Fiscal stringency and fiscal sustainability: Panel evidence from the American state and local governments

Most state (and local) governments in the U.S. operate under formal fiscal rules which limit their ability to run budget deficits and resort to debt financing. A priori, one would expect to find evidence in favor of an intertemporally balanced budget, or fiscal sustainability, for these states, especially those characterized by a relatively high degree of fiscal stringency. We test this hypothesis for a panel of 47 state–local government units (1961–2006) using four budget balance definitions and several subsamples defined based on regional classifications, or presence of certain balanced budget requirements (BBRs). Our results, obtained from panel estimation techniques that allow for general forms of serial and cross-sectional dependence, suggest that a sufficient condition for “strong” sustainability is consistently satisfied for the full sample and all subsamples in relation to balances that include special funds and/or federal grants. However, we find evidence consistent with the “weak” version of sustainability for the full sample and some regional subsamples (particularly Far West dominated by California) in at least one of the two balances that exclude these items. Finally, the BBRs seem to matter only in relation to the sustainability of the more narrowly defined balances. We discuss the implications of these findings for the role of fiscal rules and federal grant policies.     

The Firm as a Means of Concealing Information

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that a firm may owe its continued existence to its attempts to conceal information from its competitors about the unknown characteristics of a certain factor, not just to its savings on market transaction costs, its team‐working, risk‐sharing, or the encouragement of ex ante specific investment. This is because the existence of a firm contract severs the relationship between the factor market and the product market, thereby making it difficult for outsiders to observe the marginal contribution of the intermediate factor and make statistical inferences about the factor's unknown characteristics. Furthermore, an optimal contract is determined by a trade‐off not only between traditional risk‐sharing and incentive, but also between the incentive and information concealing. Finally, we show that this latter kind of trade‐off also affects the position of the optimal boundary of the firm.     

Multilevel and nonlinear panel data models

Summary This paper presents a selective survey on panel data methods. The focus is on new developments. In particular, linear multilevel models, specific nonlinear, nonparametric and semiparametric models are at the center of the survey. In contrast to linear models there do not exist unified methods for nonlinear approaches. In this case conditional maximum likelihood methods dominate for fixed effects models. Under random effects assumptions it is sometimes possible to employ conventional maximum likelihood methods using Gaussian quadrature to reduce a T-dimensional integral. Alternatives are generalized methods of moments and simulated estimators. If the nonlinear function is not exactly known, nonparametric or semiparametric methods should be preferred. Helpful comments and suggestions from an unknown referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

Statistical precision of DEA and Malmquist indices: A bootstrap application to Norwegian grain producers

Previous applications of data envelopment analysis (DEA) and its subsequent Malmquist indices to efficiency and productivity measurements have been criticised for not providing statistical inferences regarding the significance of observed results. In this paper, DEA and a Malmquist index are combined with a bootstrap method in order to provide succinct statistical inferences that determine the performance of grain producers in Eastern Norway. The data cover the period between 1987 and 1997. Results reveal: (i) a significant degree of inefficiency (approximately 11%) and an average productivity progress of 38% over the period considered; (ii) the formidable productivity progress observed is primarily explained by technical efficiency changes that enabled producers to catch up with front runners; and (iii) environmental factors, such as weather conditions, impact both efficiency and productivity. Finally, the analysis reveals that using bootstrapping to make statistical inferences suggests that researchers should be careful in making performance comparisons based on conventional DEA methods, as any discovered differences may not be significant.     

Central banks’ priorities and the left/right partisanship of exchange rates

This study argues that when central banks subordinate all policy goals to achieving price stability greater central bank independence encourages left-wing governments to seek greater exchange rate stability. Such central bank policy priorities make the Left's preferred distributive policies more dependent on the effectiveness of fiscal policy, which under high capital mobility increases with exchange rate stability. In contrast, right-wing governments put greater emphasis on market adjustments and price stability. Hypotheses are tested by estimating the sensitivity of exchange rate variation to partisanship, central bank independence, and the salience of price stability, using a Prais-Winsten estimator and Instrumented Variables, run on pooled cross-section time-series data from 22 OECD countries during 1990-2004.     

LETTING DOWN THE TEAM? SOCIAL EFFECTS OF TEAM INCENTIVES

This paper estimates social effects of incentivizing people in teams. In three field experiments featuring exogenous team formation and opportunities for repeated social interactions, we find large team effects that operate through social channels. In particular, assignment to a team treatment increases productivity by 9%–17% relative to an individual incentive treatment, even though the individual incentive yields a higher private return. Further, we find that in a choice treatment individuals overwhelmingly prefer the individual incentive to the team incentive, despite the latter being more effective. These results are most consistent with the team effects operating through guilt or social pressure as opposed to pure altruism.     

SOCIAL COMPARISON AND EFFORT PROVISION: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT

Social comparison has potentially far reaching consequences in many economic domains. We conducted a field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers' effort provision if their own wage or that of a co‐worker is cut. Workers were assigned to groups of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both group members' wages caused a decrease in performance. But when only one group member's wage was cut, the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers' wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison among workers affects effort provision because the only difference between the two wage‐cut treatments is the other group member's wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member's pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers' wages remained unchanged. This indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort.     

KNOWING THE RIGHT PERSON IN THE RIGHT PLACE: POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

We use a political economy model of Schumpeterian growth with entry to investigate how an incumbent politician can strategically use the level of red tape to acquire incumbency advantage. By setting sufficiently high red tape, the politician induces the incumbent firm in the intermediate sector to invest in political connections, which are valued also by voters, who recognize that bureaucratic costs can be reduced by connected firms. Within this framework, we study the Markov perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated game among politicians, firms, and voters, and show that all equilibria are characterized by investments in political connections and the re‐election of the incumbent politician. Political connections may prevent entry of advanced competitors and cause the economy to lag behind the technological frontier. Our model provides a possible explanation for the persistence of inefficient democracies and political barriers to technology development, where these reflect shared rather than conflicting interests.     

Effect of financial development on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the overall economic growth effect when the growth in finance and real sector is disproportionate relying on panel data for 29 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1980–2014. Results from the system generalized methods of moments (GMM) reveal that, while financial development supports economic growth, the extent to which finance helps growth depends crucially on the simultaneous growth of real and financial sectors. The elasticity of growth to changes in either size of the real or financial sector is higher under balanced sectoral growth. We also show that rapid and unbridled credit growth comes at a huge cost to economic growth with consequences stemming from financing of risky and unsustainable investments coupled with superfluous consumption fueling inflation. However, the pass-through excess finance–economic growth effect via the investment channel is stronger.     

论人格心理学课程对大学生心理健康教育的影响

本文利用SCL─90量表,选取大学一、二、三年级共80名选修健康人格教育课程的学生作为实验组,在32学时的课程前后分别测量,同时设置另外36人选修班作为对照组,统计结果分析显示出接受健康人格教育后,学生心理健康水平有所提高,同时本研究对改善今后人格心理研究有启发意义。