In search of the wage-labour/service contract: new evidence on the validity of the Goldthorpe class schema

In this paper we examine new empirical evidence on the coherence and magnitude of the main classes in the Goldthorpe class schema. Particular attention is paid to issues that have recently been a source of academic dispute: the coherence and size of the service class and the distinction between the service class and intermediate classes. Using recently available British data collected by the Office for National Statistics we examine: (i) the extent to which measures of class-relevant job characteristics are empirically discriminated by the categories of the schema; (ii) the structure of a 'contract type' dimension of employment relations conceived of as a categorical latent variable; and (iii) the association between this latent variable and both the Goldthorpe class schema and a related measure socio-economic group (SEG). We find that the data are consistent with the existence of a three category latent 'contract type' variable largely corresponding to the notions of service, intermediate and wage-labour contracts explicit in discussions of the theoretical rationale for the Goldthorpe schema. We further find a substantial degree of fit between the latent 'contract types' and the schema. However, the service class fault line appears to lie within class I and II of the schema rather than between them and the intermediate classes which suggests a revised, smaller service class would better capture the reality of the contemporary British occupational structure.     

行政合同适用范围论略

行政合同适用范围的实质在于官民利益的对话空间,从政治、经济、法律和社会四个基础论述官民利益对话空间的可能性。同时通过运用比较方法,得出行政合同适用范围的最大特点在于开放性。最后又提出了制约我国行政合同适用范围的三个因素。     

从日美贸易纠纷看WTO争端解决机制中的非违约申诉

以日美照相胶片贸易争端案为例,从非违约申诉要件的构成、双方举证责任的划分、政府措施的范围和效力、利益受损与问题措施之间因果关系的认定等方面,揭示WTO争端解决机制处理非违约申诉的原则和特点,探讨现行WTO规则在约束成员方限制竞争行为上的局限和争端解决机制尚需完善的程序与规则,以及当事国在提出或应对非违约申诉时应该重视的若干问题。     

企业的契约性与企业价值理论探讨

本文主要根据现代企业理论 ,将企业看成是一系列契约的联结。透过企业表面深入分析企业契约的特征 ,从企业的契约性角度讨论企业的价值特性 ,探讨企业内部的价值源 ,然后据此分析企业的价值构成及企业融资行为对其价值的影响途径。     

新闻"喉舌论"考述

从历史的角度考察新闻"喉舌论"产生的社会根源,比较马克思和中国改良派两种"喉舌论"的差异,探讨西方产生自由论、中国产生"喉舌论"的必然性,认为自由论和喉舌论都是人们对新闻实践和新闻规律的认识和总结.今天,我们所提倡和坚持的是马克思主义的新闻喉舌论.     

Quick response and supply chain structure with strategic consumers

This work explores the impact of quick response on supply chain performance for various supply chain structures with strategic customer behavior. By investigating pricing and inventory decisions in decentralized supply chains under revenue-sharing contracts and in centralized supply chains, we study the performance of four various systems and compare the value of quick response in different supply chain structures. The results show that if the extra cost of quick response is relatively low, the value of quick response would be greater in centralized systems than in decentralized systems. On the other hand, if the extra cost is high, decentralized supply chains reap more incremental profits from adopting quick response. We also find that revenue-sharing contracts enable a decentralized supply chain to outperform a centralized supply chain, but only allow limited flexibility of allocating total profits between a manufacturer and a retailer.     

Impact of secondary market on consumer return policies and supply chain coordination

In this paper, we develop a unified model to study the inventory management problem of a product and the coordination of the associated supply chain consisting of a single supplier and considerably many retailers in the presence of a secondary market. Specifically, consumer returns are allowed in the initial sales. Then, we introduce a secondary market to salvage the returns and the leftovers from the initial sales. In this secondary market, a discount price will be offered to the consumers but no returns are accepted. Moreover, between the primary and the secondary market, there is an internal market where retailers can trade among themselves so that they are able to adjust their inventory levels to prepare for the sales in the secondary market. We study the retailers' and the supply chain's inventory decision in this case and highlight the impact of the secondary market on the sales as well as on the supply chain coordination contracts. We conclude that the secondary market helps us to increase the total wholesale volume. Numerical examples show that the total sales profit is also increased. However, the secondary market aggravates the incentive conflict between the retailers and the supply chain on deciding the optimal inventory levels and hence requires the supplier to offer more generous buyback or sales rebate contracts for coordination of the supply chain. Finally, we extend our analysis to more general cases and also show that our results are robust to some of the modeling assumptions.     

Consignment or wholesale: Retailer and supplier preferences and incentives for compromise

We consider two independently managed parties, a retailer and a supplier, that are considering either a wholesale or a consignment contract to produce and market a single good. Both parties have an interest in reaching an agreement, but their first choice of contract type are generally not the same. We define the strength of retailer and supplier preferences for their respective choices of contract type as the ratio of their expected profits for their first choice of contract type over that for the alternative contract type. We study how uncontrollable factors as well as controllable factors affect the strength of retailer and supplier contract preferences. We develop incentive payments that can potentially be used to increase the likelihood of success in negotiating an agreement.     

Incentive Contracts for Managing a Project with Uncertain Completion Time

We examine two time‐related incentive project management contracts (C1 and C2 contracts) when the manager conducts a reverse auction. Under the C1 contract, the contractor with the lowest bid price wins; however, the manager imposes a linear and symmetric incentive/disincentive for early/late completion according to a pre‐specified due date. Under the C2 contract, the winning contractor has the lowest composite score that is based on the quoted price and the quoted due date; however, in addition to the linear and symmetric penalty/incentive, the contractor is subject to an additional penalty for late completion. While the C2 contract is more sophisticated than the C1 contract (in terms of the number of decisions that each party has to make), our analysis reveals that, unless the project is truly urgent, the more complicated C2 contract adds no value to the manager— the simple C1 contract will suffice.     

Unsold Versus Unbought Commitment: Minimum Total Commitment Contracts with Nonzero Setup Costs

We study a minimum total commitment (MTC) contract embedded in a finite‐horizon periodic‐review inventory system. Under this contract, the buyer commits to purchase a minimum quantity of a single product from the supplier over the entire planning horizon. We consider nonstationary demand and per‐unit cost, discount factor, and nonzero setup cost. Because the formulations used in existing literature are unable to handle our setting, we develop a new formulation based on a state transformation technique using unsold commitment instead of unbought commitment as state variable. We first revisit the zero setup cost case and show that the optimal ordering policy is an unsold‐commitment‐dependent base‐stock policy. We also provide a simpler proof of the optimality of the dual base‐stock policy. We then study the nonzero setup cost case and prove a new result, that the optimal solution is an unsold‐commitment‐dependent (s, S) policy. We further propose two heuristic policies, which numerical tests show to perform very well. We also discuss two extensions to show the generality of our method's effectiveness. Finally, we use our results to examine the effect of different contract terms such as duration, lead time, and commitment on buyer's cost. We also compare total supply chain profits under periodic commitment, MTC, and no commitment.