基于修正UTAUT模型的农信社手机银行使用行为研究——以福建省农户调查数据为例

基于UTAUT模型,引入感知风险、替代软件等2个变量进行修正,构建农信社手机银行使用行为影响因素研究模型,并运用结构方程模型、Bootstrap中介检验、多群组分析等方法对福建省农户调查数据进行实证分析。研究发现:(1)感知易用性显著正向影响农信社手机银行使用意愿;感知风险和替代软件显著负向影响农信社手机银行使用意愿;社会影响对农信社手机银行使用意愿影响不显著。(2)便利条件和使用意愿显著正向影响农信社手机银行使用行为;农信社手机银行使用行为影响因素由大到小依次为便利条件、替代软件、感知风险、感知易用性。(3)教育在感知易用性对农信社手机银行使用意愿影响中具有调节作用。据此提出,应进一步增强操作的便利性以优化业务办理效率,增强信息的安全性以降低软件使用风险,增强软件的特色性以降低软件可替代性,增强软件的易用性以优化便捷使用体验,从而优化农村金融服务供给,助推农村经济发展。     

形式与意义:儿童文学作品中的游戏精神

儿童文学的"游戏精神"主要是指在儿童作品文本中体现出的、通过人物游戏所传递的一种符合儿童心理需求和审美旨趣,并实现儿童内心愿望的精神。周作人认为儿童文学的游戏精神是"幻想精神""愉悦精神"和"自由精神"。儿童文学游戏精神具有快乐性、幻想性和自由性的三性特征"。游戏精神"在儿童文学中作品的主要呈现形式为:通过"顽童""小大人""、反派"等人物形象的塑造凸显游戏精神;通过故事情节蕴涵的笨拙与聪明、嬉笑与吵闹、虚拟与真实凸显游戏精神;通过语言夸张凸显荒诞美、语言颠倒凸显逆向思维、语言突转凸显惊奇,从而凸显游戏精神。游戏精神对于儿童文学作品编创的意义在于:游戏精神是儿童文学的基本属性和内涵所在,新媒介时代儿童文学的发展需要延续游戏精神。因此游戏精神是儿童文学的作品编创的重要依据和准则。     

基于中外合作办学学生特点的教学管理策略研究

中外合作办学能够较好地满足我国社会对高等教育多样化的需求，提高高等院校人才培养的质量，但因中外合作办学的独特性，其招收的学生也是特点鲜明，文章在全面剖析中外合作办学学生特点和学习现状的基础上，提出了配套教学管理策略。     

Personality traits and strategic behavior: Anxiousness and aggressiveness in entry games

We demonstrate that personality has a systematic effect on strategic behavior. We focus on two personality traits: anxiousness and aggressiveness, and consider a 2-player entry game, where each player can guarantee a payoff by staying out, a higher payoff if she is the only player to enter, but a lower payoff if both players enter. We find that: anxious players enter less; aggressive players enter more; players are more likely to enter against anxious than non-anxious players; and players are less likely to enter against aggressive than non-aggressive players. We discuss the possible mechanism through which personality affects strategic behavior.     

Defender–Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorism

We propose a methodology, called defender–attacker decision tree analysis, to evaluate defensive actions against terrorist attacks in a dynamic and hostile environment. Like most game‐theoretic formulations of this problem, we assume that the defenders act rationally by maximizing their expected utility or minimizing their expected costs. However, we do not assume that attackers maximize their expected utilities. Instead, we encode the defender's limited knowledge about the attacker's motivations and capabilities as a conditional probability distribution over the attacker's decisions. We apply this methodology to the problem of defending against possible terrorist attacks on commercial airplanes, using one of three weapons: infrared‐guided MANPADS (man‐portable air defense systems), laser‐guided MANPADS, or visually targeted RPGs (rocket propelled grenades). We also evaluate three countermeasures against these weapons: DIRCMs (directional infrared countermeasures), perimeter control around the airport, and hardening airplanes. The model includes deterrence effects, the effectiveness of the countermeasures, and the substitution of weapons and targets once a specific countermeasure is selected. It also includes a second stage of defensive decisions after an attack occurs. Key findings are: (1) due to the high cost of the countermeasures, not implementing countermeasures is the preferred defensive alternative for a large range of parameters; (2) if the probability of an attack and the associated consequences are large, a combination of DIRCMs and ground perimeter control are preferred over any single countermeasure.     

协调：一种应对公共政策执行阻滞现象的理念——基于公共政策执行中中央与地方的博弈分析

现有研究所提出的消解公共政策执行阻滞现象的对策多为事后性对策，且偏于刚性方式。以博弈论为理论依据，通过建构传统策略下中央与地方的策略互动、“协调”作为中央策略下的策略互动、协调引入博弈最始端下的策略互动三个博弈模型，比较得出将协调引入公共政策的制定和执行中，将有助于公共政策执行阻滞现象的减少和消除，并在此基础上提出以协调为理念构建的对策。     

巧妙利用小组合作学习实现英语单元复习的高效性

比起形式丰富多彩的新授课,学生经常感到复习课枯燥乏味。为了激发学生的学习热情,在英语单元复习课上,采用小组合作学习的方式,引导学生开展各种各样的游戏和竞赛活动,使学生在宽松、愉悦的学习氛围中成功地将知识内化吸收,从而实现英语单元复习的高效性。     

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used.     

Competition and Coordination in a Two‐Channel Supply Chain

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.