关于营销管理的一个模型分析

本文建立企业内企业主体与营销部门的收益模型,在此模型下,分析选择一个怎样的均衡点,使得企业和营销部门保持一种协调的关系。     

消费者行为的一般均衡和角点均衡

消费者行为的角点均衡不应只看作是一般均衡的特例。取得一般均衡还是角点均衡首先取决于不同商品价格之间的关系 ,其次取决于收入与价格的关系 ,角点均衡与一般均衡 ,相互依存 ,密不可分。强可加效用函数的一般均衡和角点均衡的求解 ,均可采用边际分析方法。     

Money in Search Equilibrium,in Competitive Equilibrium,and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first‐order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second‐order welfare losses.     

Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets. We show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market chooses the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of actively traded assets.     

Complexity and Competition

Extensive‐form market games typically have a large number of noncompetitive equilibria. In this paper, we argue that the complexity of noncompetitive behavior provides a justification for competitive equilibrium in the sense that if rational agents have an aversion to complexity (at the margin), then maximizing behavior will result in simple behavioral rules and hence in a competitive outcome. For this purpose, we use a class of extensive‐form dynamic matching and bargaining games with a finite number of agents. In particular, we consider markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers and deterministic, exogenous, sequential matching rules, although the results can be extended to other matching processes. If the complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences lexicographically with the standard payoff, then every equilibrium strategy profile induces a competitive outcome.     

Assessing non-tariff barriers in Syria

International trade in Syria is highly regulated through a combination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. At 8% of the value of imports on average, effective tariffs are relatively low. However, non-tariff barriers to trade actually make Syria's trade restrictiveness very high. Comparing world and domestic prices of imports indeed suggests that non-tariff barriers increase the domestic price of imported goods by 17% on average, notably the result of significant quantitative restrictions. Using a computable general equilibrium model, the costs of NTBs on the Syrian economy are assessed. Simulations suggest that reallocation gains resulting from a complete removal of NTBs could be substantial. Accordingly, the key message from the analysis is that trade reform if it focuses only on tariff reduction will have limited growth benefits. On the contrary, if the Government abolishes the widespread non-tariff barriers to trade, including the elimination of quantitative trade restrictions, trade policy can become the central instrument to redress Syria's growth prospects.     

Incentives,Contracts, and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms1

This paper takes steps toward integrating firm theory in the spirit of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Grossman and Hart (1986), contract theory in the spirit of Holmstrom (1979), and general equilibrium theory in the spirit of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1959). In the model presented here, the set of firms that form and the contractual arrangements that appear, the assignments of agents to firms, the prices faced by firms for inputs and outputs, and the incentives to agents are all determined endogenously at equilibrium. Agents choose consumption—but they also choose which firms to join, which roles to occupy in those firms, and which actions to take in those roles. Agents interact anonymously with the (large) market, but strategically within the (small) firms they join. The model accommodates moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and insurance. Equilibria may be Pareto ranked.     

和谐社会的市场研究

在社会主义市场经济条件下,市场非均衡是社会不和谐的充分条件,市场均衡则是社会和谐的必要条件。在社会主义市场经济基础上,构建社会主义和谐社会,需要完善市场,维护市场均衡和健全法律法规。     

Hard‐to‐Solve Bimatrix Games

The Lemke–Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. This paper presents a class of square bimatrix games for which this algorithm takes, even in the best case, an exponential number of steps in the dimension d of the game. Using polytope theory, the games are constructed using pairs of dual cyclic polytopes with 2d suitably labeled facets in d‐space. The construction is extended to nonsquare games where, in addition to exponentially long Lemke–Howson computations, finding an equilibrium by support enumeration takes on average exponential time.     

认同度对相关性评价的影响分析

本文针对相关性评价的复合性,建立了“一主多从”的博弈模型,以分析参与互评的多个利益相关者之间的关系,特别是欺诈性合谋的可能性.借助数学模型,定量地讨论了企业文化中,认同度和企业制度建设之间的互动关系.结果表明,认同度的提高有助于评价的顺利进行,但制度建设是不可替代的,否则将无法避免合谋的出现.相关性评价的效果既依赖于员工的认同度,也依赖于制度建设.