公益诉讼费用分担方式的构建

公益诉讼费用是公益诉讼必然面临的问题,其合理与否极大地关系着人们享受法律保障的程度。但公益诉讼往往诉讼成本高,导致公益诉讼难以取得理想的预期效果,而现行的诉讼费用分担方式并不能完全适应公益诉讼的发展需要。因此,应从被告方分担、受益者分担、国家分担三方面入手,通过设立公益诉讼奖励基金以及费用移转支付的方式,建立起一个与公益诉讼理念相契合的公益诉讼费用分担方式。     

Social Cognitive Factors,Support, and Engagement: Early Adolescents’ Math Interests as Precursors to Choice of Career

The authors examined the central hypothesis that students’ early perceptions of support and sense of engagement in math classes and math activities strongly influence the broadening or narrowing of their math interest. The focus was on the first wave of qualitative data collected from 5th‐, 7th‐, and 9th‐grade students during the 2007–2008 academic year as part of a longitudinal study. Findings indicate the importance of using group work and extrinsic motivation in middle school math classes to broaden interest; peer classroom behavior was often a detractor of math interest.     

利益分析视角下的公路班线客运集约化发展研究

公路班线客运集约化改革的难点在于利益关系的协调。在广泛调研和深入访谈的基础上，结合班线客运发展历程及现状，从利益分析的视角剖析了政府、企业、个体之间的利益诉求、利益冲突及利益博弈的内在机理，指出挂靠关系下企业与个体之间的利益争夺是集约化发展难以推进的根源。研究提出以当前利益分配格局为均衡点的“实收配股”集约化发展改革方案，同时强调政府应转变职能定位、完善相关政策，防止形成市场封锁或垄断。     

儒家“义—利”价值结构与西方“财富”价值结构比较研究简

通过中国儒家和西方经济价值结构的比较研究，发现儒家以“义一利”为价值结构模型，西方以“财富”为价值结构模型。儒家价值结构的基本特征是“义体利用”，表现方式是：强国的道义在于顺天时、尽地利、忠人和；安国的道义在于民朴民富；治国的道义在于蓄储俭用。西方价值结构的基本特征是“利体义用”，表现方式是：鼓励获取财富、财富规则和财富责任。儒家“义一利”价值结构与西方“财富”价值结构是两种不同的价值评判话语体系，在中国现代“义利共体”的价值结构建构中，儒家价值结构提供着人文精神基础，西方价值结构提供着物质文明建设可资借鉴的经验。     

论对大学生进行财商教育的重要意义

传承传统重义轻利观念的大学教育,对学生的财富意识具有极大的压抑作用。改革开放以来,一部分人陷入拜金主义的泥潭,一部分人则保持着"饿死事小失节事大"的极端思想。调查的结果令人担忧,大学生财商整体水平较低。对大学生进行财商教育,是实现教育"使人更幸福地生活"目的之必然要求。     

大学内部的利益冲突与组织决策——以某地方综合性大学旧房改造项目为例

本案例中，大学的规章制度与组织结构规定了参与旧房改造项目相关决策的群体和机构以及做出相关决策所需要的步骤与程序，也规定了不同群体在这一决策过程中的不同地位和可能拥有的资源，甚至是他们的决策倾向；旧房改造项目的冲突根源在于计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型过程中大学内部出现的不同群体的利益分化，但值得注意的是，这些不同群体的利益冲突却是以质疑相关环节上决策者行为的合法性为中心展开的，而关于合法性的争议则更多地涉及了对相关行为的价值意义的解释。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

以习近平总书记“3·18”讲话为重要遵循 推进新时代思政课建设

习近平总书记在2019年3月18日主持召开全国学校思想政治理论座谈会并发表重要讲话，即“3·18”讲话。在“3·18”讲 话中，习近平总书记不仅强调了新时代我们“为什么”要办好思想政治理论课，而且明确回答了新时代我们要办“什么样”的思 想政治理论课和“如何办好”思想政治理论课等一系列重大问题。实践表明， “3·18”讲话是党中央新时代办好思想政治理论课 的重要遵循。在该讲话发表一周年之际，重温这一讲话具有重要理论和现实意义。     

Machine Learning Vasicek Model Calibration with Gaussian Processes

In this article, we calibrate the Vasicek interest rate model under the risk neutral measure by learning the model parameters using Gaussian processes for machine learning regression. The calibration is done by maximizing the likelihood of zero coupon bond log prices, using mean and covariance functions computed analytically, as well as likelihood derivatives with respect to the parameters. The maximization method used is the conjugate gradients. The only prices needed for calibration are zero coupon bond prices and the parameters are directly obtained in the arbitrage free risk neutral measure.