自然资源经济学的难解之题——水资源价格与节约的冲突

日益短缺的水资源面临的价格与节约的冲突,成为自然资源经济学的一个难解之题：水资源严重短缺的趋势,需要通过价格调整其分配与消费,而作为公用事业产品的生活用水,价格的长期粘性不利于水资源节约。提出这个问题,意在提示人们共同探讨破解这一难题的方法。     

零售企业平台化转型及其双边定价策略研究

运用双边市场理论方法,研究传统零售企业的平台化转型及其双边定价模式选择,发现：1）在生产成本和消费者估价均匀分布的条件下,赚差价的传统垄断零售商收取进场费并不能增加利润,转型为会员费制双边零售平台反而降低利润.2）随着供应商单位分销成本的增加,传统零售商可先选择转型为佣金制双边零售平台作为过渡;随着单位分销成本的进一步提高,零售企业可以进一步提高佣金率,并对供应商进行适当补贴,但对消费者免收会员费,转型为二部收费制平台.3）会员费制双边零售平台的倾斜性双边定价策略与产品价格及其分销成本有关,当供应商的零售价格适中时,平台应向消费者与供应商收取会员费;而当供应商零售价格较高时,平台应向供应商收取会员费并补贴消费者.此外,本文结合我国 B2C 零售平台的收费模式进行应用分析.     

基于可变强度跳跃-GARCH模型的资产价格跳跃行为分析——以中国上市公司股票市场数据为例

近年来,美国金融危机、欧债危机、地震等突发事件不断冲击着我国金融市场,各类资产价格频繁出现大幅跳动,收益风险短期内急剧扩大。鉴于此,本文构建了门限效应下状态变量依赖自回归强度跳跃-GARCH模型（简称TSD-ARJI-GARCH模型）来探讨股票资产价格随时间平滑波动和大幅度跳跃的双重特征。该模型扩展了现有可变强度跳跃-GARCH模型,克服了片面强调内生或外生因素的局限性,既允许跳跃强度受单个资产异质因素的内生驱动,以刻画跳跃变化的时变性及集聚性,也考虑了外部状态变量影响的门限效应。通过对不同类型中国上市公司股票市场数据的实证分析,验证了该模型对各类上市公司股票资产价格跳跃特征都具有较好的辨别和预测能力,可为动态监管金融资产的跳跃风险提供理论依据。     

Coordinating Production and Marketing with Dynamic Transfer Prices

Decentralized decision making is a fact in the modern business world accompanied by extensive research that looks into its consequences for overall firm profits. We study the interactions of decentralized marketing and operations divisions in a corporation and explore their impact on overall firm profits in the case with and without coordination of the two decentralized units. We assume that the marketing department is responsible for the price that influences the demand (sales), and the operations department is responsible for the production rate. We allow for backlogging over time. We model the interdependence involving marketing and operations decisions as a non‐cooperative differential game, with the two divisions as strategically interacting players. We find that, without coordination, strategic interactions of marketing and production result in inefficiencies that can quantitatively be substantial. Next, we introduce a dynamic transfer pricing scheme as a coordination device and evaluate if it establishes efficient (first best and fully coordinated) outcomes. We show that if production and marketing play a game with pre‐commitment strategies, there exists a dynamic transfer price that efficiently (fully) coordinates decentralized decision making and hence results in Pareto‐efficient company profits. If the two decentralized divisions play a game without pre‐commitment, dynamic transfer prices can partially coordinate decentralized decision making but fail to fully eliminate overall inefficiencies arising from strategic interactions among decentralized divisions.     

Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

Non‐Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

In many real‐life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined, and it is demonstrated to be constrained efficient and (group) non‐manipulable for “almost all” preference profiles. In its bounding cases, the rule reduces to a number of well‐known mechanisms from the matching literature. In this sense, the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework.     

基于小波分析的石油价格长期趋势预测方法及其实证研究

本文将小波方法引入到油价长期趋势的预测中,利用小波多尺度分析的功能,提出了一种可以较为准确地根据油价时序列预测其未来长期走势的方法。这种方法的优点在于可以准确地提取油价的长期趋势,从总体上把握油价的非线性波动特征,从而能够很好地利用油价时间序列的历史数据,开展对未来一段时期内的多步预测。实证研究中,对Brent油价开展了时间跨度为1年的趋势预测,并将预测结果与ARIMA、GARCH、Holtwinters等方法得到的结果进行了比较,表明了基于小波分析的长期趋势预测法的预测能力是其他方法所不能比拟的,反映了本文所建立的石油价格长期趋势预测方法的有效性。     

激励企业技术创新的两种管制方式

本文旨在探讨激励垄断企业技术创新的两种管制方式——价格上限管制和最优管制机制。首先分别建立了它们的管制模型,得出了激励企业技术创新的具体的管制机制;进一步地,比较了在这两种管制方式下企业创新的内在激励,以及创新费用的增加对消费者剩余的影响;并分析了当激励企业创新问题引入时,两种管制方式相对优势的改变。     

CRM中客户忠诚对价格敏感性的影响研究

综合考虑了CRM中的客户竞争、客户保持和转移成本因素,建立了基于客户忠诚度的客户关系保持的数学模型。然后以客户保持模型为基础,从理论上分析了不同忠诚度水平的客户的价格敏感性的不同及其原因。最后以客户价格敏感性为基础,得到了可供企业CRM系统借鉴的客户保持的定量策略。     

零售市场价格策略的演化博弈分析

基于一个三阶段Hotelling博弈模型:位于[0,1]线性城市两端的零售A和B第一阶段同时选择价格策略变量,第二阶段确定价格的大小,第三阶段由消费者选择零售商。应用演化博弈论进行研究,分析了零售市场价格策略的演化稳定性。