故事与游戏:走向数字叙事学

数字叙事只能在计算机环境下存在和体验,主要表现为互动小说、超文本小说、虚拟现实叙事以及具有叙事性的电子游戏.数字叙事学是对数字叙事的诗学描写,首先要处理故事和游戏的关系.故事和游戏可视为建构虚拟世界的两种不同但互补的模式,背后的符号意指过程分别是表征和模拟;其中故事呈现为游戏的脚本,而游戏则是潜在的故事.叙述和互动作为虚拟世界的体验方式,可以经过重构达到恰当的结合.故事的空间化逻辑为数字游戏实现叙事潜力提供了可能,叙事学的人物观可以成为计算机人物创作的灵感源泉.     

Cooperative Advertising and Pricing in a Dynamic Stochastic Supply Chain: Feedback Stackelberg Strategies

Cooperative (co‐op) advertising is an important instrument for aligning manufacturer and retailer decisions in supply chains. In this, the manufacturer announces a co‐op advertising policy, i.e., a participation rate that specifies the percentage of the retailer's advertising expenditure that it will provide. In addition, it also announces the wholesale price. In response, the retailer chooses its optimal advertising and pricing policies. We model this supply chain problem as a stochastic Stackelberg differential game whose dynamics follows Sethi's stochastic sales‐advertising model. We obtain the condition when offering co‐op advertising is optimal for the manufacturer. We provide in feedback form the optimal advertising and pricing policies for the manufacturer and the retailer. We contrast the results with the advertising and price decisions of the vertically integrated channel, and suggest a method for coordinating the channel.     

Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets

We provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static, discrete games. With respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general forms of heterogeneity across players without making equilibrium selection assumptions. We allow the effects that the entry of each individual airline has on the profits of its competitors, its “competitive effects,” to differ across airlines. The identified features of the model are sets of parameters (partial identification) such that the choice probabilities predicted by the econometric model are consistent with the empirical choice probabilities estimated from the data. We apply this methodology to investigate the empirical importance of firm heterogeneity as a determinant of market structure in the U.S. airline industry. We find evidence of heterogeneity across airlines in their profit functions. The competitive effects of large airlines (American, Delta, United) are different from those of low cost carriers and Southwest. Also, the competitive effect of an airline is increasing in its airport presence, which is an important measure of observable heterogeneity in the airline industry. Then we develop a policy experiment to estimate the effect of repealing the Wright Amendment on competition in markets out of the Dallas airports. We find that repealing the Wright Amendment would increase the number of markets served out of Dallas Love.     

Corrigendum to “Games With Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time”

Sannikov (2007) investigated properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous‐time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of Lemma 6, required for the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2), contains an error in computing a Hessian matrix. A correct proof of Lemma 6 is provided using an additional innocuous assumption and a generalized version of Lemma 5.     

博弈者认知模式与合作意愿度分析

建立了无限合作博弈类型下的合作意愿度(DWC)运算模型,目的是研究博弈者不同的认知模式将会对博弈者的DWC值和收益率产生怎样的影响;突发事件和合作环境如何影响博弈者的DWC值.模拟了2人无限合作博弈的三种模式,得出主要结论:双方都是柔性思维的博弈者比双方都是刚性思维的博弈者获得的收益率较小;如果一方为柔性思维,另一方是刚性思维,则柔性思维博弈者能够获得较高的收益,而刚性思维博弈者却能获得较高的DWC值;如果博弈者都具有柔性思维功能,合作不会稳定与满意;在突发事件起决定作用的情况下,博弈双方的平均收益率和平均DWC值都要减小;博弈一方为柔性思维者,另一方为刚性思维是较好的一种合作模式.     

朱德与陕甘宁边区的体育运动

朱德同志为陕甘宁边区体育运动的蓬勃发展作出了重大贡献。他发起成立了延安新体育会,多次为体育运动讲话、提词、发起举办“九一”扩大运动会,积极参加并精心指导体育工作。