The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals

It is generally presumed that stronger legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers because it expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This result relies on an assumption that the supply of credit is infinitely elastic. In contrast, with inelastic supply, stronger enforcement generates general equilibrium effects that may reduce credit access for small borrowers and expand it for wealthy borrowers. In a firm‐level panel, we find evidence that an Indian judicial reform that increased banks' ability to recover nonperforming loans had such an adverse distributive impact.     

Competitive and Collaborative Quality and Warranty Management in Supply Chains

Product quality and product warranty coverage are two important and closely related operational decisions. A longer warranty protection period can boost sales, but it may also result in dramatically increased warranty cost, if product quality is poor. To investigate how these two decisions interact with each other and influence supply chain performance, we develop a single‐period model with a supplier that provides a product to an original equipment manufacturer, which in turn sells it to customers. Customer demand is random and affected by the length of the product warranty period. Warranty costs are incurred by both the supplier and the manufacturer. We analyze two different scenarios based on which party sets the warranty period: manufacturer warranty and supplier warranty. Product quality is controlled by the supplier, and the manufacturer determines the ordering quantity. We analyze these decentralized systems and provide the structural properties of the equilibrium strategies. We also compare the results of centralized and decentralized systems and identify the conditions under which one system provides a longer warranty and better product quality than the other. Our numerical study further shows that, in decentralized settings, when the warranty period is determined by the firm sharing the larger proportion of total warranty costs, the supply chain can achieve greater system‐wide profit. Both parties can therefore benefit from properly delegating the warranty decision and sharing the resulting additional profit. We further design a supplier‐development and buy‐back contract for coordinating decentralized supply chains. Several extensions are also discussed.     

Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets With Strategic Traders

This paper studies information aggregation in dynamic markets with a finite number of partially informed strategic traders. It shows that, for a broad class of securities, information in such markets always gets aggregated. Trading takes place in a bounded time interval, and in every equilibrium, as time approaches the end of the interval, the market price of a “separable” security converges in probability to its expected value conditional on the traders' pooled information. If the security is “non‐separable,” then there exists a common prior over the states of the world and an equilibrium such that information does not get aggregated. The class of separable securities includes, among others, Arrow–Debreu securities, whose value is 1 in one state of the world and 0 in all others, and “additive” securities, whose value can be interpreted as the sum of traders' signals.     

生命原理与人口控制

平衡原理、关联原理、生命伦理是以生存原则为前提的三大生命原理.生物种群、生物量与环境容量必须保持平衡的平衡原理及平衡原理贯彻的必然性和破坏性,提供了人口控制的必然性;生物数量、体形(质量)、寿命以环境容量空-时限定为背景的相互关联,和人类作为一个"生态学悖论"的存在,表现了人口控制的紧迫性;而生命伦理,则体现了人口控制对人类和生物的道德性.     

Non‐Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

In many real‐life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined, and it is demonstrated to be constrained efficient and (group) non‐manipulable for “almost all” preference profiles. In its bounding cases, the rule reduces to a number of well‐known mechanisms from the matching literature. In this sense, the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework.     

提前偿贷风险下催生次贷危机的微观主体行为分析——基于不完全信息动态博弈的视角

始于2007年的次贷危机所诱发的金融海啸席卷全球,当后危机时代逐渐走近之时,各种关于这场危机原因的探讨从宏观层面上作出了种种解释。但微观主体的理性决策行为与群体的不可预知性促使笔者从各参与主体的利益状况出发,采用博弈论的原理对次贷危机深层次的原因进行进一步的剖析。在不完全信息的假定下,本文从静态和动态两方面分别考察了贷款人、商业银行、投资者以及特定目的机构的收益函数,正是由于商业银行在贝叶斯均衡与序列均衡中都存在获利的可能,从而催生了整个证券化过程的展开。     

采购拍卖与谈判机制设计及其贝叶斯均衡策略

设计了一种先"拍卖"再"谈判"的两阶段采购机制,实现了更具分配效率且更符合实际的单物品采购运作。该机制设计的特色在于考虑到:采购业务中同时存在关于价格和质量的投标竞争与议价谈判,供应商与采购商在采购的不同阶段的私有信息披露问题,以及谈判阶段的时间成本和相应均衡策略问题。研究的基本结论是:在机制的拍卖阶段中,存在最佳近视反应意义下的招投标策略;机制的议价阶段在均衡路径上的分配结果,与买卖双方的真实价值具有重要的确定性关系;议价阶段实现了对拍卖阶段分配效率的改进,且买卖双方都存在关于质量和价格的贝叶斯纳什均衡议价策略与相关信念。     

平衡开发式创新和探索式创新一定有利于提升企业绩效吗?

在日益动态的商业环境下,平衡开发式创新和探索式创新是企业兼顾当前和未来竞争所必须重视的问题。现有研究过度强调了同时重视开发式创新和探索式创新的二元平衡的价值,假设二元平衡是对任何企业都普遍适用的,但实证检验的结果却并非如此。本研究注意到资源紧缺条件对企业开发式创新和探索式创新平衡战略的影响,发展了资源紧缺条件下中国企业开发式创新和探索式创新的平衡理论,指出,开发式创新和探索式创新的平衡策略不仅有二元平衡,还有间断平衡,究竟哪种策略有效取决于企业资源约束条件决定的开发式创新和探索式创新之间究竟是正交关系还是竞争关系起主导作用。最后,本研究以新创企业和成熟企业的大规模调查数据的比较性实证研究证实了本文的主要理论假设。     

基于共识程度的双体博弈纳什均衡拓展研究

首先对一般双体博弈的策略进行拓展,提出共识纳什均衡的概念,并证明其存在性;根据共识程度的降低提出其他3种拓展形式——近似共识纳什均衡、局部共识纳什均衡和局部近似共识纳什均衡,并举例进行说明;然后,对各种均衡形式下的合作效率进行分析和比较。研究表明,共识纳什均衡的利益分配是基于信息本身——竞争环境的特殊形式,它是具有效率的。其他3种形式均衡的效率低于共识纳什均衡,但仍高于双体博弈纳什均衡。共识纳什均衡和其他3种形式的均衡为参与人组织更具效率的合作提供了渠道和理论解释。     

日语自他动词论

日语中的自他动词可从不同角度对同一事件加以表述,这是语言中一种非常独特的现象。自他动词常常成对出现,性质稳定,但某些动词,本身兼有自他两种属性,也有些动词自他属性不稳定,使用情况较为复杂。自他动词的用法能够反映出「話し手」关注的焦点或注意力所在——"焦点论;"能够体现日本人在日常的现实生活中,注重或体谅对方的心理状态——"交际论;"还涉及到语法学及语义学,能够体现保持语言整体的"平衡性"的作用——"平衡论"。另外,日语自动词在很多情形下本身就包含着可能与被动的意义,笔者称之为"自动词的可能论与被动论"。