The Effect of Competition on the Efficient–Responsive Choice

In determining their operations strategy, a firm chooses whether to be responsive or efficient. For firms competing in a market with uncertain demand and varying intensity of substitutability for the competitor's product, we characterize the responsive or efficient choice in equilibrium. To focus first on the competitive implications, we study a model where a firm can choose to be responsive at no additional fixed or marginal cost. We find that competing firms will choose the same configuration (responsive or efficient), and responsiveness tends to be favorable when demand uncertainty is high or when product competition is not too strong. Intense competition can drive firms to choose to be efficient rather than responsive even when there is no additional cost of being responsive. In such a case, both firms would be better off by choosing to be responsive but cannot credibly commit. We extend the basic model to study the impact of endogenized production timing, multiple productions and product holdback (or, equivalently, postponed production). For all these settings, we find structurally similar results; firms choose the same configuration, and the firms may miss Pareto‐improvements. Furthermore, through extensions to the basic model, we find that greater operational flexibility can make responsiveness look less attractive in the presence of product competition. In contrast to our basic model and other extensions, we find it is possible for one firm to be responsive while the other is efficient when there is either a fixed cost or variable cost premium associated with responsive delivery.     

Browse‐and‐Switch: Retail‐Online Competition under Value Uncertainty

Although online shopping is becoming popular, consumers who are unsure about whether to buy a product may find it advantageous to visit a brick‐and‐mortar retail store to first examine the product before purchasing it. But, after browsing at the store, consumers have the option of switching to an e‐tailer to purchase the item at a cheaper price rather than buying at the store. Recent business press refers to this browse‐and‐switch behavior as “showrooming,” and attributes to it the declining profits of brick‐and‐mortar retailers. To study the effect of the browse‐and‐switch option on retail and online pricing strategies and profits, we analyze a stylized economic model that incorporates uncertainty in consumers' valuation of the product, captures the heterogeneity among consumers in their inclination to purchase online, and permits product returns. We consider various equilibrium scenarios for different combinations of consumer shopping behaviors, characterize the parameter ranges for each scenario, and demonstrate that browse‐and‐switch behavior can indeed occur under equilibrium. Our analysis further shows that the option for consumers to browse‐and‐switch intensifies competition, reducing the profits for both firms.     

Competitive Quality Choice and Remanufacturing

We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who faces competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR). The OEM decides the quality of the new product, which also determines the quality of the competing remanufactured product. The OEM and the IR then competitively determine their production quantities. We explicitly characterize how the OEM competes with the IR in equilibrium. Specifically, we show that the OEM relies more on quality as a strategic lever when it has a stronger competitive position (determined by the relative cost and value of new and remanufactured products), and in contrast it relies more heavily on limiting quantity of cores when it has a weaker competitive position. The IR's entry threat as well as its successful entry can decrease the consumer surplus. Furthermore, our results illustrate that ignoring the competition or the OEM's quality choice leads to overestimating benefits of remanufacturing for consumer and social welfare. In addition, we show an IR with either a sufficiently weak competitive position (so the OEM deters entry) or a sufficiently strong one (so the OEM is forced to limit quantity of cores) is desirable for reducing the environmental impact. Comparing our results with the benchmark in which the OEM remanufactures suggests that encouraging IRs to remanufacture in lieu of the OEMs may not benefit the environment. Furthermore, the benchmark illustrates that making remanufacturing more attractive improves the environmental impact when the remanufacturer is the OEM, while worsening it when remanufacturing is done by the IR.     

Vertical Integration under Competition: Forward,Backward, or No Integration?

We consider two competing supply chains, each consisting of supplier, a manufacturer, and a retailer. The suppliers exert effort to improve product quality, and the retailers sell products competitively. Each manufacturer chooses one of the three strategies: forward integration, backward integration, or no vertical integration. We seek for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and study the resulting market structure. Moreover, we characterize the effect of vertical integration on profitability, product price, and quality in a competitive setting. Existing literature has shown that, when manufacturers consider only forward integration, they may choose not to vertically integrate in equilibrium. In contrast, we find that, when both forward and backward integration options are considered, disintegration cannot be an equilibrium outcome. In this case, both manufacturers either forward or backward integrate, and the degree of product perishability, cost of quality, and how much consumers value quality are critical for the chosen direction of integration. Furthermore, competition increases attractiveness of backward integration relative to forward integration. We show that, while integrating backward unilaterally is always beneficial, unilateral forward integration can harm a manufacturer's profitability. Finally, vertical integration can result in a better quality product sold at a lower price.     

浅析我国商业银行面临的国际竞争及对策

随着新世纪的到来,中国入世,金融全球化进程加快,中国商业银行面临日趋严峻的国际冲击。中国商业银行应采取加强自身建设增强竞争力、利用金融创新加快混业经营步伐、拓展网上银行业务等对策,以应对外资银行对商业银行的挑战、混业经营全球化趋势的冲击以及网络银行对商业银行的挑战。     

报业竞争下的新闻卖点策划——基于《成都晚报》的内容分析

新闻卖点的成立具有理论基础和实践基础。本文通过对《成都晚报》的内容分析阐释了市场竞争背景下新闻卖点对报业和受众所具有的多方面社会功能,在此基础上提出新闻卖点策划要从报纸定位、受众心理诉求、内容表达和包装设计入手的见解。     

生源竞争与高校招生宣传工作原则及策略研究

社会对高等教育期望值的提高、高等教育格局的悄然改变、高等教育规模的稳步扩大，必然会引起激烈的生源竞争。生源质量直接关系着学校的生存、前途和命运。加强招生宣传工作已为许多高校所重视。只有遵循若干原则和规则，合理运用各种策略，招生宣传工作才能有序有效。     

走出企业国际化的误区

中国企业国际化已经成为不可逆转的历史潮流,但学术界和企业界在企业国际化的真正内涵、企业如何进行国际化等问题上,还存在不少认识上的误区。我国已经进入WTO后过渡期,企业国际化的经济背景发生了深刻的变化,一大批中国企业国际化的步伐加快,迅速跻身全球化竞争的行列。但在具体实践过程中,我国企业国际化面对贸易争端不断、缺少国际化的品牌、对外投资规模小、海外并购并非一帆风顺等难题。中国企业应该具有全球化的视野,走出企业国际化方面的认识误区,在全球产业链中寻找自己合适的位置,培养独特的核心竞争力,认真按国际规则办事,走出一条适合自身特点的国际化道路。     

区域旅游业时空演变形式与机制探析

区域旅游业的时空演变,在产业功能、增长方式、市场扩展、对外区域关系、旅游企业成长等方面表现出典型的阶段性特征。空间上表现为旅游产业规模扩大、旅游客源市场规模增大、旅游形象和知名度提升、旅游投资与建设的多元化和国际化等。区域旅游的驱动力来自于区域经济一体化、旅游市场拓展、旅游信息传播、地域文化交流等。区域竞争是旅游业发展的必然趋势,其内在机制在于旅游资源、产品和市场的一系列属性特征,区域旅游业空间演化的最终趋势是走向区域之间的联合协作。     

商业秘密的法律界定

商业秘密 ,不同国家的法律有不同的表述。根据我国《反不正当竞争法》的规定 ,属于商业秘密范畴的技术信息和经营信息必须具有秘密性、价值性、实用性和保密性 ,这是界定商业秘密的标准和条件。对商业秘密的正确界定 ,有利于对技术信息和经营信息的法律保护适度 ,正确划分侵犯商业秘密行为的界限 ,更好的发挥法律的保护作用。