Change agent's contribution to recipients' resistance to change: A two-sided story

In the change management literature, most studies on recipients' resistance to change include only the views of agents or of recipients, thereby ignoring that these parties may have different perceptions. In this quantitative study, we include the perceptions of both parties in studying the recipients' resistance and the impact of the agent's leadership behavior. In a sample of 117 agent-recipients groupings, covering 110 different change projects in 90 organizations, we found that agents perceive higher levels of recipients' resistance than do the recipients themselves. Additionally, we found that agents who create space to enable recipients to think and act differently (by employing creating behavior) report higher levels of recipients' resistance, whereas recipients perceive their resistance to be lowered when agents facilitate an emotional connection to the change (framing behavior). The depth of the change appeared to moderate the relationship between agent's leadership behavior and recipients' resistance, indicating that agents and recipients differ in which change leadership behaviors they perceive as increasing or decreasing resistance at different levels of change depth. These findings imply to reconsider the relationship between agent and recipients and we propose some promising avenues for future studies in resistance research.     

融资约束、代理冲突与中国上市公司非效率投资行为研究

本文以中国上市公司2000—2009年的实际数据,就我国上市公司融资约束、代理冲突与非效率投资行为三者之间的相互关系展开研究。结果显示,在不同的股权性质与公司规模特征的企业中,由控制权私有收益引发的投资行为扭曲具有不同的表现方式:公司非效率投资行为同时受到由控制权私有收益引起的融资约束和代理冲突的作用,这两种影响的相互作用共同决定了企业的投资行为状态;国有上市公司和非国有上市公司都拥有较高的投资—现金流敏感性,但表现在投资决策行为上却各不相同,国有上市公司整体上呈现出过度投资,而非国有上市公司则表现出投资不足;相对大规模公司而言,小规模公司可能呈现出更高的投资—现金流敏感性,并呈现出投资不足的非效率投资行为,而大规模公司则更可能表现出过度投资的非效率投资行为。     

Incentives in a Stage‐Gate Process

Many large organizations use a stage‐gate process to manage new product development projects. In a typical stage‐gate process project managers learn about potential ideas from research and exert effort in development while senior executives make intervening go/no‐go decisions. This decentralized decision making results in an agency problem because the idea quality in early stages is unknown to the executive and the project manager must exert unobservable development effort in later stages. In light of these challenges, how should the firm structure incentives to ensure that project managers reveal relevant information and invest the appropriate effort to create value? In this study, we develop a model of adverse selection in research and moral hazard in development with a go/no‐go decision at the intervening gate. Our results show that the principal's uncertainty regarding early‐stage idea quality—a term we refer to as idea risk—alters the effect of late‐stage development risk. The presence of idea risk can alter the incentives offered to the agent and may lead the principal to reject projects that otherwise seem favorable in terms of positive net present value. A simulation of early‐stage ideas, found through search on a complex landscape, shows that the firm can mitigate the negative effects of idea risk by encouraging breadth of search and high tolerance for failure.     

现代企业组织制度中的委托─代理关系

现代企业组织制度中存在一系列委托─代理关系,基于所有权和经营权相分离的委托─代理制既是必要的,有效的,又存在着委托人和代理人的效用函数不同的矛盾。西方管理学家对委托人目标和代理人效用函数的不一致性进行了研究,提出了委托─代理理论。本文简要介绍这一理论,并从对代理人的考核评价和奖惩、实行目标管理、培育企业文化以及建设正常运行的市场四个方面,论述了建立健全激励─约束机制,改善委托─代理关系的途径。     

论特留份制度

规定特留份制度 ,目的在于保护缺乏劳动能力又没有生活来源的法定继承人的权益。我国继承法也规定了“必要的遗产份额” ,但存在着继承人范围过窄和份额规定不明的缺陷 ,因此作相应的修正非常必要。     

城市历史建筑保护对策研究——以粤港为例

随着经济和商业社会的发展,城市开发建设不同程度地蚕食历史建筑,破坏历史街区的整体风貌。历史建筑是人类发展痕迹的见证,一定程度上反映着地域文化。保护历史建筑也是保护地域文化。粤港政府在历史建筑保护工作方面积累了不少经验,通过分析粤港两地历史建筑保护措施,提出对城市历史建筑保护与利用的对策建议。     

行动者及其环境行为博弈:城市环境问题形成机制的探讨

从环境社会学的视角分析社会行动者的环境行为之社会学意涵及其主要特征入手,通过对政府、企业和公众等各类相关行动者之间环境行为博弈过程的分析,可以揭示环境行为与城市环境问题的关联,进而对城市环境问题的形成机制进行理论探讨。     

新鲜鱿鱼超高压杀菌工艺试验

为确定新鲜鱿鱼超高压杀菌工艺的最佳工艺参数,以杀菌压力、保压时间、漂烫温度为条件,设计了新鲜鱿鱼超 高压杀菌试验。试验结果表明,90℃漂烫10 min,在400 MPa压力下保压10 min,此为新鲜鱿鱼超高压杀菌的最佳工艺 条件。     

基于委托一代理的高校科研项目管理激励建模研究

如何制定激励机制是高校科研项目管理的重要问题。本文基于委托一代理理论,建立了教师参与项目成果分享的激励模型,分析了在信息对称和信息非对称两种情况下的最优代理合同。分析结果表明,在信息对称情况下,存在帕累托最优合同,教师不承担项目风险,分享的项目成果份额为零;在信息不对称情况下,教师承担的风险水平、分享的科研成果份额与其风险规避度负相关,教师越规避风险,分享的成果份额越小。     

基于多任务代理模型的管理者动态报酬契约设计

从Holmstrom提出的多任务代理模型出发,分析了企业管理者面临的纵向多任务特性,并将管理者投入划分为追求当期财务绩效和追求企业能力两个维度,以此为基础构建了基于多任务代理模型的管理者动态报酬契约。结果表明,基于多任务代理模型的管理者动态报酬契约相对于传统静态报酬契约具有明显的帕累托效率改进,有利于诱导管理者在不同维度上合理分配投入,避免短期效应的发生。最后,运用K集团公司的简单案例对其应用进行了简单分析。