Estimation of regression vectors in linear mixed models with Dirichlet process random effects

The Dirichlet process has been used extensively in Bayesian non parametric modeling, and has proven to be very useful. In particular, mixed models with Dirichlet process random effects have been used in modeling many types of data and can often outperform their normal random effect counterparts. Here we examine the linear mixed model with Dirichlet process random effects from a classical view, and derive the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of the fixed effects. We are also able to calculate the resulting covariance matrix and find that the covariance is directly related to the precision parameter of the Dirichlet process, giving a new interpretation of this parameter. We also characterize the relationship between the BLUE and the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimator and show how confidence intervals can be approximated.     

A self-normalized central limit theorem for a ρ-mixing stationary sequence

We investigate a self-normalized central limit theorem for a ρ-mixing stationary sequence {X_i, i ? 1} of random variables such that L(x) ? E(X²₁I{|X₁| ? x}) is a slowly varying function as x → ∞. The results obtained generalize the results of Gine, Gotze, and Mason (1997) and Mason (2005 Mason, D. M. 2005. The asymptotic distribution of self-normalized triangular arrays. Journal of Theoretical Probability 18 (4):853–70.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) to ρ-mixing sequences.     

二阶常微分方程组边值问题正解的存在性

利用锥上不动点定理,研究了一类二阶非线性常微分方程组四点边值问题正解的存在性.在非线性项满足一定增长的条件下,得到了至少一个和两个正解存在的几个充分条件.     

Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences

When players have identical time preferences, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs coincides with the convex hull of the underlying stage- game payoffs. Moreover, all feasible and individually rational payoffs can be sustained by equilibria if the players are sufficiently patient. Neither of these facts generalizes to the case of different time preferences. First, players can mutually benefit from trading payoffs across time. Hence, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs is typically larger than the convex hull of the underlying stage-game payoffs. Second, it is not usually the case that every trade plan that guarantees individually rational payoffs can be sustained by an equilibrium, no matter how patient the players are. This paper provides a simple characterization of the sets of Nash and of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games.     

交错级数敛散性的一个判别定理

提出了交错级数敛散性的一个新的判别定理.该定理的判别式为极限形式,运用其判别交错级数的敛散性非常简便.     

Approximate exchangeability and de Finetti priors in 2022

This is a review paper, beginning with de Finetti's work on partial exchangeability, continuing with his approach to approximate exchangeability, and then his (surprising) approach to assigning informative priors in nonstandard situations. Recent progress on Markov chain Monte Carlo methods for drawing conclusions is supplemented by a review of work by Gerencsér and Ottolini on getting honest bounds for rates of convergence. The paper concludes with a speculative approach to combining classical asymptotics with Monte Carlo. This promises real speed-ups and makes a nice example of how theory and computation can interact.