《证券法》的修改与上市公司信息披露的规范

上市公司信息披露关系到市场的健康发展,但目前上市公司信息披露存在着许多问题,如信息披露制度不完善,信息披露质量难言满意等。根据证券法修订草案中对上市公司信息披露的相应修改内容,应用XBRL技术加速上市公司信息披露规范,多管齐下改善披露质量:引入做空机制是一个优选;加重违反信息披露法律法规上市公司的法律责任;加大信息披露监管力度。     

构建信息技术经济学学科体系

随着信息技术的不断发展,信息技术已经渗透到社会的各行各业,对经济的影响越来越大,信息技术经济问题越来越突出.本文探讨了构建信息技术经济学学科体系的必要性和紧迫性;提出了构建信息技术经济学学科体系的5项原则;并初步描述了信息技术经济学学科体系的基本组成部分和内容,包括信息技术经济学概论、信息技术经济学理论、信息技术经济学方法和信息技术经济学应用四部分.本文对信息技术经济学学科体系的创建具有重要意义.     

获取有效就业信息 缓解就业压力

毕业生的就业压力大,已成为不争的事实.获取有效的就业信息,对于毕业生的就业具有重要的意义.全方位、多渠道地获取有效就业信息,充分利用信息获取的主渠道和非主渠道,能缓解毕业生的就业压力.     

个人信息的民法保护

随着人们对个人信息价值的认识不断深化,传统条件下的立法主要针对隐私利益给以保护的模式越来越不能满足人们对个人信息利益保护的要求,个人信息财产属性的彰显使得人们需要法律对个人信息积极利用的权利加以保护。计算机技术的快速发展使得人们越来越难以控制自己的信息。因而迫切需要从原有的对隐私利益的消极被动的保护模式过渡到全面积极的个人信息保护模式。     

Binary Response Models for Panel Data: Identification and Information

This paper considers a panel data model for predicting a binary outcome. The conditional probability of a positive response is obtained by evaluating a given distribution function (F) at a linear combination of the predictor variables. One of the predictor variables is unobserved. It is a random effect that varies across individuals but is constant over time. The semiparametric aspect is that the conditional distribution of the random effect, given the predictor variables, is unrestricted. This paper has two results. If the support of the observed predictor variables is bounded, then identification is possible only in the logistic case. Even if the support is unbounded, so that (from Manski (1987)) identification holds quite generally, the information bound is zero unless F is logistic. Hence consistent estimation at the standard pn rate is possible only in the logistic case.     

Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options

We study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long‐run player and a sequence of short‐run players. The outside option is not only a disagreement point, but reveals information privately held by the long‐run player. In equilibrium, the uninformed short‐run players' offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long‐run player's payoffs are discontinuous. The long‐run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short‐run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff, but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power. We investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses. In both cases, bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation‐building probabilities are interior.     

Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues

We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the committee and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.     

Optimal Inattention to the Stock Market With Information Costs and Transactions Costs

Information costs, which comprise costs of gathering and processing information about stock values and costs of deciding how to respond to this information, induce a consumer to remain inattentive to the stock market for finite intervals of time. Whether, and how much, a consumer transfers assets between accounts depends on the costs of undertaking such transactions. In general, optimal behavior by a consumer facing both information costs and transactions costs is state‐dependent, with the timing of observations and the timing and size of transactions depending on the state. Surprisingly, if the fixed component of the transactions cost is sufficiently small, then eventually, with probability 1, a time‐dependent rule emerges: the interval between observations is constant and on each observation date, the consumer converts enough assets to liquid assets to finance consumption until the next observation. If the fixed component of transactions costs is large, the optimal rule remains state‐dependent indefinitely.     

Sentiments

This paper develops a new theory of fluctuations—one that helps accommodate the notions of “animal spirits” and “market sentiment” in unique‐equilibrium, rational‐expectations, macroeconomic models. To this goal, we limit the communication that is embedded in a neoclassical economy by allowing trading to be random and decentralized. We then show that the business cycle may be driven by a certain type of extrinsic shocks which we call sentiments. These shocks formalize shifts in expectations of economic activity without shifts in the underlying preferences and technologies; they are akin to sunspots, but operate in unique‐equilibrium models. We further show how communication may help propagate these shocks in a way that resembles the spread of fads and rumors and that gives rise to boom‐and‐bust phenomena. We finally illustrate the quantitative potential of our insights within a variant of the RBC model.     

行政过程中的信息公开:美国的实践

美国行政过程中的信息公开内容十分丰富,如在行政决策领域,"通知和评论"式规则制定、规则草案免于公开的特定情形、完善的意见征询系统都很有特色,在行政处罚、行政许可等其他行政领域也都有可资借鉴的实践经验。