垄断竞争市场定价策略的微分对策模型研究

首先分析了在垄断竞争的市场条件下,消费者对同类商品不同品牌的价值判断函数．进而研究了消费者在市场上的品牌选择概率和品牌偏好的动态过程．最后给出了以利润最大化为目标的垄断竞争市场条件下的最优定价策略的微分对策模型,并给出了最优定价策略的Ｎａｓｈ均衡稳态解     

Large Robust Games

With many semi‐anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous‐move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous‐play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.     

Take-it-or-leave-it offers in negotiations: Behavioral types and endogenous deadlines

This paper studies a reputational bargaining model, and investigates the effects of “exit threat” on negotiators’ equilibrium behaviors. Although it is a purely cheap talk message, exit threat is effective and has two main effects: (1) it renders the final outcome efficient and unique, and (2) shifts the bargaining power towards the negotiator who can make this threat. Setting a deadline for negotiations pressures the opponent and incentivizes her to compromise. However, a deadline that is too early makes the opponent less willing to compromise. Thus, effective deadline is uniquely determined. Last minute agreements occur with a positive probability if negotiators cannot reach an immediate agreement. Frequency of agreement has peaks at the beginning and at the end of negotiations (deadline effect), and is flat otherwise.     

Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World

We study a coordination game with randomly changing payoffs and small frictions in changing actions. Using only backwards induction, we find that players must coordinate on the risk‐dominant equilibrium. More precisely, a continuum of fully rational players are randomly matched to play a symmetric 2×2 game. The payoff matrix changes according to a random walk. Players observe these payoffs and the population distribution of actions as they evolve. The game has frictions: opportunities to change strategies arrive from independent random processes, so that the players are locked into their actions for some time. As the frictions disappear, each player ignores what the others are doing and switches at her first opportunity to the risk‐dominant action. History dependence emerges in some cases when frictions remain positive.     

On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x^* and every payoff vector limit u^* resulting from strategies approaching x^*, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u_i^* even if the others deviate slightly from x^*. If strategy spaces are compact and convex, payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner's strategy, and the game is better-reply secure, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Better-reply security holds in many economic games. It also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy Nash equilibria.     

Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games

We report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and Dutch auctions. Centipede games with a clock format unravel, as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two‐player tree‐format centipede games. Dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bids, unlike previous literature on clock‐format Dutch auctions. Our data provide a new, expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and Dutch auctions.