Foreign Direct Investment,Trade, and Skilled Labour Demand in Eastern Europe

In this paper, we study the effects of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade on relative skilled labour demand in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Our estimates show significant heterogeneity in the FDI effect across the three economies: the effect is always significantly positive for Hungary, weakly negative for Poland, and negligible for the Czech Republic. As to trade, we find much more homogeneity in coefficient estimates, which are generally negative for all countries, although significant only in the case of Hungary.     

How the Risk of Displacement for Older Workers Has Changed

Using Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition and relying on the consistent design of the Displaced Worker Survey since 1996, this study analyses various factors contributing to the rising dislocation of older workers, such as changes in tenure, industry mix, educational attainment, and labor force participation. Although in the past older workers were less prone to displacement compared with prime‐age workers, this paper finds that older workers are now more likely to be displaced, conditional on education, manufacturing industry, and tenure. Declining tenure, a higher incidence of displacement in manufacturing, and a higher labor force participation among older workers largely explain the convergence of displacement rates among older and prime‐age workers.     

Occupational and Locational Substitution: Measuring the Effect of Occupational and Regional Mobility

The paper analyses the effects of occupational and regional mobility on the matching rate using monthly panel data disaggregated at the regional and occupational level. The main contribution of the paper is to measure the effect of substitutability between vacancies in different occupations, and vacancies in different regions on the matching rate. The estimates indicate higher regional mobility in West Germany but higher occupational mobility in East Germany. The results show that if occupations were perfect substitutes, then the number of matches could increase by 5–9 per cent. Perfect regional mobility would increase matchings by 5–15 per cent. It is also shown that partial aggregation causes a downward bias in substitutability estimates.     

CLASS SIZE AND CLASS HETEROGENEITY

We study how class size and class composition affect the academic and labor market performance of college students, two crucial policy questions given the secular increase in college enrollment. Our identification strategy relies on the random assignment of students to teaching classes. We find that a one standard deviation increase in class‐size results in a 0.1 standard deviation deterioration of the average grade. Further, the effect is heterogeneous as it is stronger for males and lower income students. Also, the effects of class composition in terms of gender and ability appear to be inverse U‐shaped. Finally, a reduction of 20 students (one standard deviation) in one’s class size has a positive effect on monthly wages of about €80 ($115) or 6% over the average.     

CONTROL RIGHTS IN COMPLEX PARTNERSHIPS

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex partnership, that is, a partnership which produces impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties’ valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party’s investment is more important than the other party’s. If the parties’ investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low‐valuation party. If the importance of the parties’ investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low‐valuation party should receive sole authority. We analyze an extension in which side payments are infeasible. We check for robustness of our results in several dimensions, such as allowing for multiple parties or for joint authority, and apply our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships, including those involving schools and child custody.     

Intergenerational redistribution in a small open economy with endogenous fertility

For pay-as-you-go financed pension systems, claims may be calculated according to individual contributions (income) or the number of children of a family. We analyse the optimal structure of these parameters in a model with endogenous fertility. It is shown that for both structural determinants there exists no interior solution of the problem of intragenerational utility maximisation. Thus, pure systems are always welfare maximizing. Furthermore, children-related pension claims induce a fiscal externality that tends to be positive. The determination of the optimal contribution rate shows that the widely accepted Aaron-condition is in general a misleading indicator for the comparison of fully funded and pay-as-you-go financed pension systems. Received March 12, 1996 / Accepted January 27, 1997     

Panel data unit roots tests: The role of serial correlation and the time dimension

We investigate the influence of residual serial correlation and of the time dimension on statistical inference for a unit root in dynamic longitudinal data, known as panel data in econometrics. To this end, we introduce two test statistics based on method of moments estimators. The first is based on the generalized method of moments estimators, while the second is based on the instrumental variables estimator. Analytical results for the Instrumental Variables (IV) based test in a simplified setting show that (i) large time dimension panel unit root tests will suffer from serious size distortions in finite samples, even for samples that would normally be considered large in practice, and (ii) negative serial correlation in the error terms of the panel reduces the power of the unit root tests, possibly up to a point where the test becomes biased. However, near the unit root the test is shown to have power against a wide range of alternatives. These findings are confirmed in a more general set-up through a series of Monte Carlo experiments.     

Positive externalities from active car safety systems: A new justification for car safety regulations

Policymakers around the globe have opted for high levels of regulation of the market for vehicle safety and declared many vehicle safety systems as mandatory for new cars. In this paper we argue that the delivered justifications for these policies are at least questionable. We add a completely new argument to the discussion and show in a simple theoretical model that vehicle safety systems might cause positive externalities. Based on a large dataset of traffic accidents in Germany we show that the these externalities in fact occur. Based on our estimation results we show that for anti-lock-brakes (ABS) and electronic stability programmes (ESP) the average expected externality exceeds the price of these systems. Thus, the obligation to equip any new car with both ABS and ESP is adequate from an allocative point of view although the official justification for the introduction of these regulations are flawed.     

PUBLIC EDUCATION AND PENSIONS IN DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY

A dynamic political economy theory of fiscal policy is presented to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies. The driving force of the model is the intergenerational conflict over the allocation of the public budget. Successive generations of voters choose fiscal policies through repeated elections. The political power of elderly voters creates the motive for adults to support public investment in the human capital of future generations since it expands future pension possibilities. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the voting game in a small open economy. The equilibrium reproduces salient features of intergenerational fiscal policies in modern economies.