Economic Manufacturing Quantity and Its Integrating Implications

Several contradictions are noted among the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ), Just‐In‐Time (JIT), and Optimized Production Technology (OPT) approaches and the economic framework for profit maximization. A fundamental model referred to as the Economic Manufacturing Quantity (EMO) is developed and examined for its integrating implications for the three approaches. An implication for the classic EOQ approach is that the balance between setup and inventory carrying costs is valid when a production facility is operating at or below a certain critical level but not when operating above that level. An implication for the JIT approach is that one must reduce setup cost at non‐bottlenecks and setup time at bottlenecks to reduce inventory. An implication for the OPT approach is that trade‐offs between setup and inventory carrying costs may indeed be ignored while determining process batch sizes, provided each facility in a production system is operating at or above Its critical level. Economic theoretic analysis of the EMO model provides a basis for unification of JIT which advocates stability in operating level as a key to improved productivity and quality, and OPT that advocates maximizing operating level with resultant emphasis on bottlenecks as a key to increased profits. This unifying basis states that a profit‐maximizing production facility or system will operate at the full and stable level as long as market demand remains relatively sensitive to price and operating at the full (maximum) level provides positive unit contribution.     

产品组合竞争下远视互补品供应商联盟的稳定结构

考虑由4个远视供应商与1个零售商所组成的两层供应链系统,基于最大一致集的概念,探讨部分供应商可替代时互补品联合销售联盟的远视稳定结构。研究发现:当供应商的成本相差较小时,如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较小,则远视供应商会偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商;如果两类产品组合的零售竞争强度较大,则远视供应商会偏好形成一个由3个供应商联合销售的大联盟。当供应商的成本相差较大时,远视供应商会偏好形成联合销售的大联盟,或者偏好各自独立销售给下游零售商。但是,两个供应商形成的联合销售联盟不是远视稳定的。     

流域排污权交易下地方政府和企业氮减排演化博弈分析

针对目前流域氮污染问题的加剧，本文以在流域排污权交易机制下的有限理性地方政府和企业为博弈主体，运用演化博弈方法研究了在静态和动态补贴政策下地方政府的监管策略和企业的氮减排策略选择的动态演化过程，并分析了各参数对动态补贴政策下均衡点的影响，最后进行了仿真分析。研究结果表明，在静态补贴机制下，系统存在四种演化稳定策略和一种状态下的周期性波动；其中企业的减排策略选择主要根据氮减排成本与收益的比较，政府是否监管主要取决于社会舆论成本与监督成本、补贴费用等因素的比较。当地方政府实施动态补贴机制，博弈双方的演化轨迹线将收敛于唯一的混合策略均衡点。     

Inference in Arch and Garch Models with Heavy–Tailed Errors

ARCH and GARCH models directly address the dependency of conditional second moments, and have proved particularly valuable in modelling processes where a relatively large degree of fluctuation is present. These include financial time series, which can be particularly heavy tailed. However, little is known about properties of ARCH or GARCH models in the heavy–tailed setting, and no methods are available for approximating the distributions of parameter estimators there. In this paper we show that, for heavy–tailed errors, the asymptotic distributions of quasi–maximum likelihood parameter estimators in ARCH and GARCH models are nonnormal, and are particularly difficult to estimate directly using standard parametric methods. Standard bootstrap methods also fail to produce consistent estimators. To overcome these problems we develop percentile–t, subsample bootstrap approximations to estimator distributions. Studentizing is employed to approximate scale, and the subsample bootstrap is used to estimate shape. The good performance of this approach is demonstrated both theoretically and numerically.     

稳定型机构投资者、盈余平滑与股价同步性

稳定型机构投资者秉承长期投资和价值投资理念,在提高上市公司信息披露质量、增强资本市场韧性等方面能够发挥重要作用。基于2010—2021年中国沪深A股上市公司数据,以盈余平滑为会计信息质量的衡量维度,考察了稳定型机构投资者对不同属性盈余平滑的影响,并探讨了其在降低股价同步性方面的治理作用。研究发现:稳定型机构投资者可以促进企业的信息属性盈余平滑,抑制机会主义属性盈余平滑；稳定型机构投资者通过促进信息属性盈余平滑降低了资本市场的股价同步性；异质性分析表明,当企业内部控制较差、市场竞争程度较高时,稳定型机构投资者对信息属性盈余平滑的促进作用更大。因此,要加快建设机构投资者体系,发挥稳定型机构投资者提高企业会计信息质量的积极作用,以提升资本市场资源配置效率,推动资本市场高质量发展。