Convergence rates for uniform confidence intervals based on local polynomial regression estimators

We investigate the convergence rates of uniform bias-corrected confidence intervals for a smooth curve using local polynomial regression for both the interior and boundary region. We discuss the cases when the degree of the polynomial is odd and even. The uniform confidence intervals are based on the volume-of-tube formula modified for biased estimators. We empirically show that the proposed uniform confidence intervals attain, at least approximately, nominal coverage. Finally, we investigate the performance of the volume-of-tube based confidence intervals for independent non-Gaussian errors.     

Global Governance,neoliberalism and national responses: The case of Bangladesh’s ready‐made garment (RMG) sector

This article on the ready‐made garment (RMG) sector of Bangladesh shows how over‐reliance on foreign capital for development financing and deregulated investment—a hallmark of neoliberal economic arrangements—undermines the incorporation of SDGs’ and INGOs’ equity principles, contributing to biased policy responses yielding unequal outcomes. The article cautions that while countries prioritize economic growth over social and environmental nourishment and continue to adopt neoliberal economic policies to promote economic growth, inequity is unavoidable, if not inevitable. Thus, the way forward may be to shift the focus of ‘development’ from the economy to society, to building ‘good societies’ where institutions and strategies, including those that contribute to economic growth, are organized such that these complement not compromise the evolution of such societies.     

A decade after the Reform: political activism of the Chinese of West Kalimantan,Indonesia

Political reform after the departure of President Soeharto’s New Order (1966–1998) provided opportunities for previously oppressed social groups to express their concerns and to demand fair recognition. The results of this newly found freedom have been quite immediately visible in Jakarta, where social and political institutions spearheaded by Chinese originally sprouted. In the regions, political participation of ethnic Chinese has also grown; significantly in those regions with a large Chinese population. In West Kalimantan, the number of Chinese being elected to local parliaments in some regions has doubled. They have also contested numerous direct local executive elections since 2003 and have been successful in winning four posts: a mayor, a district head, a deputy district head, and a deputy governor. By looking at the case of West Kalimantan, this article will examine the factors behind the growth in Chinese political activism, the factors contributing to the success of Chinese candidates in elections, how the Chinese have influenced local and provincial politics, and the challenges they are facing.     

Estimation and diagnostic analysis in skew-generalized-normal regression models

The skew-generalized-normal distribution [Arellano-Valle, RB, Gómez, HW, Quintana, FA. A new class of skew-normal distributions. Comm Statist Theory Methods 2004;33(7):1465–1480] is a class of asymmetric normal distributions, which contains the normal and skew-normal distributions as special cases. The main virtues of this distribution is that it is easy to simulate from and it also supplies a genuine expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm for maximum likelihood estimation. In this paper, we extend the EM algorithm for linear regression models assuming skew-generalized-normal random errors and we develop a diagnostics analyses via local influence and generalized leverage, following Zhu and Lee's approach. This is because Cook's well-known approach would be more complicated to use to obtain measures of local influence. Finally, results obtained for a real data set are reported, illustrating the usefulness of the proposed method.     

Spatially Balanced Sampling of Continuous Populations

When sampling from a continuous population (or distribution), we often want a rather small sample due to some cost attached to processing the sample or to collecting information in the field. Moreover, a probability sample that allows for design‐based statistical inference is often desired. Given these requirements, we want to reduce the sampling variance of the Horvitz–Thompson estimator as much as possible. To achieve this, we introduce different approaches to using the local pivotal method for selecting well‐spread samples from multidimensional continuous populations. The results of a simulation study clearly indicate that we succeed in selecting spatially balanced samples and improve the efficiency of the Horvitz–Thompson estimator.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

以政务诚信引领全社会诚信建设的对策与思考

国务院颁布《社会信用体系建设规划纲要（2014—2020年）》后，各省、市分别结合本地的特点制定了信用体系建设规划纲要，将全社会的诚信建设纳入规划。针对社会诚信建设的需要，在分析我国当前社会诚信缺失的基础上，提出了加强政务诚信建设，通过政务诚信建设示范引领全社会诚信建设的对策建议。     

Reputation spillover effects from grant‐providing institutions

There is a broad academic discussion about the impact of funding grants from a foundation or a government department on individual support intentions toward the nonprofit organization receiving the grant. However, the role of the grant provider's reputation has frequently been overlooked. In this study, we experimentally tested whether there is a reputation spillover effect of a grant‐providing organization. Based on a real‐life example, we asked citizens to rate their willingness to donate to a nonprofit organization, and we experimentally manipulated the available information on funding sources. We test this for both a government department and a foundation as a grant provider. Our results suggest that not the act of receiving a grant, but the citizens' awareness about the funding organization—at least in the case of a foundation—has an impact on support intentions. In contrast, for a prominent government department as a grant provider, we did not find support for a reputation spillover effect.     

我国学前教育地方立法研究

学前教育地方立法是我国学前教育立法体系的有机组成部分，截至2020 年1 月，我国现行有效的学前教育地方性法规 规章共61 部，呈现出立法时间跨度大，立法主体覆盖面广，立法模式体例多样等特征。地方立法一定程度上规范着地方学前 教育的有序开展，但也存在部分省市立法机关对当地学前教育立法关注度不高、部分立法难以满足当前学前教育发展需求、表 达不规范、可操作性欠佳、缺乏地方特色以及冲突与越位等问题。对此，应从科学确定学前教育地方立法内容、建立地方性法 律适时更新制度、健全学前教育地方立法调研制度、加强地方立法专业化制度建设等方面予以优化。     

土地流转中为什么会形成大量小农复制

土地流转是实现规模化经营的前提之一,然而土地流转中却出现大量小农复制,从而影响土地流转的质量和效果。运用12省(自治区)2 553份农户问卷,详细分析土地流转中小农复制的现状及其形成原因。研究发现：(1)农户流转耕地面积不大,转入户流转面积20亩及以下的约占总转入户数的60.3％,转出户流转面积5亩及以下的约占总转出户数的74.38％,转出户中仍然经营土地的约占总转出户数的74％。(2)农业分工发达使生产更加方便、文化传统形成路径依赖、禀赋效应产生“价值幻觉”以及公共服务不健全使未来存在不确定性导致转出户流转部分土地。乡土社会限制土地流转范围和经营风险增加风险感知导致转入户流转小规模土地。