竞争、产权与管理:基于企业绩效的分析--兼论国有企业改革

在企业资源禀赋既定的条件下,企业绩效是竞争、产权与管理综合作用的结果.对于国有企业改革来说,应根据国有企业所处的行业特点、社会职能、市场竞争状况以及不同的发展阶段等分别实施不同的改革战略,侧重点也应有所不同有的应加强管理,有的应强调产权,有的必须创造竞争的外部环境,而有的则需要实施竞争、产权和管理三个方面的改革共同推进的策略.     

试析“以人为本”的商业服务理念的产生及原因

“:以人为本”,既为顾客提供最人性化的优质服务,已日益成为当今商业的服务理念,它不仅成为广大消费者评价商家服务质量的标准,也成为当今商业服务制胜的法宝。     

非同类企业竞争与合作策略收益模型及风险分析

在比较同类企业竞争策略模型与合作策略模型的基础上,讨论了价格的信息作用,分析了合作策略收益更大和风险并不随之增加的原因。然后以现代决策理念为出发点,探讨了企业最大利润与企业条件的关系,提出了与企业单位变动成本和生产能力条件相适应的合理最大利润的概念,对“理性企业的假设”赋予了“追求与企业条件相适应的合理最大利润”的新含义。据此设计了非同类企业产量分配函数,建立了适用性更广的非同类企业合作策略最佳收益模型,并给出了随市场价格变化的企业最佳应对策略。最后用1个算例来直观体现合作策略的优势。     

工程量清单和合理低价评标法的探讨

探讨在适应市场机制和W TO的工程量清单计价模式下,建设工程招标定标过程中采用“合理低价评标法”可能出现的无序低价的情况及危害,并且提出解决此问题的几点建议。     

Managing Downstream Competition via Capacity Allocation

Consider a supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers. The supplier produces a single product and sells it to the retailers, who in turn sell the product to consumers. The supplier has limited production capacity, and the retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition at the consumer/market level. When the sum of the retailer orders exceeds the capacity, the supplier allocates her capacity according to a pre‐announced allocation mechanism. Two mechanisms are considered: proportional allocation and lexicographic allocation. An extensive study of the two allocation mechanisms shows that the lexicographic mechanism has the ability to dampen the competition at the retail level, increasing the profits for both the supplier and the supply chain.     

On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer

This study investigates a supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM), in which the CM acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to the OEM. The two parties can engage in one of three Cournot competition games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the CM as the Stackelberg leader. On the basis of these three basic games, this study investigates the two parties' Stackelberg leadership/followership decisions. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are exogenously given, either party may prefer Stackelberg leadership or followership. For example, when the wholesale price or the proportion of production outsourced to the CM is lower than a threshold value, both parties prefer Stackelberg leadership and, consequently, play a simultaneous game in the consumer market. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are decision variables, the competitive CM sets a wholesale price sufficiently low to allow both parties to coexist in the market, and the OEM outsources its entire production to this CM. This study also examines the impact of the supply chain parties' bargaining power on contract outcomes by considering a wholesale price that is determined via the generalized Nash bargaining scheme, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium to be sustained when the CM's degree of bargaining power is great and the non‐competitive CM's wholesale price is high.     

商业秘密法律保护模式探讨——兼论我国立法的完善

对于商业秘密的立法保护,既有"行为法"模式,也有"权利法"模式。前者侧重于规制侵犯商业秘密的不正当竞争行为,强调竞争秩序的维护及社会公共利益的保护,形为"宽保护",实为"弱保护";后者侧重于保护权利人的商业秘密权,强调私权保护,形为"窄保护",实属"强保护"。厘清并强调商业秘密的知识产权属性,对确立商业秘密的权利法保护将起着重要的影响乃至决定作用。我国立法现状及司法实践,都亟待权利法的"强保护",即以权利法为中心,以行为法为补充的综合立法保护。     

不完全竞争市场结构下贸易的环境效应作用机理分析

全球性资源危机、环境污染和生态破坏使国际贸易和环境保护之间矛盾重重。通过将污染外部性融合到新贸易框架中,建立模型解释了当经济体为不完全竞争市场结构且存在规模经济的情形下,污染密集型产品的产业内贸易对环境的影响。将污染密集型产品的生产和贸易对环境的影响分为规模效应、技术效应和选择效应,这三个效应的程度和方向共同决定环境质量。另外,阐述了环境税强度变化所带来的影响,认为更严格的环境税赋并非必然导致排污水平下降,但明显提高产品价格,降低消费水平,带来福利损失。     

智慧图书馆的概念、特征、构成及平台建设

随着城镇化建设的提速与持续推进,智慧化已经成为未来城市发展的重要趋势,而＂智慧图书馆＂将成为智慧城市建设的重要内容。智慧系统平台主要有以下几项功能：深刻感知、服务智慧化、管理智慧化。智慧系统平台系统主要由感知层、网络层、应用层和服务层组成。智慧系统平台能够构建人性化的公共文化服务环境、提升图书馆总体管理效率。     

“漂绿”的竞争法规制

随着绿色需求对商品经济的渗透,环境友好产品、服务或实践的声明愈加普遍。不乏企业作出虚假或误导性的绿色声明即实施“漂绿”（greenwashing）。“漂绿”对竞争者、消费者和公共利益造成了损害,亟需法律规制。根据“漂绿”的界定及对美国竞争法规制“漂绿”案例的分析可证明竞争法规制较为有效。中国《反不正当竞争法》第五条、第九条和第十四条和“漂绿”最为关联,但因条文的局限,不能完全有效规制“漂绿”,应作修改：明确“漂绿”的标准和引人误解的虚假宣传的概念;允许利益受侵害的消费者作为诉讼主体;增加一般条款和规制“漂绿”的条款;加强“漂绿”企业所需承担的法律责任。