关于铁路国有资本效绩评价的探讨

本文把国有资本效绩评价理论分为财务导向型与综合评价型两种,认为由于这两种评价理论没有考虑到铁路国有资本的公益性和企业性、非营利性和营利性的产业特点,单纯按照一般工商企业的资本效绩评价原则来考核铁路国有资本,会扭曲不同铁路国有资本的性质和职能,政府职能也就不能得到清晰界定.因此,应该分别针对铁路营利性和非营利性国有资本,以两类效绩评价理论为指导,按照"分离均衡"原则设计我国铁路国有资本效绩评价体系.     

失业成因新探

现代西方经济学的几种失业理论,从不同角度在不同程度上解释了失业现象,但大多对造成失业的因素分析不足.作者通过对消费者行为和厂商行为进行模型分析,用消费者效用最大化和厂商利润最大化分别导出有效劳动力供给方程和需求方程,从而说明失业是如何决定的.失业是一种经济现象,它是劳动力总供给不能被生产完全吸收的结果,由有效劳动力供给和有效劳动力需求两种力量共同决定.劳动力总供给、政府津贴、工资、消费是有效劳动供给形成的因素.劳动力总供给、工资、政府津贴、消费、资本投入和技术是决定有效劳动力需求的主要因素.     

关于铁路国有资本效绩评价的探讨

本文把国有资本效绩评价理论分为财务导向型与综合评价型两种，认为由于这两种评价理论没有考虑到铁路国有资本的公益性和企业性、非营利性和营利性的产业特点，单纯按照一般工商企业的资本效绩评价原则来考核铁路国有资本，会扭曲不同铁路国有资本的性质和职能，政府职能也就不能得到清晰界定。因此，应该分别针对铁路营利性和非营利性国有资本，以两类效绩评价理论为指导，按照“分离均衡”原则设计我国铁路国有资本效绩评价体系。     

审计监管与违规审计的博弈论分析

按照博弈论的观点,可能有违规审计行为的会计师事务所与执行审计监管的政府部门是相互博弈的主体,在不考虑职业道德因素的情况下,它们之间存在着互相以对方的行为模式来决定自己行为模式的规律.文章通过建立违规审计的一般博弈模型和处罚模型,运用实际数据,探讨了违规审计与审计监管的内在规律,认为要有效抑制违规审计行为,必须将监管面扩大到审计收费金额的1/3,处罚力度应加大到没收非法所得并处以3倍左右的罚款.     

寻求均衡:政府责任在行政立法层面的博弈分析

政府责任是指行政主体在对国家事务和社会公共事务进行行政立法、执法及监督与救济时应承担的具体职责和作用,是政府运用公权力来调整权利(力)之间的冲突与矛盾时所应尽的一种义务.政府往往通过行政立法对权利(力)进行规则性配置,从而体现其责任承担状况,同时调整由政府所代表的公权力与相对人所代表的私权利之间的权利(力)关系,以期寻求二者之间的最优均衡.但有时立法的实施效果却并不能实现政府的预期目的.针对这一现象,笔者拮取了几个近年来颇受关注的有关行政立法的典型案例,试图运用博弈论的方法对其进行研究与分析.从中我们可以发现,政府责任的规避与承担和权利(力)结构的失衡与均衡有着极为重要的联系,进而引发我们对寻求实现权利(力)结构在行政立法层面的最优均衡问题进行思考与研究,藉此希望能对今后完善我国行政立法有所启迪与裨益.     

一个齐次的有限Markov链——Ehrenfest模型

本文用递推数列的方法研究了一个齐次的有限Markov链(Ehrenfest模型),得出与李政道著“统计力学”相同的结论。但本文表述方式较之准确、简练,推导所用数学工具较之初等、直接。     

A bargaining model with players' perceptions on the retractability of offers

This paper studies a generalization of Rubinstein's bargaining model with retractable offers. The model incorporates and parameterizes the bargainers' perceptions on the retractability of offers. Our key result characterizes the limiting set of perfect equilibria as the time interval between two consecutive offers tends to zero. In this limit, for any possible players' perceptions on the retractability of offers such that at least one of the players perceives that there is at least a small chance that offers may be retractable, the bargaining game possesses a continuum of perfect equilibria.     

Recursive Equilibrium in Stochastic Overlapping‐Generations Economies

We prove the generic existence of a recursive equilibrium for overlapping‐generations economies with uncertainty. “Generic” here means in a residual set of utilities and endowments. The result holds provided there is a sufficient number of potentially different individuals within each cohort.     

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private‐value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participation constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. In an environment with diverse preferences it is the unique mechanism satisfying ex post incentive, ex post participation, and efficient exit conditions. We develop the dynamic pivot mechanism in detail for a repeated auction of a single object in which each bidder learns over time her true valuation of the object. The dynamic pivot mechanism here is equivalent to a modified second price auction.     

Managing Downstream Competition via Capacity Allocation

Consider a supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers. The supplier produces a single product and sells it to the retailers, who in turn sell the product to consumers. The supplier has limited production capacity, and the retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition at the consumer/market level. When the sum of the retailer orders exceeds the capacity, the supplier allocates her capacity according to a pre‐announced allocation mechanism. Two mechanisms are considered: proportional allocation and lexicographic allocation. An extensive study of the two allocation mechanisms shows that the lexicographic mechanism has the ability to dampen the competition at the retail level, increasing the profits for both the supplier and the supply chain.