Allocation of resources in asymmetric competitions: How do the weak maintain a chance of winning?

To maintain a chance of occasionally beating a stronger player in a competition waged over several fields, a weaker player should give up on some of the fields and concentrate resources on the remaining ones. But when do weak players actually do this? And which fields do they give up when the fields differ in their likelihood of being assessed? We report an experimental study of resource allocation in which asymmetric pairs of players compete over asymmetric fields. Symmetric players and symmetric fields are used for control. We find that players behave as follows: (1) Average wins are the same in the symmetric and asymmetric fields conditions and correspond to relative player strength. (2) The proportion of fields given up on decreases with a player’s greater relative strength, increases for asymmetric field likelihoods, and increases when competitions are framed in meaningful context; this proportion is related to wins. (3) When field likelihoods are asymmetric, players’ resource allocation is correlated with likelihood. Wins generally increase with that correlation but the relation is different for players of different strength. (4) The proportion of fields given up on and the correlation with likelihood change with experience towards the values corresponding to higher wins.     

高校人才资源与社会需求的合理配置

高校是重要的人才生产基地，必须根据社会的需求，对人才资源进行合理的配置。大学毕业生供给与人才市场竞争的局面给大学毕业生的职业指导工作带来了巨大的困难和严峻挑战。如何提高学生的综合素质和职业竞争力已经成为社会关注的热点，高校应当充分利用自身的人才资源优势，做好毕业生的职业指导工作，从而为社会提供高素质的优秀人才。     

基于优先权拍卖的产能分配机制研究

本文考虑一个供应商和两个独立零售商构成的供应链系统。当供应商的产能受到约束时，零售商可能会竞争有限的产能。本文提出将“优先分配权”作为一个有价值的标的物进行拍卖，按照出价高低确定优先分配顺序。本文证明了优先权拍卖机制属于共同价值模型，并提出了两类拍卖机制：事先拍卖和事后拍卖。本文证明两类优先权拍卖机制均会促使零售商提交真实的需求作为订单量，并且满足收益等价定理。而就供应商期望利润而言，事后优先权拍卖机制要高于事先优先权拍卖机制。     

Optimal control strategies for dividend payments and capital injections in compound Markov binomial risk model with penalties for deficits

We consider the compound Markov binomial risk model. The company controls the amount of dividends paid to the shareholders as well as the capital injections in order to maximize the cumulative expected discounted dividends minus the discounted capital injections and the discounted penalties for deficits prior to ruin. We show that the optimal value function is the unique solution of an HJB equation, and the optimal control strategy is a two-barriers strategy given the current state of the Markov chain. We obtain some properties of the optimal strategy and the optimal condition for ruining the company. We offer a high-efficiency algorithm for obtaining the optimal strategy and the optimal value function. In addition, we also discuss the optimal control problem under a restriction of bounded dividend rates. Numerical results are provided to illustrate the algorithm and the impact of the penalties.     

Moments of suprema of random variables

The supremum of random variables representing a sequence of rewards is of interest in establishing the existence of optimal stopping rules. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for existence of moments of sup_n(X_n ? c_n) and sup_n(S_n ? c_n) where X₁, X₂, … are i.i.d. random variables, S_n = X₁ + … + X_n, and c_n = (nL(n))^1/r, 0 < r < 2, L = 1, L = log, and L = log log. Following Cohn (1974), “rates of convergence” results are used in the proof.     

基于历史法和零和DEA方法的用能权与碳排放权初始分配研究

本文引入了同时考虑用能权与碳排放权初始分配的零和DEA方法,从公平与效率视角对比分析了历史法与零和DEA方法两种分配方式的适用性,并应用市场交易模型检验了不同初始分配方式对各地区交易行为的影响。研究结果表明,零和DEA方法能够提高用能权与碳排放权初始分配的公平性,但却是以牺牲前沿技术效率水平为代价。其次,完善的市场机制能够提高基于零和DEA方法调配用能权与碳排放权的配置效率,生产技术水平较高的地区可以通过出售多余的用能权和碳排放权来获得额外收益,有利于促进绿色技术创新;相反,历史法容易导致高耗能、高排放的地区在初始分配中获得较多的用能权和碳排放权,不利于正向促进技术进步。最后,当市场机制不完善时,基于零和DEA方法配置用能权和碳排放权,可能会抑制技术进步,而基于历史法的初始分配方式则至少可以在短期内维持现有生产技术水平。     

碳排放权分配对碳市场成本有效性的影响研究

交易成本和市场势力影响碳市场成本有效性,不同的碳排放权分配方法是否造成不等的碳市场效率损失? 本文构建碳交易机制下企业决策模型,探究交易成本、市场势力存在时,碳排放权分配方法的选择对碳市场成本有效性的影响． 研究发现: 1) 交易成本中交易佣金会导致碳市场效率损失,基准法和祖父法的影响程度小于拍卖法; 2) 碳市场存在市场势力时,祖父法和基准法导致的碳市场效率损失小于拍卖法; 3) 当碳市场同时存在交易成本和市场势力时,市场势力进一步加剧了交易成本导致的碳市场效率损失,祖父法和基准法导致的增加损失小于拍卖法． 本文建议政策制定者采用祖父法或者基准法对市场势力企业进行碳排放权分配,并取消交易佣金．     

BT项目合同风险分担研究

合理的风险分担有利于促进BT项目双方的合作,保证BT项目的顺利实施.首先,探讨了Shapley值是否可应用在BT项目共担风险分担中,结论为合适.其次,遵循风险分担的基本原则,将影响BT项目风险分担的五个因素:风险成因、承担风险能力、参与项目程度及收益、控制风险能力及经济地位与修正的Shapley值进行结合,构建了BT项目风险分担模型,以期在BT发起人和主办人之间进行合理的风险分担.最后,运用构建的风险分担模型分析了某围海造陆BT项目的合同风险,并与合同风险分担结果进行了比较,得出的结论是合同风险分担基本合理,但不可抗力风险可适当让BT主办人承担工程损失风险,通货膨胀引起的材料价格上涨风险,应加大BT主办人承担比例.     

竞争市场中生产与碳交易策略

在碳排放约束下,利用动态古诺模型,分析厂商如何优化产量、交易碳排放权的规模、净化节约额以实现利润最大化的问题,得到相应的均衡量和各阶段最优量,并给出竞争市场中的企业减排策略以及政府的行为和碳排放权价格对企业减排策略的影响,阐述在竞争市场中减排和碳排放权交易的运行机制。研究发现: 双寡头竞争市场中存在均衡状态;在减排率较低时,制造上获得最高利润,而企业追求过高的减排率将会导致过分依赖碳减排市场而获得较低的利润;制造商应该适时低价购入过量碳排放权,而在高价时卖出多余的碳排放权,以充分利用碳排放权市场以增加利润降低成本;制造商的利润会随着政府碳排放权分配系数的增加而增加。