利益分析视角下的公路班线客运集约化发展研究

公路班线客运集约化改革的难点在于利益关系的协调。在广泛调研和深入访谈的基础上，结合班线客运发展历程及现状，从利益分析的视角剖析了政府、企业、个体之间的利益诉求、利益冲突及利益博弈的内在机理，指出挂靠关系下企业与个体之间的利益争夺是集约化发展难以推进的根源。研究提出以当前利益分配格局为均衡点的“实收配股”集约化发展改革方案，同时强调政府应转变职能定位、完善相关政策，防止形成市场封锁或垄断。     

儒家“义—利”价值结构与西方“财富”价值结构比较研究简

通过中国儒家和西方经济价值结构的比较研究，发现儒家以“义一利”为价值结构模型，西方以“财富”为价值结构模型。儒家价值结构的基本特征是“义体利用”，表现方式是：强国的道义在于顺天时、尽地利、忠人和；安国的道义在于民朴民富；治国的道义在于蓄储俭用。西方价值结构的基本特征是“利体义用”，表现方式是：鼓励获取财富、财富规则和财富责任。儒家“义一利”价值结构与西方“财富”价值结构是两种不同的价值评判话语体系，在中国现代“义利共体”的价值结构建构中，儒家价值结构提供着人文精神基础，西方价值结构提供着物质文明建设可资借鉴的经验。     

论对大学生进行财商教育的重要意义

传承传统重义轻利观念的大学教育,对学生的财富意识具有极大的压抑作用。改革开放以来,一部分人陷入拜金主义的泥潭,一部分人则保持着"饿死事小失节事大"的极端思想。调查的结果令人担忧,大学生财商整体水平较低。对大学生进行财商教育,是实现教育"使人更幸福地生活"目的之必然要求。     

大学内部的利益冲突与组织决策——以某地方综合性大学旧房改造项目为例

本案例中，大学的规章制度与组织结构规定了参与旧房改造项目相关决策的群体和机构以及做出相关决策所需要的步骤与程序，也规定了不同群体在这一决策过程中的不同地位和可能拥有的资源，甚至是他们的决策倾向；旧房改造项目的冲突根源在于计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型过程中大学内部出现的不同群体的利益分化，但值得注意的是，这些不同群体的利益冲突却是以质疑相关环节上决策者行为的合法性为中心展开的，而关于合法性的争议则更多地涉及了对相关行为的价值意义的解释。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

Machine Learning Vasicek Model Calibration with Gaussian Processes

In this article, we calibrate the Vasicek interest rate model under the risk neutral measure by learning the model parameters using Gaussian processes for machine learning regression. The calibration is done by maximizing the likelihood of zero coupon bond log prices, using mean and covariance functions computed analytically, as well as likelihood derivatives with respect to the parameters. The maximization method used is the conjugate gradients. The only prices needed for calibration are zero coupon bond prices and the parameters are directly obtained in the arbitrage free risk neutral measure.     

网络文学版权保护探析

侵犯网络文学著作权尤其是信息网络传播权的现象在当下十分严重。侵权的模式包括"云霄阁模式"和"百度模式"。它的背后既体现了社会公众、网络服务提供者和版权人之间的利益平衡,也是互联网精神、权利意识和商业模式三者博弈的结果。解决侵犯网络文学版权的问题需要注重培育公众正确的互联网意识、完善法律制度建设、创新文学网站的盈利模式及大力发挥社会组织的作用。保护网络文学著作权对创新虚拟社会管理有重要意义。     

意识形态之争探赜

伴随着阶级和国家的产生,关于意识形态的争论从来没有停止过。意识形态之争的表象是话语权、信奉者和影响力、感召力的争夺;意识形态之争的根基源于意识形态的科学性、传播方式和经济基础;意识形态之争的实质归于阶级和国家利益的维护。当前,认清意识形态争论的表象、阐明意识形态争论的根基、揭示意识形态争论的本质对于我国主流意识形态的建设具有重要意义。     

在文本与实践之间——法律移植之困境再论

当前我国法制建设在制度移植与重生方面面临着一种困境，即法制建设究竟是应该整理传统以利用本土资源并进而实现传统的创造性转化，还是应该以西方制度演化史所积淀的现代法制模式为榜样进行整体或局部的法律移植，学界对此亦存在相当的论争。然而值得怀疑的是，这些不同角度的理论进路究竟在多大程度上能给当前的困境提供一种出路，甚而有学者以为当前的制度变革本就无解。     

博弈论视角下的征地实践：基于鄂中L村的考察

基于对既有征地研究中政治抗争视角以及批判我国当前土地制度视角的反思,研究发现,需要将国家征地行为置于村庄之中,实现征地情境的还原,揭示征地本身的复杂性、所牵涉征地主体及其利益诉求的多样性,才能整体和客观理解征地纠纷和冲突产生的实质。通过对鄂中L村征地实践过程的详细展现和考察,发现征地纠纷主要是村庄内部各主体针对征地利益博弈的结果,与抗争政治视角中农民的利益或权利受损无关,也与当前我国土地制度（包括征地制度）所隐含的土地发展权国有的规定无关。村民在利益博弈过程中,因博弈能力的差异造成了村庄利益分配秩序的失衡,引发了村庄公共资源分配失序、村庄社会关系紧张、村庄历史遗留问题被激活等社会后果,侵蚀着村级组织的合法性。