Contracting and Coordination under Asymmetric Production Cost Information

We analyze a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier's unit production cost, which characterizes his type, is only privately known to him. When trading with the retailer, the supplier demands a reservation profit that depends on his unit production cost. We model this problem as a game of adverse selection. In this model, the retailer offers a menu of contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the ordering quantity and the supplier's share of the channel profit. We show that the optimal contract depends critically on a surrogate measure—the ratio of the types’ reservation profit differential to their production cost differential. An important implication from our analysis is that information asymmetry alone does not necessarily induce loss in channel efficiency. The optimal contract can coordinate the supply chain as long as the low‐cost supplier's cost efficiency is neither much overvalued nor much undervalued in the outside market. We further discuss the retailer's preference of the supplier's type under different market conditions, as well as evaluate the effects of the supplier's reservation profit, the retail price, and the demand uncertainty on the optimal contract.     

Will More Purchasing Options Benefit Customers?

This paper considers the sale of a seasonal product in the face of strategic customers. At the beginning of the selling season, the retailer announces both the price p_h at which the product will be sold during the selling season and the post‐season clearance price p<p_h for unsold items. We analyze two operating regimes: The “no reservation regime” allows a buyer either to purchase the product at price p_h when he arrives or to enter a lottery to purchase at price p if the product remains unsold. The “reservation regime” offers each buyer one extra option than the no reservation regime: reserve the product for purchase at the clearance price p. If the buyer reserves the product under the reservation regime and if it remains unsold at the end of the selling season, then he is obligated to purchase it at price p. We consider a situation in which heterogeneous customers with probabilistic valuation arrive in accord with a Poisson process. We characterize the rational purchasing behavior wherein each arriving customer is strategic; each customer takes other customers' purchasing behavior into consideration. By considering the Nash equilibrium of this game, we show that strategic customer behavior can render the customer to be worse off and the retailer to be better off under the reservation regime, despite the fact that this regime offers one extra option (reservation) to a customer. Hence, more purchasing options do not necessarily benefit customers.     

对一起保留所有权买卖案件的探究

因市场经济资金融通和动产用益的需要,保留所有权买卖被广泛采用。但由于我国合同法规定得过于简单笼统,司法实践中许多法律问题值得研究。论文以有关立法选择为背景,运用比较分析的方法,从法学理论和现行规定的双重角度,对保留所有权买卖中买受人的期待权与第三人的抵押权的关系、买受人的撤销权、出卖人的民事责任等问题进行了探讨。     

论所有权保留式分期付款

所谓所有权保留制度,是指在买卖合同中,买受人虽占有使用标的物,但在双方当事人约定的特定条件(通常是价金的一部或全部清偿)成就之前,出卖人仍保留标的物所有权。本文从所有权保留式分期付款的双方当事人所享有的权利、承担的义务及其存在的风险等方面进行了探讨。     

行政首长出庭应诉制的合法性审视

合法性问题一直是人类孜孜不倦的话题。在公法时代,一项新制度的出台,首先应考虑该制度本身是否具备法律依据,是否符合公法的原则,符合宪政的精神。日前,不啻为一缕新风的"行政首长出庭应诉制"正在全国各地广为提倡。无庸王疑,该制度的出台在时下的中国有着正当性的根基,但从法律保留原则、效率行政原则、宪法中的平等权等视角对此制度作一剖析,其合法性的危机却不容忽视。建构将正当性转化为合法性的依法行政制度应是当代中国的现实路径。     

“互联网+就业”精准指导与服务模式探索——以高校职业生涯咨询预约系统的设计为例

把互联网创新成果与就业工作资源的各个环节深度融合,大力提升创新力,形成精准就业指导、生涯教育的新形态,是当前就业工作需要加紧探索的方向。在熟知职业生涯教育及咨询专业知识的基础上,采用数据库产品,对生涯咨询预约系统进行设计,包括系统功能架构、数据流程、数据字典等,确保系统的灵活性、开放性,实现学生生涯咨询的有效预约,是实现精准生涯教育,提升就业工作服务水平的有效途径。     

肚兜对传统习俗的留存与传递探讨

本文通过从具象纹饰和抽象纹饰解析图形纹饰代表的寓意和感情,寻找肚兜图形纹饰在设计过程中表现出的习俗节庆艺术装饰的升华特性,通过造物理念与运用装饰手法让抽象的习俗更具形象感与生动性,提出肚兜对传统习俗与节庆的留存与传递方式以“象征式图腾符号”与“实物式留存符号”为主,体现了肚兜对传统习俗的留存与传递,对弘扬我国传统习俗具有一定作用。     

国际统一合同法与挑选法院

缔结国际统一合同法的宗旨和目的之一就是防止或杜绝挑选法院,但统一法的许多条款不仅未能防止或杜绝挑选法院,甚至有的条款还鼓励挑选法院。为了根除挑选法院现象,人们今后应密切审视缔结国际统一合同法的政策之有效性,并努力探寻其他法律措施。     

历史地体系地认识航海过失免责--航海过失免责存废的理论与实践

从立法的历史回顾和体系化角度认识航海过失免责,对航海过失免责存废的理论、实践进行探析.在目前海运格局下,航海过失免责仍然显示出强大的生命力,这决定了对航海过失免责的存废要持谨慎的态度.     

浅析国际私法的规避问题

通过分析案例"香港广信实业有限公司与深圳广信生物工程公司股权纠纷上诉案",探讨国际私法的规避问题和案例行为与国际私法的规避的关系。包括案例是否属于国际私法规避;案例中的行为、规避和公共秩序的关系;对案例中的行为应给予什么法律后果和法院判决存在的问题。