人的存在方式与社会和谐

强调构建“和谐社会”是因为我们的社会已存在一些不和谐现象。但指责社会种种不和谐现象并未抓到问题的实质和关键。社会生活的主体是人．人在本体论意义上的存在方式的改变或重构才是社会不和谐现象的深层原因和根本原因!身心失和不是一个心理学问题．而是一个存在论问题．它从存在论意义上改变或重构了人．并由此导致以人为主体的社会生活种种危机。因此．构建“和谐社会”除了在公共政策、制度等方面着手外．人的存在方式、人自身内在和谐方面也是不可忽略的。     

二阶常微分方程组边值问题正解的存在性

利用锥上不动点定理,研究了一类二阶非线性常微分方程组四点边值问题正解的存在性.在非线性项满足一定增长的条件下,得到了至少一个和两个正解存在的几个充分条件.     

Noisy Stochastic Games

This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise—a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period's state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoff‐irrelevant public randomization device, delivering known results on the existence of correlated equilibrium as a special case. More generally, noise can take the form of shocks that enter into players' stage payoffs and the transition probability on states. The existence result is applied to a model of industry dynamics and to a model of dynamic electoral competition.     

关于矩阵方根的一个结果

讨论了一类可对角化矩阵 ,得出其n次方根矩阵的存在与唯一性 ,并例示了在使用该结果解决正定矩阵时的优越性     

哲学、信息、智能、社会：一个复杂的认知本体

要讨论信息哲学和智能社会的关系，就需要应用恰当的哲学、信息、智能和社会概念。此研究首先把卢帕斯科(Stéphane Lupasco)的非命题逻辑应用到邬焜的信息哲学中。其次，信息哲学与智能科学的一种新观念相关联，此观念由中国的钟义信、史忠植和赵川提出，用来作为判定一个社会是否“智能”的依据。在人类社会中运行的一系列复杂的、进化的过程可以被视为一种新类型的动态系统“单元”。伊甘贝尔迪耶夫(Abir Igamberdiev)和布伦纳(Joseph Brenner)采用了本体这个术语来描述本体论单元。邬焜之前把信息体(informosome)定义为一个个体在信息术语中生活经验的部分。本体类似于一个启发性工具，使伦理学具体化并且为共同的善提供了一种整体的知识观。最后，介绍了一种自然主义的信息哲学研究进路。     

On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x^* and every payoff vector limit u^* resulting from strategies approaching x^*, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u_i^* even if the others deviate slightly from x^*. If strategy spaces are compact and convex, payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner's strategy, and the game is better-reply secure, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Better-reply security holds in many economic games. It also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy Nash equilibria.