How Can Low‐income Countries Gain from a Framework Agreement on Climate Change? An Analysis with Integrated Assessment Modelling

By using the integrated assessment model RICE this article carries out a scenario analysis with different assumptions about international negotiations on climate change, in particular hypothesising about reduction in targets for greenhouse gas emissions, technology transfers and financial transfer programmes. It finds that, in terms of growth, developing countries and in particular sub‐Saharan Africa will benefit from agreements that reduce the level of pollution and promote technological diffusion. Moreover, when developed countries are subject to emissions limits and poor regions have no such commitments, financial transfers from rich to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation enhance pro‐poor growth and help the effectiveness of poor countries in reducing emissions.     

“新金融”发展态势及上海的鼓励政策研究

中国式"新金融"规模不断扩大,对中国经济发展和宏观调控产生了重要影响。它在一定程度上使得经济增长与实体经济背离,也未能完全解决中小企业融资难问题。当前政策的出发点,不应仅出于控制金融风险而对"新金融"加以限制,更多的还是应考虑如何加大力度引导资金流向中小企业等实体经济。上海"新金融"政策定位,应借助"新金融"体系,引导社会资金流向实体经济,并以金融支持科技创新和产业升级转型为重点,以活跃和繁荣金融机构和中介服务体系为抓手,构建上海"新金融"鼓励政策。     

基于ACC支付模式的供应链金融模型研究

在零售商存在资金不足和顾客需求随机情况下,以报童模型为基础,针对变质品构建了供应链金融问题和ACC支付模式（提前支付Advance、现金支付Cash和信用支付Credit）相结合的零售商订货模型,即零售商与供应商、融资机构合作条件下的模型。研究表明,零售商会随着最优订货批量和最低期望成本的增加和降低趋势,进而调整订货量,从而规避供大于求的风险,最终降低总的期望成本。同时供应商可以适当调整支付比例,让零售商来分担坏账和商品变质风险。     

网络借贷市场参与主体行为策略的演化博弈均衡分析——基于三方博弈的视角

由于监管缺失、信用风险管理缺位,导致网络借贷市场的违约事件持续出现,损害网络借贷市场的参与者利益。本文构建了一个包括网络借贷平台、金融监管机构和投资者的网络借贷市场参与主体的三方行为策略演化博弈模型,从演化博弈的角度分析了网络借贷平台、金融监管机构和投资者的策略选择对网络借贷市场运行的影响,并以拍拍贷平台为案例进行数值模拟分析。研究结果表明：不同初始值的三方博弈结果存在显著差异,网络借贷市场参与主体行为策略的演化博弈不具有稳定中心点、且不存在稳定的均衡点。另外,当金融监管机构采取"严格监管"措施时,惩罚值越高,网络借贷平台越倾向于选择"自律"的行为策略,随着投资者投资额度的增加,网络借贷平台选择"自律"行为策略的概率逐渐降低。最后,提出规范网络借贷市场参与者行为和风险控制的对策建议。     

TOT项目融资中国有资产转让定价的博弈分析

本文以TOT项目融资方式为对象,运用博弈的方法,从合理分配国有资产经营期内增值收入的角度出发,得出这样的结论,在国有资产转让过程中,政府与私营资本之间的谈判是一系列复杂的博弈过程,在博弈中政府的最优行为是对国有资产转让进行招标,同时给予某一招标企业一定的中标优先权,这样政府能够较现行的国有资产转让方式获得更多的收益.     

Understanding Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Financial Decisions

Using a high‐stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we implement a novel design to separately identify two channels of social influence in financial decisions, both widely studied theoretically. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it, both because they learn from his choice (“social learning”) and because his possession of the asset directly affects others' utility of owning the same asset (“social utility”). We randomize whether one member of a peer pair who chose to purchase an asset has that choice implemented, thus randomizing his ability to possess the asset. Then, we randomize whether the second member of the pair: (i) receives no information about the first member, or (ii) is informed of the first member's desire to purchase the asset and the result of the randomization that determined possession. This allows us to estimate the effects of learning plus possession, and learning alone, relative to a (no information) control group. We find that both social learning and social utility channels have statistically and economically significant effects on investment decisions. Evidence from a follow‐up survey reveals that social learning effects are greatest when the first (second) investor is financially sophisticated (financially unsophisticated); investors report updating their beliefs about asset quality after learning about their peer's revealed preference; and, they report motivations consistent with “keeping up with the Joneses” when learning about their peer's possession of the asset. These results can help shed light on the mechanisms underlying herding behavior in financial markets and peer effects in consumption and investment decisions.     

多心理账户下的群体投资决策规则优化研究

从决策者有限理性角度,引入行为金融于群体投资决策系统,研究了多心理账户下群体投资决策规则优化问题。研究给出了群体投资决策系统诸多非标准金融实证异象行为的金融解释,并指出了决策者金字塔式心理账户结构;研究提出了各个心理账户下离散随机变量的信息度量方法,以行为证券组合理论为内核进行集成建模,揭示了多心理账户下群体投资决策规则的优化机理。     

基于行为金融的开放式基金绩效评价模型

考虑决策者的有限理性,在行为金融范式下研究了开放式基金绩效评价问题.利用相对财富和习惯形成效用函数,描述了开放式基金管理者的投资组合决策行为;引入均值-熵度量开放式基金风险,建立了一种行为证券组合模型;以此为内核,研究提出了B-Morningstar风险评价模型;应用模拟分析结果表明,基于行为金融的B-Morningstar模型能够有效逼近其实际绩效水平.     

Enterprising Education: Doing Away with the Public School System

We critically examine the accepted notion that primary education is a legitimate and necessary function of the state. The notion is based upon three tenets: 1) public education is a necessary condition for democracy, 2) the market will not provide equal access and quality of education to all, and 3) education represents an external economy. Each tenet is addressed and evaluated according to its merits. In doing so, we also contrast the fulfillment of the ends implicit in the tenets under state and market provisions. We conclude that the state provision of primary education cannot be justified by these goals, and that market provision is a preferable alternative. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.