个人生物识别信息的公益诉讼保护路径优化

生物识别信息作为敏感的个人信息,深度体现个人的生理和行为特征。数字时代下,个人信息保护与经济价值产出之间产生对立,同时个人信息权益逐渐由个体私益向社会公益交织演变,构建优化多维的公益诉讼保护路径、维护个人基本权利符合发展要义。坚持行政公益诉讼为主,发挥行政机关守护社会公共利益的第一顺位作用,民事公益诉讼为辅,拓宽多元主体参与守护公共利益通道,创新刑事附带民事诉讼,发挥传统检察优势力量与新时期救济手段相结合,完善公益诉讼救济内涵路径、增设惩罚性规则等体制机制,符合我国司法信息保护能动治理之路。     

博弈论视角下的个体道德行为形成过程及其对德育的启示

教育对象知行不一是我们在德育过程中遇到的难题之一。本文引入博弈论的研究方法,对个体道德行为的形成过程进行量化分析,从理性人的角度说明知行不一现象的主要原因在于没有恰当的教育制度和社会制度与德育所传播的思想道德观念相配合,制度在理性个体道德行为形成过程中起着举足轻重的作用。     

张祜诗歌美学特征略说

中晚唐著名诗人张祜以宫词、山水僧寺题咏诗享名。近年来,学界关于张祜生平、里贯等方面的研究取得较多成果,分析张祜诗歌文本,可以发掘出其诗歌情、理、趣三者交融的美学特征。     

公益诉讼界定之分析

公益诉讼是当前盛行于我国诉讼法学界的热点问题。围绕如何对这一“舶来”制度进行法律移植,使之结合中国的宪政体制和司法实际,在理论设计和制度设计层面,学界作了大量研究并取得丰硕的成果。但对于“公益诉讼”的界定这一基础性问题,学界存在较大分歧,系统研究尚嫌不足。本文以此为着眼点,在考察其语源和归纳分析国内学界几种主要观点的基础上,采取由外而内的逻辑顺序,首先对公益诉讼与私益诉讼、公益诉讼与国家利益诉讼进行辨析,然后从概念内部入手,以目的、主体、体系三个视角对公益诉讼的内涵进行分析,以期得出较为适当的界定。     

收益率分布主观模型及其实证分析

在累积展望理论基础上,通过累积概率描述主观因素对内在价值分布的影响,建立收益率分布主观模型。建立从经验收益率数据中估计投资群体的风险追求程度、投资情绪和非完全理性程度等行为变量参数的方法。利用沪市A股数据,进行χ2同分布拟合检验,结果表明:0.05水平下,沪市69.56%股票的收益率分布认为符合收益率分布主观模型,接受t分布、双正态混合分布、稳定分布和正态分布假设的股票分别为56.31%、44.80%、46.06%和1.74%。通过比较大、小公司投资群体的行为差异,以及利用收益率主观模型估计的内在价值信息参数和行为参数对截面个股收益率进行解释的实证分析,表明收益率分布主观模型及估计行为参数的方法具有合理性。     

创业投资利益分割模型研究:基于创业企业家视角的分析

创业企业对创业企业家的激励是否有效决定着创新的成败。为了研究创业投资中的利益分割问题,从创业过程的特征出发,本文首先分析创业企业家的角色特征,应用间接定价理论和交易效率比较,结合委托-代理模型,构造了基于对创业企业家间接定价的创业企业利益分割的两部动态规划模型,并进一步探讨了债权型和股权型利益分割合约的使用条件和创业企业管理团队的选择问题。研究表明:创业企业家和创业资本家的利益分割合约是基于两部动态规划的优化问题;债权型与股权型合约作为利益分割机制对于创业企业家和资本家的效用取决于各自对未来的预期;只有满足一定条件下,创业企业才倾向于选择能力较高的第三方团队充当企业管理者;在能力同等条件下,创业企业倾向于选择创业企业家充当创业企业的管理者。     

基于理性提前偿付的住房抵押贷款证券定价研究

在分析MBS定价的影响因素以及比较结构化模型与简化形式模型定价方法的基础上,考虑模型的稳健性和可操作性,本文利用简化方法中的Schwartz和Torous定价模型,以建元2007-1RMBS作为研究对象,模拟出BDT利率模型下的利率期限结构,再结合提前还款模型中的PSA法确定贷款现金流,进而确定期权调整价差OAS,构建了适用于我国的MBS定价模型。     

Search for Yield

We present a model of the relationship between real interest rates, credit spreads, and the structure and risk of the banking system. Banks intermediate between entrepreneurs and investors, and can monitor entrepreneurs' projects. We characterize the equilibrium for a fixed aggregate supply of savings, showing that safer entrepreneurs will be funded by nonmonitoring banks and riskier entrepreneurs by monitoring banks. We show that an increase in savings reduces interest rates and spreads, and increases the relative size of the nonmonitoring banking system and the probability of failure of monitoring banks. We also show that the dynamic version of the model exhibits endogenous boom and bust cycles, and rationalizes the existence of countercyclical risk premia and the connection between low interest rates, tight credit spreads, and the buildup of risks during booms.     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

体验型产品消费行为的羊群效应及机理研究——基于电影行业消费行为的实证解释

互联网环境下消费者购买体验型产品时对网络信息的依赖性很大。因此,研究社交媒体影响下体验型产品的消费者决策选择行为具有现实意义。本文以电影行业的票房偏离及消费跟风现象为切入点,探究体验型产品的羊群效应并对其产生的内在机理进行解释。采集艺恩资讯的票房数据以及豆瓣的电影基本信息及影评等数据作为研究样本,从消费者"羊群行为"视角分析其对电影票房的影响。研究发现：在控制了质量等内生性影响之后,消费者羊群效应依然存在;产品特征信息对羊群效应起到了调节作用,从而形成理性跟随;采用预期差异模型可以解释消费者实现理性跟随的过程。研究结论对于电影行业宏观政策制定及对体验型产品合理进行营销推广提供了理论基础与实证依据。